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Freedom Fighters, Freedom Haters, Martyrs, and Evildoers:
The Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism
Cécile Valérie Van de Voorde
ABSTRACT
Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically
war-trained individuals to die while destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets
in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Rooted in the historical, social, and
psychological dimensions of international terrorism, suicide terrorism is neither a unique
nor a new phenomenon. Its recent resurgence and the extensive media coverage it has
received account for the misleading uniqueness of this violent, complex, and adaptive
form of terrorism. This qualitative study examines the definitional and rhetorical
processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed. Using a social
constructionist theoretical framework coupled with a symbolic interactionist approach,
this multi-case study effectively moves the analysis of suicide bombings beyond
essentialist debates on asymmetrical warfare or terrorism and into a more nuanced
appreciation of cultural meaning and human interaction. Hence this case study
emphasizes how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a
biased representation of events and their alleged causes that is conditioned by deliberate
attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote
certain political interests. The primary research question is: How are socio-political
processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social
vii

construction of suicide terrorism? Secondary research questions focus on determining
how suicide terrorism is (a) a political weapon, (b) a communication tool, and (c) a
politicized issue that fits into a moral panic framework. Methods used to conduct the
analysis include in-depth interviews (phenomenological and elite interviewing) and
document analysis (general document review and historical review). Findings highlight
the interactions between suicide bombers (as contemporary folk devils), the news and
entertainment media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, lawmakers, law
enforcement, and action groups), and their respective roles in the social construction of
suicide terrorism. The limitations of the study, its significant theoretical and practical
implications, as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and
psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying or attempting to
annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Suicide
terrorism is rooted in the historical, social, and psychological dimensions of international
terrorism, as a result of centuries of opposition between various groups and their actual or
perceived enemies. As such, it is neither a unique nor a new phenomenon. Rather, it is an
integral feature of the historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide and the
product of an assortment of tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more
conventional terrorism.
Over the past three years, more suicide terror attacks have been recorded
worldwide than in the last twenty-five years. This resurgence of suicide terrorism in
several countries and the extensive media coverage it has received account for the
seeming, misleading uniqueness of the phenomenon. Until recently, it was witnessed in
less than a dozen countries, primarily Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel. It has now spread
across the world and even reached U.S. soil. Today, about twenty religious or secular
terrorist groups have resorted to or are capable of using suicide terrorism against their
own governments and foreign governments alike. Such an unprecedented propagation of
suicide terror attacks against Western interests at the dawn of the twenty-first century has
1

made governments and the public glaringly aware of how vulnerable they are to this
extremely violent, adaptive form of terrorism, and how imperative it is to devise effective
and efficient measures to combat and prevent suicide terrorism.
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, its etiology, outcomes, and
implications are still misconstrued today by policymakers and scholars alike. There has
been an outpouring of literature on terrorism since September 2001 and, in particular,
articles and book chapters about suicide terrorism have multiplied in a variety of
academic journals and more mainstream books. The majority of these pieces focus on the
contemporary development of suicide bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the
legitimization of such a violent practice as a tool of war. They also typically focus on
Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide terrorism, despite the fact that nonMuslim religious groups and even secular groups have resorted to suicide terrorism, and
highlight the psychological or psychopathological features of typical suicide bombers.
This distinctive study shall advance our understanding of the complex and
adaptive phenomenon that is suicide terrorism. The latter, much like terrorism in general,
is a socio-political concept that is understood differently from one society to another and
from one historical or political era to the next. As such, suicide terrorism is essentially the
product of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and
mass media organizations. The popular imagery and stereotypes manufactured by these
processes, and perpetuated by government officials as well as many academics, do not
provide us with an accurate representation of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Even
the mere definition of suicide terrorism requires a very subjective, complex approach that
is laden with political undertones and contradictions.
2

Suicide terrorism is not only a complex, adaptive phenomenon and a longstanding tool of asymmetric warfare, but also a concept that varies depending on the
socio-political context involved. Certain events (objective actions) will be labeled as
suicide terrorism in a specific context or segment of society, whereas similar events
would not be construed as such in a different context or another segment of society.
Hence, the interpretation (subjective meaning) of the concept suicide terrorism calls for
further study in order to fully understand the mechanisms and dynamics involved and,
ultimately, the growing threat it poses worldwide.
The interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is subjective and contingent
upon rhetorical mechanisms by which diverse interest groups and bureaucratic agencies
impose their particular opinion on suicide terrorism as the set of beliefs that must be
recognized as right (i.e., the new and only acceptable norm). This study proposes to
examine the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is
socially constructed.
Using a constructionist and interactionist approach, the purpose of this multi-case
study is to demonstrate that suicide terrorism is essentially a socially constructed
problem, and how collective definitions, interpretations, and understandings of suicide
bombings depend upon the interaction of the media, the public, and agents of social
control (politicians, law enforcement, lawmakers, and interest groups). Such an approach
shall effectively move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond essentialist debates and
into more nuanced understandings of cultural and ideological meaning, socio-political
context, and human action. Hence, this study is designed to determine how the
interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation
3

of events (and their alleged causes) in official and media accounts that is conditioned by
deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and
promote certain political interests. Thus, the main research question on which this study
focuses is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media
structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of three
research questions can be derived from this. (a) How is suicide terrorism a political
weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide
terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?
This chapter has presented the introduction, statement of the problem,
significance of the present multi-case study, and research questions. Chapter 2 presents a
conceptual framework, or theoretical perspective, with a review of the extant literature on
suicide terrorism, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism, as pertains to the
issue under investigation. The methodology and procedures for data collection are
described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study. Finally, Chapter 5
comprises a summary of the multi-case study, a comprehensive discussion of the
theoretical and practical outcomes of the analysis, as well as an examination of the
limitations of the latter and suggestions for future research.

4

Chapter Two
Literature Review
The extant literature on terrorism is sizable and diverse. Prior to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil, terrorism was already a topic of interest
across many academic disciplines, mainly political science, sociology, and psychology.
Since September 2001, thousands of articles and books on terrorism have been published
in an attempt to understand the dynamics of this peculiar form of violence. The field,
however, is dominated by historical surveys and literature integrators (less than 5% of
published scholarly pieces rely on interviews, for instance). Most authors rely solely upon
open-source documents, which accounts for the overall lack of meaningful primary data
and substantive new knowledge. Thus “[t]errorism research exists on a diet of fast-food
research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious” (Silke, 2004:68).
Unlike terrorism in general, the particular phenomenon of suicide terrorism
remains largely understudied and fundamentally misconstrued. Impartial efforts (by
scholars, governments or the media) to fully and methodically comprehend suicide
bombings have been minor compared to efforts to prevent or control them. Without a
clear, thorough understanding of suicide bombings within their specific context, any
efforts to combat them with anti-terrorism (operational) or counter-terrorism (preventive)
measures will remain futile. This analysis aims distinctively at determining whether
suicide bombings are a product of specific socio-political processes and ideological
5

constructions, i.e., how they can be interpreted and politicized as terrorism or not based
on a subjective construal of certain events and their alleged causes. Inasmuch as there
have been more suicide terror attacks worldwide over the past four years than in the last
two decades, it appears crucial to provide a sound understanding of the socio-political
and ideological constructions of this significant contemporary phenomenon. The
sociology of terrorism has been mostly neglected in the scholarly literature and the study
of suicide terrorism, as noted below, has typically been limited to the overall use of
suicide bombings as a political weapon without much attention being paid to the sociopolitical dynamics, institutional processes, and complex biases inherent in the
phenomenon, its interpretation, and our understanding of it.
The following examination of the current literature on suicide terrorism, social
constructionism, and symbolic interactionism shall provide an overview of the conceptual
and theoretical foundation of this multi-case study of suicide bombings.
Suicide Terrorism
Defining Terrorism
Although scholars in various disciplines have focused on the phenomenon, and
even though a plethora of articles are available on the topic, there is still no agreed upon,
all-encompassing definition of terrorism (Archick & Gallis, 2003; Caracci, 2002;
Crenshaw, 1992; Hewitt, 2000; Hoffman, 2003; Hudson, 2000; International Policy
Insitute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Jenkins, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur,
2003; Nyatepe-Coo & Zeisler-Vralsted, 2004; Poland, 2004; Simonsen & Spindlove,
2003; van Leeuwen, 2003c; White, 2003; Whittaker, 2001, 2002). The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force against persons or
6

property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives (Poland, 2004; Simonsen &
Spindlove, 2003; White, 2003).
As Schweitzer (2001) points out, “[d]efining a terror attack as a suicide bombing
depends primarily on whether the perpetrator is killed.” If the bomber dies, as intended,
while completing his or her mission, the terror attack will qualify as a suicide bombing. A
contrario, the bombing cannot possibly be a suicide bombing if the perpetrator does not
die in the course of the attack. Hence, a suicide terror attack can be construed as
a violent, politically motivated attack, carried out in a deliberate state of
awareness by a person who blows himself up together with his chosen
target. The pre-meditated certain death of the perpetrator is the precondition for the success of the attack. (Ibid.)
Phenomenology and Etiology
Virtually all the articles and books published on suicide terrorism focus on
phenomenology, etiology, and promising prevention measures. Most articles on the
“genesis of suicide terrorism” (Atran, 2003) underscore not only the processes by which
suicide terrorism has developed from its early manifestations to contemporary times, but
also the general characteristics of the phenomenon as observed around the world today
(Beyler, 2003a; Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; Dale, 1988; Gunaratna, 2000, 2001;
Hoffman, 2003; Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism, 2000; Kondaki, 2001; Pipes, 1986; Schweitzer, 2001; Sprinzak,
2000a, 2000b). In particular, Pape (2003) studied 188 suicide terrorist attacks perpetrated
worldwide between 1980 and 2001. His study evidences that suicide terrorism follows a
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“strategic logic” distinctively intended to obtain considerable territorial concessions by
coercing contemporary liberal democracies.
Psychological explanations of suicide terrorism. Several authors have focused on
the psychological issues inherent in the “making of” a suicide bomber, most notably the
absence of major psychopathological traits or psychiatric features (Atran, 2003, 2004;
Glausiusz, 2003; Mansdorf, 2003; Perina, 2002; Sprinzak, 2000; Van Biema, 2001). In an
attempt to provide an understanding of “what makes suicide bombers tick,” Shuman
(2001) examines Palestinian bombers and highlights their strict religious education with
promises of paradise in reward for martyrdom, the support they receive from their parents
for their convictions, as well as the brainwashing process and the encouragement
received “from a Palestinian society with no other means of fighting back against
oppression and humiliation.”
Socio-economic explanations of suicide terrorism. Yet others highlight the socioeconomic and political processes involved in the development and perpetuation of suicide
terrorism recruitment campaigns and missions. Strenski (2003) emphasizes the “social
logic” of Muslim “human bombers.” Atran (2003, 2004) firmly rebukes the position
adopted by many government officials and political observers who deem contemporary
suicide terrorists (especially in the Middle East) as “crazed cowards bent on senseless
destruction who thrive on poverty and ignorance.” Kushner (2002) focuses on the sociopolitical aspects of suicide terrorism, whereas Griset and Mahan (2003) put the
phenomenon in perspective within a more general study of terrorism. The latter approach
is in fact the preferred one in most terrorism books available today.
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Religious and moral explanations of suicide terrorism. The religious and moral
roots of suicide terrorism are also at the center of several articles, book chapters, and
books. The “moral infrastructure” of suicide bombers is emphasized to offer an
understanding of the phenomenon from a moral judgment perspective (Berko, 2004). The
significance of suicide terrorism as religious violence, religious propaganda tool, and
ultimate jihad is at the center of numerous articles and books published over the past few
years (see, for instance, Ali, 2002; Bond, 2004; International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism, 2001; Israeli, 2003; Laqueur, 2003; Selegut, 2003; Victor, 2003). The
substantial role of religious fundamentalism and martyrdom in Islamic terrorism is
typically favored (see, for instance, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
2001; Israeli, 2002, 2003). The endorsement of suicide terrorism by top Muslim clerics
(Fighel, 2002) garners as much attention from scholars and analysts as does the
interdiction of the trend by senior officials and religious leaders (Paz, 2001; Pope, 2003).
Isolating issues and cases. Some articles or books provide more or less developed
accounts (rather than analyses) of cases involving female suicide bombers (Beyler,
2003b; Eshel, 2001; Victor, 2003). Others concentrate on specific groups using suicide
terrorism or countries affected by it. For instance, Abuza (2002) reports on Al-Qaeda’s
activities and allies in Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on suicide bombings perpetrated
by Jemaah Islamyah and security concerns in the Philippines and Indonesia. Van de
Voorde (2005) examines Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, describing the LTTE’s Black Tiger
suicide unit as the masters of suicide bombing. Palestinian suicide terrorism is the focal
point of many articles and books available today (see, for instance, Kimhi & Even, 2003;
Luft, 2002; Moghadam, 2003; Simon & Stevenson, 2003; Stork, 2002; Telhami, 2002).
9

Moghadam (2003) analyzes suicide bombers of the al-Aqsa Intifada (from September
2000 to June 2002 only) in order to highlight the motivational and organizational
elements involved in the process. Simon and Stevenson (2003) focus specifically on
Hamas, its ideology, operations, and influence on the peace process between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority.
Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism issues. Ways to “outsmart” suicide terrorists
(Sprinzak, 2000b) or “defeat suicide terrorism” (Wolfson, 2003) are sporadically
discussed in the extant literature. In 2001, the International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism (ICT) published a collection of chapters on countering suicide terrorism that
provides both an overview of this worldwide phenomenon, brief case studies of specific
countries or groups, as well as recommendations regarding realistic strategies and
promising measures against suicide terrorism. Moghadam (2003) discusses counterterrorism strategies targeting Palestinian suicide terrorism and suggests that Israel
identify ways of eliminating or at least reducing the incentives that encourage some
Palestinians to volunteer for suicide missions. Simon and Stevenson (2003) suggest ways
for Israel to deal with Hamas and survey the role of the United States in handling the
ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Van de Voorde (2005)
focuses on the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and offers policy
recommendations to assess and effectively address the issue of ethnic separatism and
violence in Sri Lanka.
The sociology of suicide terrorism. What is still missing from the extant literature
is a thorough analysis of “the dynamics through which terrorism becomes a social
phenomenon” (Turk, 2004:271). Sociologists have, however, contributed to the study of
10

terrorism in general by adopting an interpretive approach in order to determine that
terrorism is a social construction (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde
& Mason, 2004). As Turk (2004) stresses, “[c]ontrary to the impression fostered by
official incidence counts and media reports, terrorism is not a given in the real world but
is instead an interpretation of events and their presumed causes” (2004:271). For
instance, it appears that the United States itself
has a long history of violence associated with political, labor, racial,
religious, and other social and cultural conflicts. . . . Assassinations,
bombings, massacres, and other secretive deadly attacks have caused
many thousands of casualties. Yet, few incidents have been defined as
terrorism or the perpetrators as terrorists. Instead, authorities have
typically ignored or downplayed the political significance of such
violence, opting to portray and treat the violence as apolitical criminal acts
by deranged or evil individuals, outlaws or gangsters, or ‘imported’
agitators. . . . In official public usage, terrorism is far more likely to refer
to incidents associated with agents and supporters of presumably foreignbased terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda than with the violence of
home-grown militants. (2004:272)
Suicide Terrorism in Perspective
Main Characteristics
Suicide terrorism is a form of terrorism characterized by the willingness of
physically and psychologically war-trained individuals to die in the course of destroying
or attempting to annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social
objectives. A suicide terror operation is a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated
by self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death through
blowing themselves up along with their chosen target. The ensured death of the
perpetrator is a precondition for the success of his or her mission.
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Suicide operations are differentiated depending on whether they occur on or off
the battlefield. Battlefield operations are those in which suicide bombers belong to the
attacking groups. For instance, during World War II, scores of Japanese pilots known as
Kamikaze (i.e., “the divine wind”) used their planes as missiles to crash into U.S. military
targets. Japan first used suicide attacks during the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.
In the fall of 1944, the Japanese Imperial Army organized massive suicide attacks, known
as “Tokkotai.” In addition to destroying U.S. warships, the primary purpose of the
Tokkotai was to launch a psychological warfare against Americans and discourage them
from engaging in the conflict. The Kamikaze pilots believed that serving and honoring
their Emperor by becoming human bombs would open the gates of heaven for them and
guarantee their eternal happiness. Moreover, besides the promise of paradise and spiritual
integrity, the majority of the Kamikaze were motivated by revenge and a desire to save
their country from the invading, all-conquering Americans. The Kamikaze were therefore
dying for a cause, serving both God and their country. Therefore, even though they target
civilians instead of soldiers, Palestinian suicide bombers have been compared to
Kamikaze terrorists since they typically also believe that they are fighting not only for
their country but also against the enemies of God, that is, Israel and America. Operations
taking place off the battlefield, on the other hand, usually involve single suicide bombers;
however, multiple suicide bombers have also been used, as evidenced in attacks
perpetrated by Hamas or the LTTE. The targets are generally varied: they can be either
stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian,
military, political, economic, or cultural (International Policy Insitute for CounterTerrorism, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
12

Historical Developments
History shows that suicide attacks are indubitably a long-standing modus
operandi for terrorist groups. In ancient times, a couple of legendary sects, the Jewish
Sicarii (Zealots) and the Islamic Hashishiyun (Assassins), were well known for
committing suicide terror attacks (Schweitzer, 2002; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
From the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, various Muslim
communities in Asia also opted for terrorist suicide attacks in their fight against European
colonialism. Suicide operations were carried out against Western hegemonists on the
Malabar Coast of Southwestern India, in Northern Sumatra in Atjeh, as well as in the
Southern Philippines in both Mindanao and Sulu. The terrorists belonged to a minority
subcultural group within the Muslim community; although they were established along
the coast of the Indian Ocean, they terrorized Europeans both in the region and on the
Old Continent. The suicide attacks would take place whenever hopeless militant Muslims
would give up on resisting the Europeans. Their purpose was not only to protect the
honor of the Islamic community, but also to terrify Europeans or local Christians. The
terrorists considered their actions as a private jihad: they were driven by their intense
religious commitment and their aspiration to personal merit. Characteristic of the suicidal
jihads was the heroic literature they spawned (e.g., songs, poems, legal and theological
treatises, epic narratives); it glorified both martyrdom and the rituals performed prior to
carrying out the attacks. Epics specifically celebrated the sacrifice made by the suicide
terrorists and encouraged other Muslims in the community to emulate the martyrs. Since
the suicide attacks typically happened when military opposition to colonialism had been
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unsuccessful, they were suspended once innovative political prospects flourished in the
area (sometimes as late as the 1920s) (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
As Dale (1988) explains in his study of anti-colonial terrorism in Islamic Asia,
although the attacks did not involve bombings, they were “a premodern form of
terrorism, and by studying them it is possible to appreciate why many Muslims regard the
recent terrorist attacks in the Middle East as only a more politicized variant of a type of
anticolonial resistance that long antedates the twentieth century” (1988:39). The
contemporary trend of suicide terrorism in the Middle East is a result of the use and
misuse of Islam as a political tool by Islamist, fundamentalist movements. Political Islam,
even its most vicious and extremist manifestations, appeared early on in Islamic history
owing to radical puritans such as the Kharijites, who would attack Muslims they did not
deem devout or virtuous enough. Modern forms of politicized Islam are derived from the
Wahhabi reforms initiated in Arabia in the late eighteenth century. Today, the extremist
ideology developed by the Wahhabis is still promoted by their spiritual heirs in Saudi
Arabia and the al-Qaeda network (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
Hence, put in the historical perspective of the development of oppositional
terrorism across the world, the contemporary trend of suicide terrorism appears much less
exceptional or unique. Rather, it is an essential factor of the profound, underlying
animosity between terrorist organizations and their governmental foes. Suicide terrorism
merely mirrors the development of general terrorist tactics, as well as the ability of
terrorist groups to refine their methods of operation in order to wage the most efficient
and cost-effective psychological warfare of all, which also coincides with the
advancement of technology and the evolution of the socio-economic forces inherent in
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today’s society (International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002; Van de
Voorde & Mason, 2004).
As emphasized by Boaz Ganor (2002a), the executive director of the International
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, at the 2000 International Conference on
Countering Suicide Terrorism,
Suicide terrorism constitutes a significant escalation in terrorist
activity. In his ability to implement the attack at precisely the time and
place where it will cause the maximum number of casualties and greatest
damage, the suicide bomber is virtually guaranteed success. Even the least
deadly of such attacks succeed in striking a devastating blow to public
morale. (2002a:1)
Suicide terrorism is all the more threatening because of the difficulties of combating it,
the large number of casualties it creates, and the religious and ideological zeal it inspires.
It is a phenomenon that often, though not always, goes hand in hand with religious
extremism – distorting religion in the service of political aims.
Contemporary Trends and Issues
Terrorism today is very different from ancient methods of warfare; likewise,
contemporary suicide terrorism has departed from the ancient strategies that spawned it.
The primary purpose of suicide terrorism is to cause maximum physical damage and
subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming fear and angst. This
guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of the impromptu operations not
only on the direct attack victims, but also on entire populations. The high number of
casualties in suicide attacks further warrants worldwide media coverage, which
guarantees the exposure of suicide terrorist organizations on the international scene.
Suicide terrorism has consequently become one of the most spectacular and dreadful
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weapons available to terrorists, along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using
weapons of mass destruction (Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
The currently observed manifestations of suicide terrorism have typically
involved terrorists carrying explosive charges concealed on their bodies or transported by
various vehicles (generally cars, trucks, boats, or even bicycles and animals). Attacks
usually involved one or two bombers. Terrorist bombings target enclosed spaces (e.g.,
buses, trains), semi-confined spaces (e.g., restaurants, cafés, hotels), and open spaces
(e.g., open marketplace, bus stop, pedestrian areas) (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky,
Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004). As Almogy et al. (2005) emphasize, “[t]he combination of
military-grade explosive material, high-mass shrapnel, and precise control of the timing
of detonation has transformed suicide bombing attacks into an ultimate tool in the hands
of terrorists” (2005:390). The lethal effect of the bombs is often amplified by using
explosives packed with metallic pellets, nails and bolts, or bombers who are carriers of
viruses such as HIV or Hepatitis B and C (Almogy et al., 2005; Kluger et al., 2005;
Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001).
The mass casualty situation that can ensue from a terrorist bombing is a concern
to the emergency management community. “Suicide bombing attacks seriously challenge
the most experienced medical facilities” (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, &
Rivkind, 2004:295) and require even large-volume trauma centers to update and modify
their protocol regarding casualty management, triage, and treatment. Furthermore, the
likelihood of severe injury and multiple contamination resulting from blast exposure
presents new challenges to the civilian medical corps in advanced and developing
countries alike (Almogy, Belzberg, Mintz, Pikarsky, Zamir, & Rivkind, 2004; Mrena,
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Paakkonen, Back, Pirvola, & Ylikoski, 2004; Siegel-Itzkovich, 2001; Zafar, Rehmani,
Chawla, Umer, & Mohsin-e-Azam, 2005).
Using passenger airliners to organize airborne suicide attacks, on the other hand,
is a relatively innovative and highly effective method. As explained by Rohan Gunaratna
(2001) after the September 2001 attacks on U.S. soil, “[t]he use of passenger airliners in a
suicide role demonstrates an escalation in the threat aimed at causing mass casualties. As
the threshold has been crossed, it is very likely that several other terrorist groups will
attempt similar operations in the immediate or foreseeable future” (2001:8).
The concept of hijacking and employing passenger airliners in a suicide mission
can be traced back to the Middle East. The idea first developed in the mid-1980s as
Middle Eastern terrorist groups attempted to develop an air capability, primarily to gain
access from Lebanon into Israel, and therefore acquired light air vehicles and trained
soon-to-be-kamikaze pilots with much sophistication throughout the 1990s. Until the fall
of 2001, although “the Western security intelligence community has been aware of
terrorist consideration of the airborne suicide option for nearly three decades” (Ibid.),
there had been little to no assessment of what should be done in order to safeguard the
individuals and infrastructures that could be targeted by airborne suicide activities. Prior
to the September 2001 unprecedented attacks on symbolic landmarks on U.S. soil, there
are only two examples of terrorist groups trying to use passenger airliners in order to
carry out a suicide attack. First, in 1986, Hizballah followers hijacked a TWA
commercial jetliner and were determined to crash it into buildings in downtown Tel Aviv.
The second attempt dates back to December 24, 1994, when the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers in an effort to raise international concern
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over the Algerian struggle and punish France for supporting the Algerian government.
The aircraft, which had over 225 passengers and crew on board, left for France after
several women and children were released and three men killed. The GIA cell, led by 25year-old Abdul Abdallah Yahia (a.k.a. Abou), intended to crash the fully fueled plane
into the Eiffel Tower in Paris or, if their effort failed, to blow the plane up in mid-air over
the French capital. Seemingly however, because of the strong likelihood of significant
governmental retaliation, Islamic terrorist groups (whether Asian or Middle Eastern) have
overall been reluctant to carry out mass-casualty attacks (Jacinto, 2002).
The Global War on Terror: War of Ideas and War of Words
Ideological warfare and the terrorist label. Terrorism is fundamentally a socially
constructed problem (Ben-Yehuda, 1993; Turk, 2002a, 2004; Van de Voorde & Mason,
2004). Hence the subjective interpretations involved in the construction process “are not
unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to
promote certain interests at the expense of others. When people and events come to be
regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other
entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative
designations such as ‘martyr’ and ‘liberation struggle’” (Turk, 2004:271-272). Indeed,
“parties in conflict are trying to stigmatize one another. The construction and selective
application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political
conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer is a dimension of the
struggle to win support for one’s own cause” (2004:273). “Terrorism” thus becomes a
convenient label that is used in a “pervasive and indiscriminate” manner (Bassiouni,
1981:2) to vilify one’s enemy. As Davidson (1986) explains,
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Labeling one’s opponent a terrorist is one way to barbarize both his image
and his cause. Many world leaders see terrorism as monolithic: that is,
they trace all important terrorist actions – either directly or indirectly – to
the same source. In the U.S. they are branded as degenerative acts of
immoral enemies. . . . The terror of one’s foes is real terror, premeditated
and pathological, while that of one’s friends is only a temporary
aberration, a mistake, to be addressed, if at all, by quiet diplomacy. . . .
One of the consequences of the bipolar struggle in which states like Israel
and the U.S. believe themselves to be involved is that the space for
objectivity becomes considerably narrowed . . . [and] it is hard to seek the
causes of the individual acts of terrorism dispassionately. (1986:109)
The FTO solution: Denomination or demonization? Terrorism is a dynamic and
complex phenomenon. It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how many terrorist
groups or organizations exist today. In the United States, the Office of Counterterrorism
of the Department of State is responsible for identifying Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs), the groups and organizations designated by the Secretary of State in accordance
with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. Being
labeled as a terrorist group has legal, political, and fiscal consequences. FTO designations
play a critical role in the fight against terrorism and can be an effective means of
curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism
business. The 42 current FTOs (as of October 2005) are listed in Appendix A.
On the other hand, “pronouncements by the U.S. State Department . . . reflect
assessments not only of objective threat but also of the political, economic, and military
implications of naming particular entities as terrorist” (Turk, 2004:272). Ultimately, the
process of labeling people or entities as terrorists results in the demonization of that
group, organization, individual, or sponsor based on criteria unilaterally determined and
selectively applied by the U.S. administration. Categorizing terrorists as “evildoers” or
“evil cowards” has indeed been the approach of choice in the past few years, especially in
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reference to members and supporters of the Al-Qaeda network (Atran, 2004; Van de
Voorde & Mason, 2004). President Bush has, in effect, repeatedly declared that it is the
responsibility of the United States “to rid the world of Evil” (Van de Voorde & Mason,
2004). He also named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the three major components of the
“Axis of Evil” that ought to be fought relentlessly in the war on terror, much like
President Reagan had targeted the U.S.S.R. as the “Empire of Evil” two decades earlier.
Such reductionist and moralistic rhetoric unfortunately contributes nothing
positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism or international terrorism.
Publicly pitting the moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, versus the
amoral world of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a rhetorical style that actually feeds
into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God
(Dar al-Islam, or House of Submission) against the House of War (Dar al-Harb). This
“simple dualism of violence . . . is . . . reminiscent of Edward Said’s notion of
Orientalism . . . a discourse about the East which carries with it notions of the chaotic, the
violent, the disorderly, the treacherous, and the irrational . . . [to create] an Other in a
binary mode which, by contrast, serves to define the West, the Occident” (Young,
2004:1). This dualism of violence is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Binary of Violence – The West vs. the Other
The West
Us
Good
Moral
Rational
Justified
Focused
Response
Defensive
Generating Security
Modernity

The Other
Them
Evil
Immoral / Amoral
Irrational
Hysterical
Wanton
Provocation
Offensive
Inspiring Terror
Anti-Modernity
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Although the tendency to adopt double standards is recurrent in foreign policy and
the somewhat naive good vs. evil worldview is prevalent in American culture and
politics, demonizing one’s foes is neither constructive nor commendable. The success of
suicide terrorist campaigns depends on the ability of the bombers to dehumanize their
enemy (Sprinzak, 1998; Van de Voorde & Mason, 2004). Applying the same kind of
rhetoric and reasoning to suicide terrorism policy-making and prevention is rather
senseless. Instead of imposing the American style of democracy onto others as the one
and only sustainable mode of civilization across the globe, the United States and its allies
must work towards bettering their understanding of the socio-cultural and religious
values of the countries where suicide terrorism sponsors and supporters are found (Van
de Voorde & Mason, 2004).
Rationale for a Social Constructionist Approach to the Study of Suicide Terrorism
Contrary to popular belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated
in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient
times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have.
Rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a longstanding, highly adaptable and extremely violent tool of “propaganda by deed” that is
constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events.
Terrorist suicide attacks are characterized by the use of rather primitive means
which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the recruitment, formation, and training
of the bombers or attack teams), result in considerable psychological and physical harm.
Terrorist suicide attacks happen without warning and are virtually always successful in
wreaking utter chaos upon entire populations. They are prime weapons of psychological
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warfare and, as such, constitute one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists
today.
Studies typically focus on the “who, when, and where” instead of the “why and
how” of suicide bombing attacks. The scholarly literature on suicide bombings therefore
fails to provide a thorough, objective analysis and a critical understanding of dynamics
and patterns. It merely offers an erroneous interpretation of suicide terrorism as a
homogenous phenomenon, thus ignoring that it is a fundamentally adaptive, resilient,
complex phenomenon involving a wide array of actors and a variety of activities. The
literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it
generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide
terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter.
In order to thwart and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence
community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism
efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. To prevent suicide
terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend the complex combination of factors that exhort
people to join a terrorist group and unite them behind common ideologies and grievances.
It is furthermore important to bear in mind that the sustainability and growing popularity
of suicide terrorism are partially affected by the foreign policies of the Western nations
leading the “global war on terrorism,” as well as their overall social, political, economic,
and cultural agendas.
Social constructionism “is a well-developed model for studying the contested
claims that are made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and
politicians – in the construction of new social problem categories” (Cohen, 2002:xxii). It
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has been used to study the moral signification of a variety of cases, from “drunken
driving, hate crime, stalking, environmental problems” (2002:xxiii) or psychiatric
disorders to, more recently, terrorism (Jenkins, 2003; Turk, 2004).
Applying a social constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in
particular can help understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk
devils, as well as the moral campaign and panic that ensued. Social constructionism
further makes it possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of
social control policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their
polarization against the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented
by the entities involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in
publicizing attacks, triggering a “contagion effect,” and encouraging the ideological and
commercial exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social
constructionist investigation.
There can be no immediate or long-term solution to suicide terrorism if the
significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is persistently overlooked.
Likewise, it is unsuitable to keep ignoring the dynamics of the moral signification of the
phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large. A social constructionist
approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance can help determine how the
interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation
of events (and their alleged causes) that is conditioned by deliberate attempts to
stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain
political interests. It shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral
sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes,
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bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of
suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media
contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as
its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of
group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and
counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.
It is of utmost importance that we fully comprehend how all these social entities
have interacted to exploit suicide terrorism as a pressing social problem, to dramatize it
by magnifying its symbolic nature and ramifications, and to further polarize ideologically
opposed entities. In effect, they have mobilized extremists and helped them structure
more cohesive networks. Once this intricate process of moral signification, exploitation,
amplification, and polarization is explained, we may address the incongruity of arbitrary
social policy and indiscriminate social action to assess why moral campaigns, panics and
crusades have not worked to prevent suicide terrorism. Hence, such a progressive
approach shall shed light on ways to develop the efficient and effective prevention
strategies that have yet to be soundly devised.
Social Constructionism
The phrase “social construction” has become a recurrent catchphrase in scholarly
books and articles since Berger and Luckmann introduced it in the sociological literature
in The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Social constructionism is a postmodernist
school of thought that focuses on the processes involved in constructing, or creating,
social phenomena and social reality. Social constructionism focuses on how social rules
are shaped, altered, institutionalized, and passed on traditionally from generation to
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generation (Adler & Adler, 2003; Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hacking,
1999).
Defining Social Problems and Social Reality
Social constructionists are interested more in institutional- or structural-level
analyses of social problems than in etiological approaches. They claim that specific
issues, or putative conditions, become social problems as a result of their collective
definitions (Blumer, 1969; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Loseke & Best, 2003; Searle,
1995). Indeed, “objective conditions become social problems only when they are defined
as or felt to be problematic – disturbing in some way, undesirable, in need of solution or
remedy” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:88). According to Kitsuse and Spector (1995),
social problems are a “process by which members of groups or societies define a putative
condition as a problem” (1995:296). More specifically, they can be defined as “the
activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with
respect to some putative conditions” (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977:75).
The emergence of a social problem, then, is contingent on the organization
of group activities with reference to defining some putative condition as a
problem, and asserting the need for eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise
changing the condition. The central problem for a theory of social
problems, so defined, is to account for the emergence and maintenance of
claim-making and responding activities. (Kitsuse & Spector, 1995:296)
Hence, “social problems do not exist ‘objectively’ . . . they are constructed by the
human mind, called into being or constituted by the definitional process” (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994:88). “All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in
scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations,
formulations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization”
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(Schutz, as cited in Prus, 1996:xvii). Social constructs, therefore, shape what could be
called “reality by consensus.” As further explained by Fuller and Myers (1941:320),
“[s]ocial problems are what people think they are, and if conditions are not defined as
social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to these people,
although they may be problems to outsiders.” Social problems therefore exist where a
group of people identify something as wrong, concerned, and attempt to correct it. They
have to not only be considered a problem, but also a “remediable condition” (Goode &
Ben-Yehuda, 1994:89). As Becker (2003) emphasizes, “social groups create deviance by
making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to
particular people and labeling them as outsiders” (2003:70).
Constructionist perspectives on social problems “ask how and why particular
social problems emerge and become the focus of demonstrations and protests, front-page
news stories and television coverage, and new social politics” (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix).
In addition, social constructionists “examine how public consciousness of social
problems can change the world around us as well as our understanding of this world”
(Ibid.). Ultimately, “it is the social construction or subjective interpretation of conditions
that defines a social problem, not the nature of the condition itself” (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994:91). Social construction indeed describes subjective, rather than objective,
reality. Subjectivity is the antithesis of the epistemic virtue of objectivity; it implies
judging something based on one’s personal opinion, values or intuitions, not objective
examination, analysis, and beliefs. As a philosophical principle, subjectivism holds
subjective experiences paramount: it implies that the very existence of any object or
condition depends only on people’s subjective awareness of it.
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Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality is
constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their
subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Social constructionists essentially seek “to
understand exactly how, and by whom, social problems are ‘discovered’” (Ibid.). They
focus on the significance of “interests, resources, and legitimacy” (1994:92) involved in
the process of creating or “discovering” social problems.
Members or representatives of organizations or groups that stand to profit
from the discovery of a problem are likely to be motivated to do so;
organizations or groups that can command resources – many members,
access to the media or to influential political figures, financial resources,
and so on – are likely to be more successful in defining a condition as a
social problem; and spokespersons who are considered credible, reliable,
and respectable, likewise, are more likely to be taken seriously as the
definers of a new problem. (Ibid.)
Strict vs. Contextual Constructionism
Social constructionism is either strict (hard) or moderate (soft or contextual).
Moderate constructionists take into consideration the “objective seriousness” (Goode &
Ben-Yehuda, 1994:94) of conditions that may or may not be re-defined as social
problems. Social reality is constructed by conditions and problems that are both
epistemologically objective and ontologically subjective (Searle, 1995). According to
Pinker (2002), an adherent of moderate or contextual constructionism, “some categories
really are social constructions: they exist only because people tacitly agree to act as if
they exist” (Pinker, 2002:202). On the other hand, according to strict constructionists, “it
is impossible to determine the relationship between objective damage and subjective
concern because there is no such thing as objectivity in the first place” (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994:94). Strict constructionists dismiss the efforts of contextual
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constructionists “to privilege a scientific version of reality over a popular or public one . .
. [as] a fallacy, a bias, an inappropriate mixing of levels of analysis, a case of ‘ontological
gerrymandering’ . . . [and] an improper enterprise” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:95-96).
Following a contextual constructionist approach, it appears that “definitions of
and concern about conditions are far more sociologically relevant, while the objective
threat that conditions present stems from a wide variety of sources” (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994:96). This implies that “the objective seriousness of a given condition” is
not what solely “determines the public’s reaction to it” (Ibid.).
Social movement activity, legislation, a prominent ranking on the public’s
list of society’s most serious problems, and media attention, are all
generated by a variety of factors. . . . Public concern and action about a
certain issue rise and fall in part for political, ideological, and moral
reasons. There is, in other words, a ‘politics of social problems.’ . . . [T]he
public may be stirred up as a result of the efforts of a ‘moral entrepreneur’
or moral crusader – an individual who feels that ‘something ought to be
done’ about a supposed wrongdoing, and takes steps to make sure that
certain rules are enforced. (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:97)
Social Problems and Audiences
The sociological “focus on deviance as subjectively problematic implies the
importance of an audience, that is, those individuals who directly or indirectly witness,
hear about, and evaluate the behavior or the individuals in question” (Goode & BenYehuda, 1994:71). In order to determine if a certain type of behavior is deviant or can be
labeled a social problem, one must determine who constructs the behavior as deviant or
problematic, what audience’s reaction matters, and whose assessment of the behavior is
of importance. Essentially, the construction of social problems and deviance “is
completely meaningless without reference to a specific, relevant audience” (Ibid.).
Hence, a behavior that may be interpreted as immoral or evil by an audience may not be
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viewed as such by another audience. Audiences therefore play a crucial role in the
construction of meanings and, ultimately, social problems.
Public Images of Social Problems
Rhetoric and random violence. Best’s (1999) interdisciplinary approach to the
study of social problems posits that some new crime problems emerge and rapidly wither
out of the public’s attention, whereas others will proliferate and turn into long-term social
problems. Best highlights the processes through which these crimes are purposely
described as new, random, and epidemic in nature, even though they truly are not, in
order to both sustain private fears and influence public policies. Best not only focuses on
the cultural framework of “random violence” as pertains to contemporary crime trends,
but also exposes the erroneous claim that violence is ever more increasing. He thus
analyzes how it is now conventional to “declare a war” on social problems and
institutionalize crime problems with the help of the mass media, activists, officials, and
crime or policy experts. The description and interpretation of social problems are
characterized by a type of rhetoric, or language, chosen specifically to shape policies and
control outcomes, which in turn promotes widespread social distrust and may lead to
moral panics.
Mass media, symbolic violence, and representations of crime. As Barak (1994)
points out, “[m]ass news representations in the ‘information age’ have become the most
significant communication by which the average person comes to know the world outside
his or her immediate experience” (1994:3). Our understanding of social concepts is
influenced and determined by our moral assessments of these concepts, that is, how we
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perceive them. These subjective perceptions of crime and justice therefore vary across
human groups or societies. They are, in effect,
influenced by the different ways in which the interplay between criminals,
apprehenders, and victims are socially and ethically perceived by ordinary
citizens, criminal justice policy makers, those responsible for carrying out
legal norms, criminologists, and the press. The mass communication of
these perceptions construct [sic] a cultural awareness of crime, of
victim/offender encounters, and of the administration of justice. (1994:4)
The mass media are inherently “active and subject to changing norms and values”
and “also have a dialectical relationship with their object matter” (1994:13). As a result,
the interaction of the mass media and symbolic deviance is at the core of the “mainstream
set of outlooks, assumptions and beliefs about behavior” (1994:12). It is therefore crucial
to analyze the dialectic nature of the dynamic interface of mass media coverage of crime
news, the social trends the media either follow or create, the political change they may
instigate, as well as the rhetorical processes involved in the categorization or labeling of
certain acts and their presumed causes.
Social Problems and Moral Panics
Overview of moral panics. Moral panic “is characterized by the feeling, held by a
substantial number of the members of a given society, that evildoers pose a threat to the
society and to the moral order as a consequence of their behavior and, therefore,
‘something should be done’ about them and their behavior” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda,
1994:31). Five criteria define the concept of moral panic: concern, hostility, consensus,
disproportionality, and volatility.
The first indicator implies the need for “a heightened level of concern over the
behavior of a certain group and the consequences that that behavior presumably causes
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for the rest of society” (1994:33). Such concern should be genuine and measurable
(media attention, social movement organizations, new legislation, etc.). This is different
from the concept of fear, which is an expectable but not required element of the response
to a tangible threat.
In addition, moral panic is characterized by “an increased level of hostility toward
the group or category regarded as engaging in the behavior in question. Members of this
category are collectively designated as the enemy, or an enemy, of respectable society;
their behavior is seen as harmful or threatening to the values, the interests, possibly the
very existence, of the society” (Ibid.). This entails identifying a group or segment of
society as “responsible for the threat” (1994:34). As a result, “a division is made between
‘us’ – good, decent, respectable folk – and ‘them’ – deviants, bad guys, outsiders,
criminals, the underworld. . . . This dichotomization includes stereotyping: generating
‘folk devils’ or villains and folk heroes in this morality play of evil versus good” (Ibid.).
There must also be “substantial or widespread agreement or consensus . . . that
the threat is real, serious, and caused by the wrongdoing group members and their
behavior” (Ibid.). People of course react differently to threats. Thus, moral panic can be
observed throughout society, but it can also be limited to sub-cultures, as well as local or
regional levels.
The fourth criterion is more implicit and focuses on the “sense on the part of
many members of the society that a more sizable number of individuals are engaged in
the behavior in question than actually are, and the threat, danger, or damage said to be
caused by the behavior is far more substantial than, is incommensurate with and in fact is
‘above and beyond that which a realistic appraisal could sustain’” (1994:36). In other
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words, moral panic involves excessive public concern compared to the objective harm or
threat. Clearly establishing the objective dimension at stake is difficult, if not impossible,
but taking it into consideration helps understand the existence of various levels or degrees
of disproportionality.
Finally, moral panics are inherently volatile. Indeed, “they erupt fairly suddenly . .
. and, nearly as suddenly, subside. Some moral panics may become routinized or
institutionalized, that is, the moral concern about the target behavior results in, or remains
in place in the form of, social movement organizations, legislation, enforcement
practices, informal interpersonal norms or practices for punishing transgressors, after it
has run its course” (1994:38-39). Still, it is also important not to neglect the “structural or
historical antecedents” (1994:39) that moral panics may have.
In sum,
the concept, moral panic, does not define a concern over a given issue or
putative threat about which a given cynical observer is unsympathetic, or
feels is morally or ideologically inappropriate. . . . The moral panic is a
phenomenon – given its broad and sprawling nature – that can be located
and measured in a fairly unbiased fashion. It does not matter whether we
sympathize with the concern or not. What is important is that the concern
locates a ‘folk devil,’ is shared, is out of synch with the measurable
seriousness of the condition that generates it, and varies in intensity over
time. . . . [I]f that concern is focused exclusively on moral or symbolic
issues as ends in themselves, it cannot be regarded as a moral panic.
(1994:41)
Deviance and morality. The concept of deviance entails behaviors that are in
violation of standards of conduct within a group or society, or behaviors that are
interpreted as violating such standards. Deviance is determined by societal reaction. It is
inherently relative to cultural norms and its definition varies depending on the social
context and processes at stake, as well as the actors and audiences involved. Morality, on
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the other hand, is a system of ethical principles and codes of conduct that distinguishes
right from wrong and may be either relative or absolute.
The absolute or objectively given approach is the traditional, conventional
perspective; it assumes that we all know – or should know – what good
and bad, right and wrong, virtue and evil, are. The quality of evil or
immorality resides in the very nature of an act itself; it is inherent,
intrinsic, or immanent within certain forms of behavior. If an act is wrong,
it is wrong now and for ever; it is evil in the abstract. . . . Behavior is
wrong if it violates an absolute, eternal, final law. It need not be seen or
judged by external human observers to be regarded as wrong; its
immorality is a simple, objective fact, even if it takes place in a society or
group that condones it. . . . Moreover, the objectively given approach
assumes that “evil causes evil,” or “the doctrine of evil consequences,”
that is, that consequences universally agreed to be negative and harmful
inevitably flow from immoral practices. . . .
[Conversely, considering] morality as relative or subjectively
problematic . . . attempts to understand how and why behavior is regarded
as evil or deviant. The focus is on the definition or understanding that
members of a society hold with respect to the acts designated as
undesirable. The existence of the evil in the indwelling, objectively given,
or immanent sense is not so much negated as put aside for a focus on how
morality is defined and acted out. What is regarded as evil in one place or
situation, or at one time, may be acceptable or even rewarded at others. . . .
[D]esignating certain behaviors and individuals as deviant is problematic,
non commonsensical, and it is the members of the society who decide, not
the external observer. . . . What is crucial is how behavior is defined,
judged, and evaluated in a particular context. What counts is these varying
definitions and evaluations; it is they and they alone that determine the
status of an act with respect to morality and immorality. (1994:66-67)
Morality may serve as a universal guide that rational individuals use to control the
behavior of moral agents and hold them accountable should they fail to abide by the
established moral codes. This notion of universal moral consciousness is similar to what
such philosophers as Kant or Mill focused on when analyzing how individual behavior
affects other people. As Gergen (1999) stresses, “[b]eliefs in individual knowledge and
reason are closely related to . . . another cultural talisman: moral principles. In a sense,
most of our actions are congenial with a moral order – standards of what is appropriate or
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acceptable. And it is because we endow individuals with the capacity for knowledge and
conscious reasoning that we hold them responsible for deviations from this order”
(1999:15).
Moral crusades and moral entrepreneurs. “Societies everywhere have at times
been gripped by moral panics” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994:51). When government
officials, authorities, or segments of society redefine certain forms of behavior as major
social problems, they are often influenced by “the intensity of the concern that was
aroused” (1994:19) and focus on deviant behavior they equate with “immoral
wrongdoing” (Ibid.) as the root cause of the problem. This illustrates the notion of moral
crusade, which is different from a moral panic (though the two are not mutually
exclusive). “The moral crusades concept implies that the activists who are working to
bring about change are motivated by moral, and not rational or protectionist, interests”
(1994:20). Examples of moral crusades include the Prohibition movement of the early
twentieth century, the frenzied campaign for anti-marijuana laws of the mid-1930s, or the
more recent Satanism scare (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).
Adler and Adler (2003) stress that “[t]he process of constructing and applying
definitions of deviance can be understood as a moral enterprise. That is, it involves the
constructions of moral meanings and the association of them with specific acts or
conditions” (2003:133). The concept of the moral crusade necessarily entails that of
crusaders or, as they are sometimes referred to, moral entrepreneurs (Adler & Adler,
2003; Becker, 1994; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hawkins & Tiedeman, 1975). These
moral entrepreneurs launch their moral crusades to target new or past “folk devils,”
which inevitably translates into a demonization process and feeds into a dichotomous
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worldview pitting Good against Evil. “Once the public viewpoint has been swayed and a
majority (or a vocal and powerful enough minority) of people have adopted a social
definition, it may remain at the level of a norm or become elevated to the status of law
through a legislative effort. In some cases both situations occur” (Adler & Adler,
2003:135).
The “deviance-making enterprise” (Adler & Adler, 2003:134) is twofold. On the
one hand, it involves the creation of rules (rule-creating), otherwise there would be no
deviant behavior; on the other hand, it entails the enforcement of these rules (ruleenforcing), which requires the application of the rules to certain groups of people. As a
result, there are two types of moral entrepreneurs: the rule creators and the rule enforcers
(Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).
Rule creation and rule enforcement. Rules can be created either by individuals or
by groups. The latter are more commonly involved in rule-creating, inasmuch as groups
of moral entrepreneurs can more easily and efficiently “use their collective energy and
resources to change social definitions and create norms and rules” (Adler & Adler,
2003:134).
These groups of moral entrepreneurs represent interest groups that can be
galvanized and activated into pressure groups. Rule creators ensure that
our society is supplied with a constant stock of deviance and deviants by
defining the behavior of others as immoral. They do this because they
perceive threats in and feel fearful, distrustful, and suspicious of the
behavior of these others. In so doing, they seek to transform private
troubles into public issues and their private morality into the normative
order. (Ibid.)
Moral rules and legal systems can therefore be viewed as the products of a
conscious enterprise to create them and ensure they become institutionalized and
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guarantee the evildoers will be punished accordingly (Adler & Adler, 2003; Goode &
Ben-Yehuda, 1994). As Adler and Adler (2003) explain,
Moral entrepreneurs manufacture public morality through a multi-stage
process. Their first goal is to generate broad awareness of a problem. They
do this through a process of claims-making where they assert "danger
messages" about a given issue. Claims-makers use these messages to
create a sense that certain conditions are problematic and pose a present or
future potential danger to society. . . . Because no rules exist to deal with
the threatening condition, claims-makers construct the impression that
these are necessary. In so doing, they draw on the testimonials of various
“experts” in the field, such as scholars, doctors, eyewitnesses, exparticipants, and others with specific knowledge of the situation. These
testimonials are disseminated to society via the media as “facts.”
(2003:134)
The rhetorical processes involved in the making and dissemination of such “facts”
include using statistics to “show the rise in incidence of a given behavior or its
correlation with another social problem” (Ibid.). Furthermore, “dramatic case examples
can paint a picture of horror in the public’s mind, inspiring fear and loathing” and various
issues can be lumped together to purposely create “a behavioral pattern portrayed as
dangerous” (Ibid.). Rhetoric further “requires that each side seek the (usually competing)
‘moral high ground’ in their assertions and attacks on each other, disavowing special
interests and pursuing only the purest public good” (Ibid.).
Moral entrepreneurs additionally strive to beget a moral conversion by persuading
others of the righteousness of their stance on the given issue or issues. “They have to
convert neutral parties and previous opponents into supporting partisans. Their successful
conversion of others further legitimates their own beliefs. To effect a moral conversion,
rule creators must compete for space in the “public arena,” often a limited resource”
(Ibid.).
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Moral entrepreneurs must draw on elements of drama, novelty, politics,
and deep mythic themes of the culture to gain the visibility they need.
They must also enlist the support of sponsors (opinion leaders who need
not have expert knowledge on any particular subject, but are liked and
respected) to provide them with public endorsements. . . . At times the
efforts of moral entrepreneurs are so successful that they create a “moral
panic.” A threat to society is depicted, and concerned individuals
promoting the problem, reacting legislators, and sensationalist news media
whip the public into a “feeding frenzy.” Moral panics . . . tend to develop
a life of their own, often moving in exaggerated propulsion beyond their
original impetus. (2003:135)
Once the rules are created, they need to be enforced. Rule enforcers typically
follow a subjective, selective pattern when applying moral rules and social norms.
Indeed, they take advantage of the fact that “[v]arious individuals or groups have greater
or lesser power to resist the enforcement of rules against them due to their
socioeconomic, racial, religious, gender, political, or other status” (Ibid.).
Differential social power. Adler and Adler (2003) stress that “[s]pecific
behavioral acts are not the only things that can be constructed as deviant; this definition
can also be applied to a social status or lifestyle. When entire groups of people become
relegated to a deviant status through their social condition (especially if it is ascribed
through birth rather than voluntarily achieved), we see the force of inequality and
differential social power in operation” (2003:136). As evidenced by the social
construction perspective and conflict theory alike, it can be argued that “those who
control the resources in society (politics, social status, gender, wealth, religious beliefs,
mobilization of the masses) have the ability to dominate, both materially and
ideologically, over the subordinate groups” (Ibid.). This implies that rules, laws, or
norms, as well as their application and enforcement, are the result of “political action by
moral entrepreneurial interest groups that are connected to society's power base” (Ibid.).
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One way to do this is to pass and enforce norms and rules that define
others’ behavior as deviant. Thus, the relative deviance of [certain
putative] conditions . . . can be seen to reflect the application of
differential social power in our society. Individuals in these groups may
find themselves discriminated against or blocked from the mainstream of
society by virtue of this basic feature of their existence, unrelated to any
particular situation or act. This application of the deviant label
emphatically illustrates the role of power in the deviance-defining
enterprise, as those positioned closer to the center of society, holding the
greater social, economic, political, and moral resources, can turn the force
of the deviant stigma onto others less fortunately placed. In so doing they
use the definition of deviance to reinforce their own favored position. This
politicization of deviance and the power associated with its use serve to
remind us that deviance is not a category inhabited only by those on the
marginal outskirts of society: the exotics, erotics, and neurotics. Instead,
any group can be pushed into this category by the exercise of another
group’s greater power. (Ibid.)
Critique of Social Constructionism
Detractors of the social constructionist perspective posit that the contributions of
the scientific inquiry are enough to discredit any claim made by the constructionists (or
the postmodernists, for that matter). Many denounce what they call the “social
construction of social constructionism,” while others criticize the paradigm because they
view it as a form of solipsism or an illustration of dogmatic narrow-mindedness (Best,
1995; Gergen, 1999). Yet others contend that “constructionists either make assumptions
about objective conditions or worse, believe they know when objective conditions have
changed or not. If so, they are unable to fulfill the constructionist imperative which
requires information on the beliefs of the people involved in the social problem process
rather than the beliefs of sociologists” (Best, 1995:341). This concern was in fact strong
enough amongst constructionist scholars to prompt the abovementioned rift between
“strict social constructionists, those who only study the claims-making process, and
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contextual constructionists, who take into account what is known about objective
conditions” (Ibid.).
Objectivists further argue that the peculiar approach adopted by constructionists is
intrinsically flawed, inasmuch as their “focus on claims-making ignores a far more
important subject: the harmful social conditions which are the ‘real’ social problems”
(1995:343). Both perspectives are radically different and, indeed, their relative value
depends on exactly what one is trying to understand. To the objectivists’ criticism
corresponds a dual social constructionist rejoinder: “(1) there is nothing wrong with
studying social conditions, but decades of objective research on social conditions have
failed to lay a foundation for general theories of social problems; and (2) it is important to
remember that we only recognize social conditions as ‘really’ harmful because someone
made persuasive claims to that effect” (Ibid.).
Thus, a social constructionist approach to the study and prevention of suicide
terrorism appears to be a more fertile one than what has been favored thus far by
scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike. Indeed, it shall shed light on the
mechanisms involved in the construction of meaning, the misinterpretation of sociocultural factors and fundamental belief systems, and the lack of understanding or
knowledge concerning the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Furthermore, in order to
explicitly focus on the interaction of the social entities involved in the interpretive
process, it appears useful to borrow from a complementary perspective that specifically
examines the social construction of subjective meanings: symbolic interactionism.

39

Symbolic Interactionism
Overview and Underlying Assumptions
Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspective that borrows theoretically
from both cultural studies and humanistic tradition. It focuses on how individuals and
groups interact and, more specifically, how personal identity (the self) is created through
interaction with others. Of particular interest is the relationship between individual action
and group pressures. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that subjective
meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings interrelate with
objective actions (Charon, 2004; Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a,
1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker, 1980).
Precursors of the sociological tradition of symbolic interaction include the
Scottish moralists (common sense school of moral philosophy), especially Adam Smith,
who “propounded the symbolic-interactionist assumptions that society is necessarily
antecedent to the individual, self and mind develop through interaction with others, selfcontrol derives from social control, and people are actors as well as reactors” (Shott,
1976:39). Heralds of the symbolic interaction perspective also include American
Pragmatists, such as George Herbert Mead, William James, and John Dewey. It was fully
developed by sociologists of the Chicago School, mainly Herbert Blumer, Robert E.
Parke, and Everett C. Hughes (Blumer, 1969; Becker & McCall, 1990; Charon, 2004;
Farberman & Perinbanayagam, 1985; Plummer, 1991a, 1991b; Prus, 1996; Stryker,
1980). Blumer (1969) described symbolic interactionism as “a down-to-earth approach to
the scientific study of human group life and human conduct” that “lodges its problems in
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[the] natural world, conducts its studies in it, and derives its interpretations from such
naturalistic studies” (1969:47).
Symbols play a significant role for human actors. Indeed, “[h]umans name,
remember, categorize, perceive, think, deliberate, problem solve, transcend space and
time, transcend themselves, create abstractions, create new ideas, and direct themselves –
all through the symbol” (Charon, 2004:63-64). Symbolic interactionism is founded upon
three fundamental assertions:
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the
meanings that the things have for them. . . . The second premise is that the
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social
interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that these
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process
used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer,
1969:2)
Symbolic interactionism thus considers meaning not as a product of “the intrinsic makeup
of the thing that has meaning,” but “as arising in the process of interaction between
people” (1969:4). The use of meanings by social actors implies a necessary “process of
interpretation” (1969:5) that is determined by self-interaction and the way meanings are
handled by the actors. Interpretation is more than the mere use of previously integrated
meanings. Instead, Blumer argues, interpretation is an active process of formulation,
reconsideration, and revision.
The Interpretive Tradition
Interpretivist social science has developed “concurrently with a critique of
positivist social science” (Prus, 1996:3). Unlike the positivist (structuralist) approach,
which studies human behavior in an objective fashion, the interpretive approach
considers “human group life as actively constituted by people in interaction with others”
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(1996:9). The interpretive tradition is therefore based upon an interactionist and
hermeneutic analysis of human lived experience.
Symbolic interaction and the study of human lived experience. The
interactionist/interpretive perspective assumes, explicitly or not, that human group life is
intersubjective, multi-perspectival, reflective, activity-based, negotiable, relational, and
processual (Prus, 1996). Indeed, “interpretivists observe that the study of human behavior
is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is rooted in people’s
meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions” (1996:9). Intersubjectivity and
reflective interchange thus emerge as the core elements of human essence.
As further explained below, the Chicago School (or Blumerian School) of
symbolic interactionism puts strong emphasis on “the thoroughly intersubjective nature
of community life,” while it “draws attention to the active dimensions (human struggles
and enterprise) of the accomplishment of intersubjectivity” (1996:22).
Hermeneutics and interpretivists. Hermeneutics is the study of the methodological
principles of interpretation. The word initially described the interpretive study of Greek
classics and religious texts. As such, hermeneutics “reflects an awareness that recorded
statements are inevitably subject to interpretation” (Prus, 1996:34). The development of
the interpretive tradition as it relates to social theory came about in the late 1800s with
the works of German theorist Wilhelm Dilthey. Other major German scholars who have
contributed to the growth of the interpretive framework include Georg Simmel, Max
Weber, and Wilhelm Wundt. American Pragmatists, mainly Charles Horton Cooley and
George Herbert Mead, further played a significant part in the emergence of the Chicago

42

School of symbolic interaction and strongly influenced the works of its founder, Herbert
Blumer.
Wilhelm Dilthey, who many regard as “the founder of contemporary interpretive
social science” (1996:35), approached human science from a purely hermeneutical
viewpoint. Indeed, “it was Dilthey who most explicitly extended the hermeneutic or
interpretive insight or Verstehen (interpretive understanding) beyond textual
interpretations to all other instances of human behavior” (Ibid.). He laid strong emphasis
on the intersubjectivity that is inherent in human behavior and interchange. He further
understood human life or group life as “built on a sharedness of understandings” (Ibid.).
According to Dilthey, interpretation “depends pivotally on making sense of the other by
reference to the community context in which the actions of the other are embedded”
(Ibid.).
Georg Simmel considered that society was essentially defined by the interaction
that took place among and between individuals. Simmel, “best known for his pronounced
emphasis on sociology as the study of the forms of human association” (1996:39), viewed
human existence, or group life, as an ensemble of continuous social processes. Human
interaction, thus, occurs through such ongoing processes as “conflict, cooperation,
compromise, mediation, domination and subordination” (Ibid.).
Max Weber is often, though erroneously, credited for inventing the concept of
Verstehen (interpretive understanding) and contributing to the advancement of
ethnography. Weber’s synthetic social theory merely built upon Dilthey’s hermeneutical
contributions on Verstehen, which were in effect more thorough and coherent than
Weber’s. “Within Weber’s contextual analysis . . . verstehen tends to be largely implicit
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and group-oriented, as opposed to denoting an attentiveness to the viewpoints of
particular people and to the ways in which they go about accomplishing their activities on
a ‘here and now’ basis” (1996:42). Weber was further influenced by other German social
scientists like Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, whose works actually
neglected the quintessential intersubjective nature of human interaction. “Weber
generated an intellectual stance in which the hermeneutic thrust was largely dismissed
from a more active consideration in social research” (1996:41). Weber ultimately
attempted to bring together the interpretive and positivist paradigms, but his mostly
empirically-driven efforts remained futile and his outlook on human group life, in the
end, appears more obscure than enlightening. Indeed,
Weber sought to develop “objective,” causal statements about group life
while simultaneously claiming an intellectual primacy in the foundations
of “subjective experience.” At the same time, Weber appears intent on
using modes of historical-cultural-legalistic analysis to formulate more
generic statements on the religious, political, and economic orderings of
human societies. In particular, Weber seemed concerned with stipulating
the historical and material conditions that fostered particular world views
and the ways in which these collectively established beliefs or group
mind-sets might find expression in the forms of association and practices
characterizing particular societies. (Ibid.)
Wilhelm Wundt’s major contribution to the interpretive paradigm came in the
form of Volkerpsychologie, or folk psychology (sometimes also referred to as psychical
anthropology), which provided “a significant source of stimulation for a number of
scholars working in the interpretive and (emergent) ethnographic traditions” (1996:45).
The basic premise of folk psychology is that human behavior is conditioned by culture
and language. Primitive culture is at the core of this approach, rather than western
cultural concepts and ideals. Wundt thus focused his interpretive analyses of social
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thought and interaction on primitive or elementary modes of human group life,
specifically communal spirit and its relation to human interchange
(Gemeinschaftpsychologie).
Pragmatists equally played a key part in the development of the interpretive and
interactionist traditions (Farberman, 1985; Lewis, 1976; Prus, 1996). The works of
Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead were highly
influential in the emergence of the philosophical movement that became known as
American Pragmatism. The movement was started by Peirce and popularized by James
(James and Mead were, incidentally, Wundt’s students). The basic premises of
Pragmatism are that the meaning of concepts lies in their practical bearings, that the
purpose of thought is to direct action, and that truth ought to be evaluated depending on
the practical outcomes of belief. “The pragmatists’ emphases were somewhat diverse, but
they generally opposed to ‘rationalist’ or ‘determinist’ (i.e., positivist) philosophy and
wanted to develop conceptualizations of human behavior that attended to the actualities
and practices of people” (Prus, 1996:46).
George H. Mead’s contribution to the sociology of knowledge, in particular, is
remarkable for it encompasses three fundamental areas of study: philosophy, history, and
social psychology (Farberman, 1985; Fine & Kleinmann, 1968; Fisher & Strauss, 1979a,
1979b; McKinney, 1991; Maines, Sugrue, & Katovich, 1983; Miller, 1973; Ropers,
1973). “Mead’s approach to behavior may be characterized by such generally descriptive
terms as pragmatic, empirical, bio-social behavioristic, naturalistic, voluntaristic,
instrumental, and functional” (McKinney, 1991:112). Mead focused on social acts as “the
unit of existence” (Miller, 1973:294), the source of “all socio-cultural behavior,”
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analyzing “self-awareness, thinking, purposive behavior, and moral discrimination” in
order to evidence “that mind and self are social emergents, and that language constituted
the mechanism for that emergence” (McKinney, 1991:113). Hence, human action was
“the key to the Meadian model of man and to the human construction of meaning and
knowledge” (Franks, 1985:39). Ultimately, Mead’s “extraction of mind, self, thinking,
and meaning from the context of the social act via the delineation of such mechanisms as
role-taking, the generalized other, symbolization, and attitude systems, constitutes an
expansion of the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge” (McKinney,
1991:118).
The Chicago School of interactionism: Blumerian contributions to the interpretive
tradition. Herbert Blumer has been presented by several scholars as “the single most
important social theorist of the twentieth century” (Prus, 1996:75). His critical work on
human lived experience and social interaction drew together the interpretive framework
and the ethnographic tradition. Blumer, a student of George Herbert Mead, unequivocally
and methodically expanded upon the works of Dilthey, Simmel, and the American
Pragmatists (Becker, 1988; Prus, 1996; Shibutani, 1988). He acknowledged early on that
human behavior was intrinsically complex, “reflective, interactive, emergent” (Prus,
1996:68). Relying on Mead’s analysis of social behaviorism and drawing from Dilthey’s
hermeneutical approach, Blumer “explicitly established the vital link of the interpretive
tradition with ethnographic research” and harshly criticized the “core features of
positivist social science” (1996:69). Blumer’s work on human interchange and
intersubjectivity, similarly to Mead’s, also focused on human group life as the product of
“the ongoing production of action” (1996:71) and, as such, further “synthesized and
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developed the theoretical and methodological significance of Mead’s ideas for the social
sciences” (1996:70). Blumer’s pivotal role in the development of social science and
interpretivism is threefold:
First, building on the works of George Herbert Mead, Blumer develops a
clearer, more coherent and sociologically focused statement pertaining to
the implications of the interpretive paradigm for the study of human lived
experience than Dilthey, Cooley, or Mead had been able to generate.
Furthermore, by emphasizing Cooley’s notion of sympathetic
introspection, Blumer helps establish the relevance of the interpretive
approach for the ongoing study of human group life. Second, Blumer
challenges the prevailing positivist (quantitative) traditions that dominate
the social sciences. . . . Blumer forcefully and clearly lays bare the central
weaknesses of mainstream social science. . . . Third, Blumer provides a
conceptual framework which not only theoretically undergirds
ethnographic research . . . in the social sciences, but which also
encourages the development of generic or transsituational social
processes. (1996:74-75)
Critique of Symbolic Interactionism
Scholars within the symbolic interactionist paradigm have voiced their criticism
of the theoretical and practical frameworks involved. Besides its potential for
methodological problems and operationalization issues, symbolic interactionism is
viewed as overemphasizing self-consciousness, having “an obsession with meaning” and
promoting “a metaphysic of meaning” (Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds, 1975:84-85). As a
result, some fear the “danger that a fetish will be made out of everyday life, especially if
the perspective comes to give a totally relativistic account of human interaction”
(1975:85). Moreover, some interactionists deplore the “unwarranted demotion of the
psychological,” which may have “robbed human needs, motives, intentions, and
aspirations of their empirical and analytical reality by treating them as mere derivations
and/or expressions of socially defined categories” (1975:84). Overall, the major “in47

house” criticism is aimed at the apparent inability of symbolic interactionism “to come to
grips with either human emotions or the unconscious” (1975:85).
Scholars outside the realm of symbolic interaction have also criticized the
approach. Positivists have been the most vocal opponents thus far. As explained by Prus
(1996), however, the positivist/structuralist critique of symbolic interactionism as “a
subjective social science or a microlevel sociology” (1996:22) is the result of a
misinformed interpretation of interactionist tenets. In fact,
symbolic interaction is intersubjective to the core and envisions the
development of language or ongoing symbolic interchanges as
fundamental to the human essence (and the human struggle for existence).
People are seen to develop (multiple) worldviews or definitions of reality
as they interact with one another and attempt to incorporate particular
objects of their awareness into their activities. Notions of community, self,
action, reflectivity, symbolic realities, human interchange, and collective
behavior are fundamental to interactionism, as are the processes of
conflict, cooperation, and compromise. Likewise, while interactionism
builds on situated definitions and interchanges, and insists on the pursuit
of research g rounded rigorously in human lived experience and the
ongoing production of action, it is quite able to deal with more molar
matters such as fashion, the media, social problems, industrialization,
economic development, law and policy formation, and other political
processes. (Ibid.)
As for concerns regarding the potential methodological shortcomings of a
theoretical perspective relying heavily (if not exclusively) on a qualitative approach,
some have counter-argued that ethnographic inquiry is as scientific as more quantitative
and, in fact, likely more reliable than positivist methods to accurately and soundly
examine human behavior and the interaction of individuals with their environment.
Indeed,
the methodology (open-ended inquiry, participant-observation, and
observation) of ethnographic research may seem less rigorous or scientific
than some other approaches in the social sciences, especially to those who
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have been encouraged to envision positivist structuralism and
quantification as synonymous with scientific progress. However, this
inference is highly inaccurate. Ethnographic inquiry is a singularly
powerful technique for studying the ways in which human behavior takes
its shape. (Ibid.)
Herbert Blumer (1956) wrote, “We can, and I think must, look upon human life as
chiefly a vast interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide
themselves by defining the objects, events, and situations which they encounter. . . . Any
scheme designed to analyze human group life in its general character has to fit this
process of interpretation” (1956:686). True to the interpretivist theoretical tradition, the
purpose of this inquiry is to apply the symbolic interactionist approach to the study of
suicide terrorism in order to expose it as a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, we
may focus on mechanisms of moral signification, sensitization, and symbolization, and
demonstrate their effects on extremist groups that favor suicide terrorism to fight their
real or perceived enemies. Such mechanisms may in turn emphasize processes of group
solidification and polarization, which are very important to account for and understand if
we want to devise efficient and effective prevention measures addressing the fundamental
socio-cultural aspects of suicide terrorism.
“All reality, as meaningful reality, is socially constructed” (Crotty, 1998:54).
Thus, suicide terrorism is a reality, a real issue indeed – no one shall deny that –, but it
must be regarded essentially as a socially constructed one. This does not mean that
suicide terrorism is a mere figment of the social scientist’s imagination or purely the
byproduct of socio-political rhetoric. It is a genuine social problem, with tangible causes
and dramatic real-life outcomes. Nonetheless, our interpretation of bombings as suicide
terrorism is first and foremost a social construction. As Shadish (1995b) emphasizes,
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social constructionism “refers to constructing knowledge about reality, not constructing
reality itself” (1995b:67). It is therefore our knowledge, as well as the very cognitive
mechanisms which influence our understanding of suicide terrorism that are at the core of
this social constructionist inquiry into the phenomenon and related meaning-making
processes. A theoretical framework allowing for the analysis of “how people in particular
contexts . . . individually and collectively construct meaning and knowledge” (Patton,
2001:78) therefore appears to be a sine qua non.
Summary of Literature and Purpose of Study
A long-standing modus operandi of asymmetric warfare, suicide bombings are an
extremely violent and adaptive form of oppositional terrorism that has been increasingly
witnessed around the world. The contemporary wave of suicide bombings, which started
in the early 1980s in Lebanon and grew stronger mostly in Israel and Sri Lanka over the
following two decades, has now reached Western Europe and the United States. Since the
suicide attacks of September 2001 in the United States, a plethora of articles about
suicide terrorism have appeared in a variety of academic journals and more mainstream
books. The majority of these pieces focus on the contemporary development of suicide
bombings as the ultimate terrorist act and the legitimization of such a violent practice as a
tool of war. They also highlight Islamic fundamentalism as the root cause of suicide
terrorism, despite the fact that non-Muslim religious groups and even secular groups have
resorted to suicide terrorism, and emphasize the psychological or psychopathological
features of typical suicide bombers.
Thus the available literature typically focuses on the “who, when, and where” and
the recent globalization of suicide terrorism, instead of the “why and how” of suicide
50

bombings. As a result, it fails to provide a thorough, methodical analysis and a critical
understanding of the dynamics and patterns involved. It ignores that suicide terrorism is
not a homogenous phenomenon but a fundamentally adaptive, resilient, and complex one.
The literature on suicide terrorism is further characterized by a lack of applied focus: it
generally relies on an arbitrary extension of terrorism research findings to suicide
terrorism without further analysis or inquiry into the distinctive features of the latter.
Finally, much like the terrorism literature in general, scholarly and mainstream articles or
books on suicide terrorism rely almost entirely on secondary data analysis and literature
integration. Without primary data and meticulous case studies, such literature contributes
little to no original information to our understanding of the phenomenon.
The popular imagery and stereotypes created and supported by government
officials and the mass media, as well as many academics, do not provide an accurate
representation of suicide terrorism. This distinctive study shall advance our
comprehension of the phenomenon. The latter, much like terrorism in general, is a sociopolitical concept that is understood differently from one society to another and from one
historical or political era to the next. Suicide terrorism therefore appears to be the product
of the interaction of social and political mechanisms, bureaucratic demands, and mass
media organizations.
“Qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored when the main
research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon, especially when
this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context” (Audet & d’Amboise,
2001). Hence this study focuses on suicide terrorism from a qualitative angle, the most
promising approach to analyzing how individuals construe their experience (i.e., human
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lived experience) and how their understanding in turn affects or determines their way of
life.
From a theoretical standpoint, the present analysis is based on social
constructionism and a complementary symbolic interactionist approach. Social
constructionism “is a well-developed model for studying the contested claims that are
made – by victims, interest groups, social movements, professionals and politicians – in
the construction of new social problem categories” (Cohen, 2002:xxii). Applying a social
constructionist approach to the study of suicide terrorism in particular can help
understand the recent emergence of terrorists as contemporary folk devils, as well as the
moral crusade and moral panic that ensued. Social constructionism further makes it
possible to highlight the negative (and usually unintended) effects of social control
policy, including the increased cohesion of terrorist groups and their polarization against
the rest of society and, specifically, agents of control as represented by the entities
involved in the global war on terror. The role of the mass media in publicizing attacks,
triggering a “contagion effect,” and encouraging the ideological and commercial
exploitation of suicide terrorism is also worthy of a thorough social constructionist
investigation. Socially constructed reality is a continuing, dynamic process; such reality
is constantly perpetuated as a pervasive set of norms by individuals who rely on their
subjective interpretation and knowledge of it. Constructionist perspectives on social
problems “ask how and why particular social problems emerge and become the focus of
demonstrations and protests, front-page news stories and television coverage, and new
social politics” (Loseke & Best, 2003:ix). Social problems are defined by the way certain
acts or conditions situations are socially constructed or subjectively interpreted, not by
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the very nature of these acts or conditions. The construction and application of definitions
of deviance is a moral enterprise that entails the construction of moral meanings and their
connection to certain acts or conditions.
In a noteworthy study entitled Images of Terror: What We Can And Can’t Know
About Terrorism, Philip Jenkins (2003) used a social constructionist approach to provide
a critical analysis of mass media representations of terrorism. Jenkins argues that
academics, journalists, and the general public naively trust the interpretations of terrorism
provided by governments and official agencies. He further claims that our understanding
of terrorism is the product of the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, private experts,
scholars, and the mass media. Thus, he contends, “bureaucratic interests create and
sustain the image presented in the mass media and popular culture” (2003:189) and the
imagery and stereotypes we are exposed to do not reflect social reality. To conduct his
research on mass media images of terrorism, Jenkins used open-source data drawn from
the extant scholarly and mainstream literature on terrorism. He relied on a variety of
documents such as articles, books, official statistics, news media reports, as well as
entertainment media sources (domestic and foreign feature films) to gather the essence of
“terrorism pop culture” and study how socio-political processes are involved in the social
construction of terrorism, terrorist movements, groups, and actions. Although the overall
analysis provides valuable insight into the role of the media and the interaction between
all the social actors involved in the definition and interpretation processes, Jenkins relied
exclusively on available data – sometimes prosaically and, in fact, occasionally
inaccurately – and derived “frequent overgeneralizations” (Ross, 2004) that undermined
the validity of an otherwise inspirational critique of terrorism research and policies.
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This study provides a narrower, more methodical application of Jenkins’
paradigm to the social construction of suicide terrorism. Based on his approach, the main
research question is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and
media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? A subset of
three research questions was derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b)
How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a
politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?
In order to remedy the shortcomings of a study relying solely upon secondary data
analysis, the research project was designed as a multi-case study in order to provide a
comprehensive description and a holistic understanding of suicide terrorism. This multisite study was designed as an instrumental collective case study. It was collective as it
consisted of the analysis of multiple cases (sites or groups) and instrumental inasmuch as
it focused on a specific issue – suicide terrorism – instead of each individual case.
Borrowing from Jenkins’ basic methodology – albeit with a much larger and more
diverse sample –, the present study relies on the use of open-source documents for a
review and content analysis of available data sources regarding suicide terrorism.
However, in an effort to significantly improve on Jenkins’ design, over three dozen
interviews conducted with key informants in various countries that have dealt with
suicide bombings over the last two-and-a-half decades were also used. The goal of
collecting and analyzing primary data was to contribute in-depth and innovative
information to our empirical knowledge of the phenomenon.
Furthermore, to complement Jenkins’ social constructionist stance, an
interactionist/interpretive perspective was chosen insofar as it focuses specifically on how
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individuals and groups interact. The symbolic interactionist perspective posits that
subjective meanings are socially constructed and that these subjective meanings
interrelate with objective actions. Hence meanings arise through interaction between
people and the use of these meanings by social actors implies interpretation, i.e., an active
process of formulation, reconsideration, and revision. The interactionist/interpretive
perspective assumes that human group life is intersubjective and reflective: “the study of
human behavior is the study of human lived experience and that human experience is
rooted in people’s meanings, interpretations, activities, and interactions” (Prus, 1996:9).
Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for
more fruitful approaches to study such a multifaceted social phenomenon as suicide
terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses
political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Suicide terrorism cannot be
combated or prevented if the significance of its historical and socio-cultural dimensions is
persistently overlooked. Likewise, the dynamics of the moral signification of the
phenomenon by agents of control, the media, and society at large cannot be ignored. A
social constructionist approach combined with a symbolic interactionist stance within the
qualitative framework of a multi-site study can help determine how the interpretive
understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation of events
(and their alleged causes) conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological
enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. The
present multi-case study shall do so by (a) focusing the analysis on mechanisms of moral
sensitization and symbolization; (b) evidencing how socio-political processes,
bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures contribute to the social construction of
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suicide terrorism; (c) highlighting how agents of social control and the mass media
contribute to the commercial and ideological exploitation of suicide terrorism, as well as
its dramatization, politicization, and escalation; and (d) improving our understanding of
group solidification and polarization processes so as to improve anti- and
counterterrorism policies regarding suicide bombing campaigns.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Multi-Case Study
“Case study research holds a long, distinguished history across many disciplines”
(Creswell, 1997:62). A case study provides an in-depth description and understanding of
one or more events, settings, groups, or other bounded systems. Audet and d’Amboise
(2001) describe the multi-site or multi-case study as an “adaptive and innovative”
qualitative research approach “designed to gain an in-depth knowledge of an
organizational phenomenon.” This further “combines several approaches to case study
research, borrowing from the positivist tradition, the interpretative approach and the
qualitative research corpus” and “involves the observation and analysis of several sites
using . . . cross-case comparisons and explanation building techniques to analyze data.”
By examining more than one case, researchers have the opportunity not to adulterate their
global approach, but rather to compare cases and discern possible themes or patterns
across cases, which in turn adds depth to the study and helps corroborate or solidify its
findings and implications.
The type of analysis of these data can be a holistic analysis of the entire
case or an embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case. . . . Through
this data collection, a detailed description of the case emerges, as do an
analysis of themes or issues and an interpretation or assertions about the
case by the researcher. . . . This analysis is rich in the context of the case
or setting in which the case presents itself. . . . When multiple cases are
chosen, a typical format is to first provide a detailed description of each
case and themes within the case, called a within-case analysis, followed
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by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a cross-case analysis, as
well as assertions or an interpretation of the meaning of the case. In the
final interpretive phase, the researcher reports . . . the ‘lessons learned’
from the case. (Creswell, 1997:63)
In keeping with such rationale for the use of multi-case studies in qualitative
research, and given the purpose of this research, the study was designed as an
instrumental collective case study. It is collective as it consists of the analysis of multiple
cases (sites or groups). It is instrumental (as opposed to intrinsic) inasmuch as it focuses
“on a specific issue rather than on the case itself . . . [and] the case becomes a vehicle to
better understand the issue” (Stake, 1995).
In case studies, the unit of analysis “is typically a system of action rather than an
individual or group of individuals” (Tellis, 1997). As such, “[c]ase studies tend to be
selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system
being examined” (Ibid.). In this particular study, suicide terrorism is the issue at stake,
not specific suicide terror attacks or groups using suicide bombings. What the analysis
focuses on is the tactic and strategy of suicide bombings, not terrorism as an ideology.
The purpose of such analysis is to shed light on the one-sided interpretations and social
construction of suicide bombings. Socio-political biases and ideological constructions are
in fact the common theme highlighted in all the cases studied, a pattern which emerged
early on during the data collection and analysis phases. In order to bring such theme to
light, a cross-case analysis was necessary, whereby “themes across cases” were
examined “to discern themes that are common to all cases” (Ibid.). Finally, the context of
each case was broadly conceptualized in order for each setting to include wide-ranging
social, political, historical, and psychological issues (see Creswell, 1997).
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The information gathered for the present study may be summarized in a matrix
highlighting the research questions, the sites selection process, the data sources, and the
themes inherent in the analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (Figure 1).
Main Research Question

Secondary Research Questions

Cases Selected

Sources of Evidence

How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic
imperatives, and media structures involved in the
social construction of suicide terrorism?
(a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b)
How is suicide terrorism used as a communication
tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue
that fits into the moral panic framework?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Afghanistan
France
Iraq
Israel
Kashmir
Lebanon
Russia
Sri Lanka
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

•
•

Primary Data: Interviews
Secondary Data: Open-Source Documents

•
•
•

Occurrence / Episodic Threats
Signification / Media Coverage
Galvanization of Public Interest and
Policymakers’ Attention
Claims-Making
Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation,
Demonization (Folk Devils),
Radical/Moralizing Rhetoric
Construction of Collective Insecurity
Moral Panics and Moral Crusades
Social Control Mechanisms / Rule Creation
and Enforcement
Construction of Social Problem (Suicide
Terrorism) and Exacerbation of Issue

•
•
Themes and Concepts
•
•
•
•

Figure 1: Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Case Study Data Matrix
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Overview of Research Design
Herbert Blumer recommended approaches to the study of human behavior and
lived experience that have now “become highly valued and widely used qualitative
methods” (Patton, 2001:112). He viewed “qualitative inquiry as the only real way of
understanding how people perceive, understand, and interpret the world. Only through
close contact and direct interaction with people in open-minded, naturalistic inquiry and
inductive analysis could the symbolic interactionist come to understand the symbolic
world of the people being studied” (Ibid.). Qualitative research focuses on how
individuals construe their experience (i.e., human lived experience) and how their
understanding in turn affects or determines their way of life. As emphasized by Audet
and d’Amboise (2001), “qualitative research approaches have traditionally been favored
when the main research objective is to improve our understanding of a phenomenon,
especially when this phenomenon is complex and deeply embedded in its context. . . .
Qualitative research has now grown into a wide domain, having evolved much beyond its
original scope of qualitative data collection.” Furthermore,
Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative methods can be used to
better understand any phenomenon about which little is yet known. They
can also be used to gain new perspectives on things about which much is
already known, or to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult
to convey quantitatively. Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate in
situations where one needs to first identify the variables that might later be
tested quantitatively, or where the researcher has determined that
quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation.
(Hoepfl, 1997)
This multi-case study of suicide bombings draws upon methods used consistently
in previous examinations of the social construction of crime (secondary data analysis). It
also broadens the field of suicide terrorism analysis by combining document analysis,
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literature integration, and series of interviews within an innovative case study framework.
The main research question at the core of this multi-case study is: How are socio-political
processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social
construction of suicide terrorism? Hence a subset of three research questions can be
derived: (a) How is suicide terrorism a political weapon? (b) How is suicide terrorism
used as a communication tool? (c) How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits
into the moral panic framework?
Qualitative inquiry, social constructionism, and symbolic interactionism allow for
more fruitful approaches to study such a complex and adaptive phenomenon as suicide
terrorism, which not only comprises a substantial human element, but also encompasses
political, social, historical, and psychological dimensions. Constructionism has been
established as “an influential methodological paradigm” (Patton, 2001:99) that enables
researchers to use a qualitative approach to study human behavior and lived experience,
group life, and social phenomena in general.
Philip Jenkins has relied on social constructionism to enlighten us about a variety
of social problems. In one study, Jenkins (1994a) offers a social constructionist
interpretation of the “ice” (smokeable crystal methamphetamine) epidemic and analyzes
the overall structure of drug scares via an examination of Congress reports and hearings,
media accounts in dailies and weeklies, and the overall context in which policies are
developed and national problems created out of local issues. In order to contribute to our
understanding of the serial murder mythology, Jenkins (1994b) focuses on rhetoric and
the process of social construction, the context of news making, changing media patterns,
as well as the role of the media, popular culture, federal law enforcement and the Justice
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Department in the making of the myth and the relentless exploitation of fear. Jenkins
(2000) also used the social constructionist approach to further study the serial killer panic
of recent years via an analysis of media publications related to serial murderers, including
a search of the New York Times archive since 1960. In another notable study, Jenkins
(2003) focused on “images of terror” and provides a critical analysis of mass media
representations of terrorism. As noted in the previous chapter, Jenkins’ work on the social
construction of terrorism which had much bearing on the design and implementation of
this multi-case study. Other researchers have also employed a social constructionist
approach to the study of social problems. For instance, Jacobs & Potter (1998) explain
the social construction of the hate crime epidemic by analyzing hate crime legislation and
news media coverage to demonstrate that political ambitions, powerful advocacy groups
and lobbies, and diehard legislation were the source of extreme social reaction
concerning hate- and bias-motivated crimes. Jacobs and Henry (2000) additionally argue
that the “hate crime epidemic” is a myth, although it has been decried by politicians,
academics, and journalists alike, as well as spokespersons for various minority advocacy
or lobbying groups. Despite what has been reported since the mid-1980s, there has been
no “explosion” of hate crimes and statistics have not “skyrocketed” in the United States.
Jacobs and Henry focus on the inadequacy of data gathering methods at the local, state,
and federal levels, review existing legislation throughout the United States, highlight the
slanted interpretation of dubious statistics, and analyze media coverage of hate or bias
incidents. They emphasize the propensity of the news media to eagerly “embrace the
most negative interpretation of intergroup relations” (2000:51). They conclude that
identity politics played a significant part in the creation of symbolic and subjective laws
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that are based on vague definitions of the concept of hate crime and enforced
inconsistently, thus undermining generic criminal law and intensifying social divisions
and conflict. Likewise, a study of the social construction of child abduction (Kappeler,
Blumberg & Potter, 2000) assessing the sensationalism of news media representations of
child-related kidnapping cases systematically highlights the use of distorted official
definitions, misleading statistics, and media accounts to demonstrate a pattern in the
presentation of a crime issue and the subsequent creation of images and crime myths. The
authors essentially focus on how politicians and the media exploit the imagery of missing
children, as well as the legal reforms that spring from emotional societal reaction and in
effect create a new type of crime and a new class of criminals without offering a
productive solution or an actual prevention option against criminality.
As for the symbolic interactionist approach, it is highly adaptive and flexible.
Hence it has been applied to a variety of contemporary issues to help understand the
interaction of agents and institutions, and the use of symbolic resources (such as
governments and global media networks) to create meanings persuasively. The
interpretation of media representations and ideological claimsmaking related to a given
issue involves a creative and selective process that can be efficiently analyzed with a
sound symbolic interactionist approach. For example, two studies on cybersex (Patton,
2001; Waskul, 2003) used in-depth interviews to analyze the symbolic interaction
between cybersex chat-room users and applied the interaction framework to explain the
social processes and structures that can emerge in the virtual community. Waskul (2002)
focuses specifically on televideo cybersex (as opposed to text-based cybersex) and,
through a series of in-depth interviews, studies the relationships between individuality
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(selfhood) and the body, as well as the context in which they are both located. The
context for interaction is thus singled out as an important aspect to consider in order to
fully comprehend the relationships between the involved agents and their social situation.
More recently, Arena and Arrigo (2005) published a study relying upon a
structural symbolic interactionist analysis of the terrorist identity. They used five major
organizing concepts (symbols, definition of situation, roles, socialization and role-taking,
and the self) in order to develop a conceptual framework focusing on “the importance of
culture, self, and society when investigating one’s membership in and identity through
militant extremist organizations” (2005:485). The article resorts to structural symbolic
interactionism to improve our “understanding of how terrorist identities are created,
embraced, and maintained, as well as how they influence the behavior of members in
militant extremist subculture” (Ibid.).
Patton (2001:113) notes that
the importance of symbolic interactionism to qualitative inquiry is its
distinct emphasis on the importance of symbols and the interpretive
processes that undergrid interactions as fundamental to understanding
human behavior. . . . [T]he study of the original meaning and influence of
symbols and shared meaning can shed light on what is most important to
people, what will be most resistant to change, and what will be most
necessary to change if the . . . organization is to move in new directions.
The subject matter and methods of symbolic interactionism also
emphasize the importance of paying attention to how particular
interactions give rise to symbolic understandings when one is engaged in
changing symbols as part of . . . [an] organizational development process.
Case Identification and Selection Criteria
Purposeful sampling was used in order to select unique research sites and key
participants for this qualitative multi-case study. Unlike probability sampling, which
derives its logic and strength from its very objective of generalization, purposeful
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sampling consists in selecting, as Blumer himself suggested, information-rich cases for
an in-depth study aimed at providing a better understanding of a complex social
phenomenon. “Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal
about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, hence the term
purposeful sampling” (Patton, 2001:46). Contrary to quantitative studies using
probabilistic sampling, the need for generalization in qualitative research is secondary –
or even nonexistent – compared to the significance of the in-depth understanding of the
phenomenon of interest. Types of purposeful sampling include site selection,
comprehensive sampling, maximum variation sampling, network sampling, and sampling
by case type.
“In choosing what case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling is
available . . . [from selecting] cases that show different perspectives on the problem,
process or event . . . [to selecting] ordinary cases, accessible cases, or unusual cases”
(Creswell, 1997:62). A combination of purposeful sampling strategies was used to select
cases for this large-scale study. These favored strategies included:
1. Site selection: specific sites were selected because the phenomenon of interest
(i.e., suicide bombings or suicide terrorism) has occurred or is considered likely to
occur there; likelihood of occurrence was determined based on the socio-political
context of a given site, recent increases in overall terrorist activities and
recruitment practices, and documented presence (e.g., training camps) of groups
linked to the phenomenon of interest;
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2. Typical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they presented
the typical characteristics of sites/groups using or likely to experience/use suicide
bombings;
3. Critical-case sampling: sites/groups were selected for analysis if they represented
dramatic examples of the phenomenon of interest;
4. Concept-based sampling: information-rich (key) participants were sampled due to
their scholarly knowledge of, professional experience with, or personal exposure
to the phenomenon of interest.
As a result of this sampling strategy, eleven countries were selected for
interviewing and document analysis purposes. They are listed below, as well as the
rationale for their inclusion. Cases where suicide terrorism has occurred or is likely to
occur, but for which little to no data or informants were available were omitted. Sampling
strategies are summarized in Table 2.
1. Afghanistan: the network known as al-Qaeda, or “the Base,” was established in
Afghanistan; suicide bombings have occurred regularly in various parts of the
war-torn country;
2. France: representatives of the Ministry of Interior and the Anti-Terrorism
Coordination Unit (U.C.L.A.T., or Unité de Coordination de la Lutte AntiTerroriste) were interviewed to discuss attempts by the Algerian GIA (Groupe
Islamique Armé) to perpetrate a suicide attack in Paris in the mid-1990s, as well
as current efforts to prevent suicide terrorism across the European Union and at
the international level; INTERPOL representatives of the Fusion Task Force were
also interviewed for the same purposes;
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Table 2
Sampling Strategies and Case Selection
Site selection
Afghanistan
France
Iraq
Israel
Kashmir
Lebanon
Russia
Sri Lanka
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Typical-case sampling
Afghanistan
Israel
Kashmir
Iraq

Critical-case sampling
Al-Qaeda
Russia
Lebanon
Sri Lanka
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Concept-based
sampling
France
Israel
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

3. Iraq: the Iraqi insurgency has been resorting to suicide bombings on a regular
basis since the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003;
4. Israel: researchers from the International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism
(ICT; Herzliya, Israel) were contacted due to their scholarly knowledge of, and
professional or personal experience with suicide terrorism;
5. Kashmir: since the late 1990s, a separatist movement of Kashmiri terrorists has
perpetrated over a dozen suicide bombings aimed at India’s Hindu government;
6. Lebanon: Hizballah, the Party of God, pioneered the contemporary use of suicide
terrorism in the early 1980s;
7. Russia: Chechen rebels opposing the Russian occupation of Chechnya have been
increasingly resorting to suicide bombings since 2000;
8. Sri Lanka: the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) began their suicide bombing campaign in
1987 and they are still the most prolific users of suicide bombings in the world;
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9. Turkey: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party; today’s KONGRA-GEL or KGK)
perpetrated several suicide attacks in the mid-1990s; Turkish government and
intelligence officials were interviewed;
10. United Kingdom: researchers at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and
Political Violence were selected due to their scholarly, professional, and personal
experiences with suicide terrorism; in addition, a series of four suicide bombings
occurred in central London in July 2005;
11. United States: the September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon were the first suicide terror attacks on American soil; the United States
had also suffered losses from suicide attacks overseas before (e.g., Kenya and
Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole attack in 2000).
The Role of the Researcher
My interest in suicide terrorism grew steadily over a decade ago, soon turning into
a downright fascination with this complex, captivating social phenomenon. Growing up
in France, where I was exposed to daily news coverage of suicide terror attacks occurring
mainly in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel, I became particularly sensitive to and intrigued
by the phenomenology and etiology of this peculiar form of terrorism. Long before the
September 2001 suicide attacks on American landmarks by members of the Afghanistanbased Al-Qaeda terror network, which essentially introduced both the U.S. government
and the general public to the reality of suicide terrorism and its dramatic practical
consequences, I decided to focus my research efforts on this extremely violent and
adaptive form of terrorism.
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Soon after (and ever since) the September 2001 terrorist attacks, a plethora of
articles, books and other reports flourished in scholarly journals, news reports, think
tanks, and bookstores across the U.S. and most of the world. Many authors,
unfortunately, have been self-proclaimed experts on terrorism whose knowledge and
understanding of the phenomenon have been as flawed and inconsistent as the
reductionist interpretations and reactionary policies that have been adopted as a result of
an obvious misconception of suicide terrorism and its outcomes.
What is featured in political and media discourse on terrorism today? Cases that
emphasize the simplistic “Good vs. Evil” or “Us vs. Them” binaries promoted by the
current administration. Such an approach illustrates the construction of deviant identities
via the stigmatization, marginalization, and demonization of entire groups of people
officially labeled as “evildoers” or “evil cowards.” Publicly setting the civilized and
moral world of Good, as defined by the United States, against the barbaric amoral world
of Evil of the terrorists only promotes a reductionist rhetorical style that actually feeds
into the similarly dichotomous extremist Islamic worldview pitting the House of God
(Dar al-Islam) against the House of War (Dar al-Harb).
The mechanisms involved in the construction of suicide terrorism as a social
problem have come to intrigue and fascinate me the most. Hence, the focus of my
dissertation shifted from a phenomenological and etiological analysis of the issue to an
approach centered specifically on the social construction of suicide terrorism, the
commission of objective acts vs. the subjective meanings ascribed to such actions, the
symbolic interaction involved in the interpretive process, and the detrimental effects of
the ideological and commercial exploitation of the phenomenon. Years of research on the
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topic have given me insight into the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism as a
subjective process that is contingent upon various rhetorical mechanisms that are worth
studying more closely. Interest groups and bureaucratic agencies are deeply involved in
the interpretation phase and it is essential to explore, uncover, and understand the
subjective definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is socially
constructed. Failing to do so will only result in developing more inadequate strategies and
arbitrary policies that ignore the inherently socio-cultural dimension of the problem and
the fact that it is first and foremost an institutional-level issue. Suicide terrorism is a
dynamic phenomenon that involves a substantial human dimension and deals with the
complexity of social interaction. Studying human behavior and human experience, as
well as the interaction between individuals and their environment therefore calls for a
pragmatic and interpretive approach effectively factoring the lived experiences of people
into the analysis. This is what a qualitative study allows, which explains why I selected
such a paradigm.
Prior to directing a qualitative study, a researcher must: (a) “adopt the stance
suggested by the characteristics of the naturalist paradigm”; (b) “develop the level of skill
appropriate for a human instrument, or the vehicle through which data will be collected
and interpreted”; and (c) “prepare a research design that utilizes accepted strategies for
naturalistic inquiry” (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). One’s competence
and skills to conduct qualitative research depend largely upon one’s “theoretical
sensitivity” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Hoepfl, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
Theoretical sensitivity refers to a personal quality of the researcher. It
indicates an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data. . . . [It] refers
to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the
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capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that
which isn’t. (Strauss & Corbin, as cited in Hoepfl, 1997)
Theoretical sensitivity is the product of various sources, including personal and
professional experience, as well as knowledge of the extant scholarly literature. As a
result, “[t]he credibility of a qualitative research report relies heavily on the confidence
readers have in the researcher’s ability to be sensitive to the data and to make appropriate
decisions in the field” (Hoepfl, 1997; also see Patton, 2001).
If humans are the “instrument of choice” when it comes to qualitative or
naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), it is mainly because
Humans are responsive to environmental cues, and able to interact with
the situation; they have the ability to collect information at multiple levels
simultaneously; they are able to perceive situations holistically; they are
able to process data as soon as they become available; they can provide
immediate feedback and request verification of data; and they can explore
atypical or unexpected responses. (Hoepfl, 1997)
LeCompte (1993) further posits that “positivistic science imposes a false distance
between researchers and the researched by mandating that the researcher maintain an
artificially impersonal stance toward the people studied” and that such detachment results
“in data that present a partial and therefore false, and an elitist and therefore biased,
reality” (1993:11-12). Authenticity is thus possible only where it is genuinely reflected in
the relationship between the researcher and the participant(s), i.e., beyond the simple
narrative. LeCompte even argues that the researcher acts as a mediator to help
participants voice their thoughts on and understanding of events and circumstances
within the broader context of their own lived experience.
Researchers conducting structured interviews are typically physically involved
but emotionally removed observers who play “a neutral role,” at the same time “casual
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and friendly” and “directive and impersonal” (Fontana & Frey, 1994:367). Semistructured interviews, on the other hand, allow for a more open, casual questioning – a
format that favors more flexibility and authenticity.
The interview protocol selected for this study was semi-structured, which made it
possible for me to effectively interact and develop a trust rapport with the research
participants while gathering insightful data on the problem of interest. My involvement in
the in-depth interview process was both intensive and extensive. Indeed, conducting the
interviews required me to make several overseas trips to meet with the key participants
selected for the research in Turkey, Scotland, France, and the United States. The length of
each stay ranged from two to ten days, depending on the destination and how many
participants had to be interviewed. Only one participant was interviewed per day (in some
cases, the interview even spanned two days) in order to ensure that I could spend enough
time with each of them and give them enough time for additional questions, formal or
informal feedback, etc.
Active listening played a significant part in conducting the interviews; responses
were taped so intensive note-taking would not distract me or the interviewees. Study
participants were therefore naturally encouraged to become more engaged in the
interview process and to openly discuss not only their experience but also their thoughts
on suicide terrorism, the meaning-making mechanisms inherent in our understanding of
the phenomenon, and various related socio-political issues. The interview process, at
times, resembled more an informal conversation than an interview (albeit a semistructured one), which never interfered with the progression of the discussion.
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Reciprocity issues were also anticipated and addressed wherever necessary. Since
interviewing is an obtrusive method that requires me to intrude on participants, even
though they have formally agreed to participate in the study, it is important for me to
reciprocate when needed. Key informants have shared information with me that I would
have otherwise had no access to via document analysis. Hence, I was clearly indebted to
them for their input and insight, and if an interviewee felt the need to ask additional
questions or inquire about my credentials and background, or the progress of the study,
the information was provided overtly and candidly. Meanwhile, I bore in mind that too
much self-disclosure (or, worse, unsolicited self-disclosure) could have a negative effect
on the participant and therefore hamper the interview process. As emphasized by
Reinharz (1992), it is crucial that I, as a qualitative researcher, learn how to “pace my
interactions and look for cues from the participant as to readiness to know more about
me” (1992:33). Thus, aware of the necessity to both time and measure any type of selfdisclosure, I made sure participants received the right amount of information about me
when they needed it, in a reasonable and balanced fashion.
Data Collection Methods
Creswell (1997) emphasizes that, “[i]n qualitative research, the convergence of
sources of information, views of investigators, different theories, and different
methodologies represents the triangulation of ideas . . . to help support the development
of themes” (1997:251). With case studies, “[t]he data collection is extensive, drawing on
multiple sources of information, such as observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual materials” (1997:62-63). Such a diversity of information sources and collected data
guarantees a more “complete picture” (Patton, 2001:307) of the phenomenon being
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studied. Such a research strategy based upon triangulation enables researchers to base
their case study on multiple sources of information and therefore evidence (Stake, 1995;
Yin, 1994). For this multi-case study, data were obtained and triangulated using two
complementary information sources: in-depth interviews and document analysis. Table 3
describes the sources from which data were collected and analyzed for the purpose of this
multi-case study. They are further detailed below.
Table 3
Sources of Data, Type of Evidence Collected, and Sample Size
Data Sources
Type of Data
Sample Size
Interviews
Phenomenological Interviews
22
Elite Interviews
17
Total
39
Documents
News Articles
1450
Television News Clips
112
Scholarly Articles
25
Books
9
Archival Records
19
Administrative Documents
24
Government Reports & Memos
43
Private Organization Reports
13
Unclassified Military Reports
16
Feature Films
5
Documentary Films
4
Recruitment Videos
11
Short Films & Animations
5
Militant Websites
18
Speeches & Letters
21
Total
1775
Interviews
Thirty-nine on-site interviews were conducted in France, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, as part of a two-year grant project on suicide terrorism
funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research via the Global Center for Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Action (G-CDMHA) at the University of South Florida
74

(USF). While the interviews focused more on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide
terrorism, risk assessments and prevention, the respondents provided answers that
continually reflected the significance of social contexts, socio-political forces, and
ideology, thus echoing issues inherent in social constructionism. Such patterns in the
initial data collection phase prompted me to later focus my attention – and my subsequent
dissertation work – on the constructions and interpretations of suicide bombings around
the world.
The interviews were semi-structured in nature since specific interview questions
had to be used within a research protocol approved by the USF Institutional Review
Board. The interviews typically lasted from 60 to 120 minutes, depending on how many
additional comments the interviewees had. Each interviewee signed an informed consent
form for minimal-risk research and was asked about 20 questions, which centered on the
issues listed below. Table 4 summarizes relevant interviewee demographics. Due to
confidentiality requirements, the exact identity and related professional or personal
details about each interviewee cannot be revealed. The actual interview questions,
although they relate more directly to the G-CDMHA project than to this current study,
are listed in Appendix B.
In-depth one-on-one interviews with information-rich participants were selected
as a data collection method following the Blumerian tradition of using key informants as
interviewees. Blumer indeed “considered a carefully selected group of naturally acute
observers and well-informed people to be a real ‘panel of experts’ about a setting or
situation, experts who would take the researcher inside the phenomenon of interest”
(Patton, 2001:112). “In-depth interviews with multiple informants at each site” also made
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it possible “to triangulate findings across sources and test issues of reliability and
validity” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:60). Potential informants were selected due to their
current or past involvement with suicide terrorism policy, prevention or research and
contacted to participate in the study. Some declinedfor security or ideological reasons,
including a representative of the Arab European League who, in January 2004, wrote:
Dear Madam, I do not wish to collaborate on your project, but i can give
yuou a tip though. you want to stop people from blowing themselves up?
Give them weapons that are equal to those of their opressors or stop
opression. Give the palestinians appachi helecoptors and F 16, that would
be a good idea to stop people from using their bodies as a weopon to detter
the oppressor. (sic)
Table 4
Interviewee Demographics for On-Site One-On-One Phenomenological and Elite
Interviewing Process, By Country
Total of
Country
Affiliation
Gender
Status
Interviews
Ministry of Interior;
Male: 8
Civilian: 9
France
9
UCLAT; Interpol
Female: 1
Military: 0
Turkish National
Police; TADOC;
UNODC; Ministry
Male: 15
Civilian: 12
Turkey
15
of Interior; Ministry
Female: 0
Military: 3
of Defense; Turkish
Intelligence Agency;
University
United
CSTPV; University;
Male: 6
Civilian: 6
6
Kingdom
London Police
Female: 0
Military: 0
United
University; Army;
Male: 9
Civilian: 4
9
States
Air Force; Navy
Female: 0
Military: 5
Two forms of in-depth interviewing were used and, ultimately, merged into the
interview process: phenomenological interviewing and elite interviewing.
Phenomenological interviewing is rooted in phenomenology, “the study of lived
experiences and the ways we understand those experiences to develop a worldview,” and
its goal is to thoroughly “describe the meaning of a concept or phenomenon that several
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individuals share” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:112). Phenomenological interviewing is a
useful tool inasmuch as “it permits an explicit focus on the researcher’s personal
experience combined with those of the interviewees” (1998:113). However, a strict
introspective exercise – called epoche – is necessary for researchers to become fully
aware of their own biases and ensure that their own experiences and worldviews do not
interfere with those of the interviewees. In the present study, respondents selected for
phenomenological interviews were the ones who could provide an academic
understanding of the phenomenon (i.e., scholars in Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), as well as law enforcement and military personnel having had exposure to
suicide terrorism or related training (in all four countries visited). Out of the thirty-nine
interviewees, twenty-two were involved in the phenomenological interviewing process.
Elite interviewing, on the other hand, focuses specifically on interviewees who are
“considered to be influential, prominent, and/or well-informed people in an organization
or a community . . . on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research”
(Ibid.). Invaluable data can be gathered by interviewing these knowledge-rich people. In
addition, elites can “report on an organization’s policies, past histories, and future plans
from a particular perspective” (Ibid.), which can yield very useful information that would
not be easily obtained elsewhere. The major limitations of elite interviewing are typically
gaining access to the elites and their lack of flexibility when dealing with a relatively or
fully structured interview format. In this study, these obstacles were circumvented thanks
to federal sponsorship for the grant the interviews were conducted through, as well as a
network of contacts in the various agencies or governmental offices included in the
project. The quality of the information thus gathered was invaluable. Seventeen of the
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thirty-nine interviewees were considered elite respondents due to their top positions and
responsibilities within specific national or international agencies (i.e., government, law
enforcement, and military senior officials).
Document Analysis
Document analysis was the second data collection method adopted for this study
to not only supplement and triangulate the interview data, but also ensure more flexibility
in the data collection and data analysis phases. This is a commonly used method that
allows researchers to verify other observations or complement interview data. Documents
used in this study included either primary sources (i.e., original work) or secondary
sources (i.e., secondhand analyses of original work). Focusing on oral narratives
(interviews), textual narratives (broadsheet media coverage, scholarly journals, official
policy statements, formal and informal governmental memoranda, speeches and reports,
archival records), and visual narratives (videotaped news coverage, feature films,
documentaries, recruitment videos) made it possible to fully explore all available
materials concerning suicide terrorism.
Articles published worldwide in newspapers and news magazines between
December 1980 and December 2005 were accessed through the LexisNexis Academic
database and compared to results from the Associated Press (AP) news archive.
Keywords used for the search included: suicide terrorism, suicide bombing, martyrdom
operation, suicide bomber, suicide attack, suicide terror attack, suicidal bombing, and
homicide bombing. The number of articles thus found is presented in Table 5.
The search was then narrowed down using the LexisNexis database option to use
only “major news” reports published in English-language major newspapers and news
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magazines for the 1980-2005 period. Articles were randomly sampled from the results.
This process yielded a total of 1450 relevant articles.
Table 5
Number of Articles Published in Major Newspapers and News Magazines, By Keyword,
1980-2005
LexisNexis Academic
Associated Press Archive
Suicide Terrorism
6470
5389
Suicide Bombing
7870
10313
Martyrdom Operation
126
0
Suicide Bomber
9790
7256
Suicide Attack
13200
14541
Suicide Terror Attack
2920
938
Suicidal Bombing
41
79
Homicide Bombing
36
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A total of 1775 documents were collected and systematically analyzed. Besides
news articles (n=1450), other open-source documents on suicide bombings that were used
in the present study include television news clips (n=112), scholarly articles (n=25),
books (n=9), archival records (n=19), administrative documents (n=24), government
reports and memoranda (n=43), private organization reports (n=13), unclassified military
reports (n=16), feature films (n=5), documentary films (n=4), recruitment videos (n=11),
short films and animations (n=5), militant websites (n=18), as well as speeches and letters
(n=21). Most documents were obtained via Internet-based archives; the rest was acquired
from the interviewees involved in the phenomenological and elite interviewing process
described above.
The data gathering phase of this study was twofold and required a general review
of documents, as well as a systematic historical analysis of documents. A general review
of documents, an unobtrusive interpretive method that allows for the use of content
analysis for the examination of various materials on suicide bombings, as well as a
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systematic historical analysis of documents occurred prior to conducting in-depth
interviews (inasmuch as it provided me with a thorough knowledge of suicide terrorism,
its emergence many centuries ago, its contemporary developments and current trends, as
well as the groups that have used / use / could resort to this method). Both were also used
during the content analysis phase of the study in order to provide more insight into the
subjective interpretation of suicide bombing events over time and across countries.
Content analysis made it possible to examine and categorize the contents of the
sources used. As “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text
into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler, 2001), content
analysis may be broadly defined as “any technique for making inferences by objectively
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969:14).
Hence, the method is not limited to textual analysis. It has in fact been used in other
areas, such as coding drawings (Wheelock, Haney, & Bebell, 2000) and coding actions
observed in videotaped studies (Stigler, Gonzales, Kawanaka, Knoll, & Serrano, 1999).
The advantage of content analysis is that it “enables researchers to sift through large
volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion” (Stemler, 2001). As Weber
(1990) points out, content analysis is a valuable method for observing and depicting “the
focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention.” Furthermore, researchers can
use content analysis to make inferences that may be corroborated by additional,
complementary data collection techniques. As Krippendorff (1980) mentions, “[m]uch
content analysis research is motivated by the search for techniques to infer from symbolic
data what would be either too costly, no longer possible, or too obtrusive by the use of
other techniques” (1980:51). Here, content analysis began with a word-frequency count
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and also entailed devising codes to divide the data into sensible concept-based groups. A
specific coding scheme was thus applied to the data and the latter were classified so that
the frequency of specific concepts could be recorded and computed more easily. The
frequency breakdown of the codes for each concept is explained and tabulated later on.
Concept mapping was then used in order to methodically analyze emerging
patterns and themes in the data. Miller and Riechert (1994) provide a thorough discussion
of concept mapping, a scaling technique that enables researchers to observe and depict
themes or categories of content within larger amounts of text. Their analysis highlights
three major benefits of concept mapping over a more traditional take on content analysis:
(a) concept mapping is a fast and convenient tool to draw attention to significant themes
in large textual bodies; (b) such themes, rather than being subjectively designed and
imposed by the researcher, emerge from the data themselves; and (c) concept mapping
emphasizes the significance of and associations between themes. The concept map for
this study is provided later on in this chapter, under the “Data Interpretation” section.
For instance, the collection of data on suicide bombings in Turkey was a twofold
process. On the one hand, in-depth one-on-one interviews were conducted in Ankara,
Turkey, between April 13 and April 21, 2004. The main focus of these interviews were
the fifteen suicide bombings perpetrated by the PKK (today’s KONGRA-GEL) between
June 30, 1995, and July 15, 1999, as well as known aborted missions. Interviewees
included senior officials from and researchers affiliated with the Turkish Academy
against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC); top officials from the Information
Ministry; top officials from the Bomb Squad and Anti-Terrorism Unit of the Turkish
National Police Academy; top officials at the Anti-Terrorism Ministry and
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representatives of the Security Department; senior officials from the Interior Security
Department; top officials at the headquarters of Turkey’s Intelligence Services; and
senior members of the Organized Crime Unit at the Ministry of Interior. On the other
hand, documents were obtained from the abovementioned interviewees and a variety of
other authoritative sources, such as governmental Websites and official publications,
published state and research reports, available press archives (Associated Press coverage
and Lexis-Nexis-Academic drawn data), as well as the official Website currently
maintained by KONGRA-GEL and associated Kurdish and PKK-related Websites and
publications. The contents of the documents and other sources were systematically
analyzed by following a twofold approach. First, a conceptual analysis was carried out to
highlight the presence and frequency of certain key words or concepts related to suicide
terrorism (e.g., suicide, bombing, martyrdom, martyr, sacrifice, jihad, infidels, mission,
Kurdistan, Kurdish, PKK, nationalism, ethnic conflict, separatism). Second, a relational
analysis of the documents and sources made it possible to lay emphasis on the
relationships between these words or concepts, in order to infer their meaning within the
text and deduce specific characteristics of their authors and intended audience. As a result
of the association of certain words or concepts, various patterns and subjective meanings
emerged.
Methodological Concerns
Smith (1998) contends that “a critical pragmatist stance . . . rejects the dominant
empiricist goal of research as generating knowledge or adding to scientific theorising,
and instead proposes a moral base of reasoning.” Indeed, the purpose of qualitative
research “is not to produce knowledge of the social world as an entity but to engage in
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knowledge making as a human activity. This is fundamentally a normative undertaking. It
requires that we come to terms with a sense of moral purpose and responsibility in human
inquiry . . . to persuade one another of the value or goodness of a way of thinking”
(Schwandt, 1993:19-20). As Smith (1992) posits, interpretive inquiry is consequently
both a practical and a moral activity: “the pursuit of knowledge must be understood in
practical and moral terms” (1992:102). Thus, owing to the moral element involved, one
cannot differentiate belief and opinion using epistemology (see Smith, 1992; Schwandt,
1993).
Conducting research consists in offering “a publicly scrutinizable analysis of a
phenomenon with the intent of clarification” (Reinharz, 1992:9). The purpose of this
study, as stated before, is to expand our theoretical and practical understanding of suicide
terrorism by providing some much needed insight into the social construction of suicide
terrorism. While gathering and analyzing data to conduct this study, several issues or
concerns arose that had to be methodically addressed.
First, it appeared primordial to ascertain the “truth value” (Lincoln & Guba,
1985:290) of the study, as well as “its applicability, consistency, and neutrality”
(Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). Researchers, in their efforts to determine the best
possible estimate of the veracity of their studies, are mostly concerned with what is
commonly referred to as validity. Campbell and Stanley (1966), amongst others, have
highlighted two types of validity: internal and external. Internal validity can be described
as the level of authority with which we infer that the relationship between two variables
is causal. On the other hand, external validity refers to the level of certainty with which
we can infer that the alleged causal relationship can be generalized to and across various
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measures of the cause-and-effect link, and across different settings, times, or groups of
people.
The strength of a qualitative study that aims to explore a problem or
describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern of interaction will
rest with its validity. An in-depth description showing the complexities of
processes and interactions will be so embedded with data derived from the
setting that it cannot help but be valid. Within the parameters of that
setting, population, and theoretical framework, the research will be valid.
A qualitative researcher should therefore adequately state those
parameters, thereby placing boundaries around the study (Marshall &
Rossman, 1998:192-193).
Much like reliability and objectivity, internal validity and external validity both
relate to a more “conventional positivist paradigm” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192) and
therefore do not seem to adequately fit the inherently naturalistic qualitative research
framework. Although the issue of validity is mostly relevant to quantitative studies, the
same terms are sometimes used in the context of qualitative research – albeit with a
slightly different understanding. More specifically, in qualitative research, internal
validity is influenced by the research design, whereas external validity refers to the
extension or transferability of the qualitative findings. Some scholars, however,
recommend the use of distinct constructs in order to assess the value and logic of
qualitative research. Munro (as cited in Smith, 1998) further argues that validity “is not a
useful [term] in research that seeks understanding and meaning.” For the purpose of
qualitative research, then, the term “validity” must be reconceptualized and clearly
distinguished from the empiricist logic that drives quantitative inquiry. Four original
constructs have been proposed in the scholarly literature: credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Marshall & Rossman,
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1998; Smith, 1998). Each one was scrupulously addressed within the framework of this
study.
Credibility
Establishing the credibility of a study consists in showing that “the inquiry was
conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and
described” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:192). The credibility of the qualitative study
essentially depends upon the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by
the researcher and the study participants. This is comparable to what quantitative
researchers focus on when determining the internal validity of their research design.
In order to optimize the credibility of the qualitative research design of this study,
following recommendations by McMillan and Schumacher (1997), various strategies
were resorted to. First of all, prolonged fieldwork was a priority during and well after the
phase involving the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology
of suicide terrorism. That allowed for interim data analysis as well as data substantiation,
which ensured that study findings matched participant reality. Furthermore, precise
accounts of interviews using verbatim statements made by the interviewees, in addition to
strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured that the exact language used by the
participants or in the analyzed documents were transformed into objective data. Likewise,
low-inference descriptors were used, so as to accurately record detailed descriptions of
specific situations. The use of mechanically recorded data (through the extensive use of
digital voice recorders, videotapes, and photographs) further ensured the accuracy and
easy corroboration of the data collected. Interviewees were asked to double-check the
accuracy of the information collected. After each interview, participants were also asked
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to review the exactness of the information gathered and transcribed during their
interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting data likely to either stand out as
exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if any, were controlled for,
recorded, analyzed, and reported.
Transferability
Qualitative researchers must demonstrate that their study findings “will be useful
to others in similar situations, with similar research questions or questions of practice”
(Marshall & Rossman, 1998:193). With qualitative studies, external validity depends on
whether the findings can be extended or transferred – either as grounded theory or as an
analytic synthesis that may be used by other researchers to conduct further research on
the phenomenon or at least appreciate comparable cases. Thus, knowledge can be
produced not by replicating studies but, rather, where extensive corroborating data
gathered via additional case studies (or even more positivist quantitative analyses) of the
phenomenon become available.
“A qualitative study’s transferability or generalizability to other settings may be
problematic. The generalization of qualitative findings to other populations [or] settings .
. . is seen by traditional canons as a weakness in the approach” (Marshall & Rossman,
1998:193). The transferability, or extension, of qualitative findings is influenced by
several factors. In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special
attention to: (a) the researcher’s role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the
site and key informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of
both the phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies;
(e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g)
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the specificity and flexibility of the analytic framework; and (h) potential alternative
interpretations.
It is important to note that the chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures
that both the collection and the analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of
specific theoretical concepts and models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a
body of theory – namely social constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic
interactionism – researchers or policymakers focusing on similar parameters are
ultimately free to decide if the cases presented in this analysis are transferable to new and
comparable research settings, or generalizable for policymaking purposes.
One of the strengths of this study derives from its likelihood to significantly
contribute to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. The qualitative research
design used here is both empirical and interpretive, aimed at fostering substantive
knowledge about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature.
Hence, although it is not purely empirical, this study has a strong potential for yielding
empirically significant results by providing researchers and policymakers with much
insight into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and, ultimately, its prevention.
In order to safeguard the empirical integrity and optimize the transferability or
generalizability of the study, another important strategic tool was used in addition to
systematic data collection procedures: triangulation, a concept that “has been fruitfully
applied to social science inquiry” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). The triangulation of
multiple data sources “is the act of bringing more than one source of data to bear on a
single point. . . . Data from different sources can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or
illuminate the research in question. . . . Designing a study in which multiple cases,
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multiple informants, or more than one data-gathering method are used can greatly
strengthen the study’s usefulness for other settings” (Ibid.). Triangulation is therefore a
corollary of the use of multiple sources of data; both ensure the collection of high-quality
qualitative data.
Patton (2001) stresses that “multiple sources of information are sought and used
because no single source of information can be trusted to provide a comprehensive
perspective. . . . By using a combination of observations, interviewing, and document
analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check
findings” (2001:306). As explained by Marshall and Rossman (1998) and further clarified
by Patton (2001:306), “[e]ach type and source of data has strengths and weaknesses.
Using a combination of data types – triangulation . . . – increases validity as the strengths
of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses of another approach.” Triangulation,
like any other method, has its flaws. It is important to bear in mind that “triangulation is
not a strategy of validation but an alternative to validation” and that “the various forms of
triangulation can produce at best only an expanded interpretive base in a study rather than
an objective account (an account which assumes a single, objective reality)” (Smith,
1998). While “there is no magic in triangulation” (Patton, as cited in Smith, 1998), it is
still useful and advantageous for researchers to “include triangulation of data sources and
analytical perspectives to increase the accuracy and credibility of findings” (Patton,
2001:93).
Dependability
Guaranteeing the dependability or trustworthiness of a study requires researchers
“to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen for study and changes in
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the design created by an increasingly refined understanding of the setting . . . [which
follows] the qualitative/interpretive assumption that the social world is always being
constructed and that the concept of replication in itself is problematic” (Marshall &
Rossman, 1998:194). During the course of this study, the initial focus on the
phenomenology and etiology of suicide terrorism shifted towards a more specific analysis
centered around issues of social construction and symbolic interaction. Conducting
interviews with key informants, analyzing the phenomenon via the study of typical cases,
and reviewing documents related to suicide bombings worldwide, from guerilla
movements to war-zone insurgents, all contributed to the realization that there is an
apparent underlying theme in the presentation and interpretation of bombings as suicide
terrorism – a social constructionist theme with clear symbolic interactionist
underpinnings. As a result, the focal point of the study became the analysis of suicide
terrorism as a socially constructed problem. Data were subsequently aggregated,
examined, summarized, and synthesized in a critical and systematic fashion to look for,
identify, and interpret patterns evidencing the socially constructed nature of suicide
terrorism.
Overall reliability was optimized by: (a) prolonging the data gathering processes
on site in order to ensure the dependability of the findings by providing more concrete
information upon which to base interpretations; (b) triangulating across methods and
sources so as not to rely exclusively on one type of observation; (c) having participants
actively check and corroborate the interpretation of collected data; and (d) collecting
referential materials in order to complement or support the data collected on site.
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The limitations of purposeful sampling were of course considered. So was the
subsequent likelihood of error. Indeed, “[i]n spite of the apparent flexibility in purposeful
sampling, researchers must be aware of three types of sampling error that can arise in
qualitative research. The first relates to distortions caused by insufficient breadth in
sampling; the second from distortions introduced by changes over time; and the third
from distortions caused by lack of depth in data collection at each site” (Hoepfl, 1997;
also see Patton, 2001). The sampling breadth of this study was wide enough that it
included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious origins, etc.
Changes over time were not a significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed
understanding of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of
time and place. As for case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as
possible, including all available and accessible information sources.
Additionally, it is well understood that gathering data via interviews is not a
flawless collection method (see Marshall & Rossman, 1998; Patton, 2001). Indeed,
“[i]nterview data limitations include possibly distorted responses due to personal bias,
anger, anxiety, politics, and simple lack of awareness. . . . Interview data are also subject
to recall error, reactivity of the interviewee to the interviewer, and self-serving responses”
(Patton, 2001:306). However, in this study, the triangulation of information across
sources (interviews and document analysis) helps ensure the depth and associated
dependability of the research. It is further taken into account that “[d]ocuments and
records also have limitations. They may be incomplete or inaccurate . . . notoriously
variable in quality and completeness, with great detail in some cases and virtually nothing
in others” (2001:306-307). Nevertheless, the analysis of documents was essential to the
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study for it complemented and strengthened the data gathered from in-depth interviews,
while providing “a behind-the-scenes look . . . that may not be directly observable and
about which the interviewer might not ask appropriate questions without the leads
provided through documents” (2001:307).
Confirmability
This construct “captures the traditional concept of objectivity . . . to ask whether
the study could be confirmed by another . . . [and whether] the data help confirm the
general findings and lead to the implications” (Marshall & Rossman, 1998:194). Due to
the very nature of qualitative inquiry, it is likely that the subjectivity of the researcher
will influence the research. However, such subjectivity can be disciplined enough to
ensure that the researcher not only subjects himself or herself to a scrupulous selfexamination, but also constantly reconsiders and reassesses all the stages of his or her
research process (see Hoepfl, 1997; Kushner & Norris, 1981; Maxwell, 1992; Norris,
1997).
For the purpose of this study, as suggested by McMillan and Schumacher (1997),
research bias was systematically monitored and subjectivity therefore reduced by: (a)
keeping a field log of dates, times, locations, people, and activities for every data set
collected; (b) keeping a field journal in order to record all decisions made while
designing the study (including rationale for such decisions and data validity evaluation);
(c) documenting pertinent ethical considerations, i.e., logging ethical issues, decisions, or
actions where applicable; (d) ensuring audibility by documenting data management
techniques, codes, categories; and (e) formally corroborating initial findings by
conducting confirmation interviews.
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As explained above, the conceptual framework of this study relies upon the social
constructionist perspective and a symbolic interactionist approach to study and provide a
better understanding of the interpretation and subjective meaning of suicide terrorism.
Figure 2 presents a concept map that summarizes the research design of this study,
including its goals, conceptual framework, research questions, methods, and validity
issues.
Data Interpretation
This comprehensive research project yielded a profusion of rich qualitative data
that had to be meticulously organized and analyzed. The collection and analysis of the
data were part of a continuous cycle and iterative process. In order to structure and
interpret the meanings derived from the raw data, the latter were methodically
transcribed, coded, categorized, and analyzed following procedures and mechanisms
described below.
Constant Comparative Analysis
As “the most complex and mysterious of all the phases of a qualitative project”
data analysis is “an explicit step in conceptually interpreting the data set as a whole, using
specific analytic strategies to transform the raw data into a new and coherent depiction of
the thing being studied” (Thorne, 2000:68). Data were constantly analyzed throughout
each and every phase of this study. Constant comparative analysis was the chosen
analytical strategy to sort, organize, conceptualize, refine, and interpret the data collected.
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Goals

Conceptual Framework

▪ Improve our understanding
of suicide terrorism
▪ Understand the conceptualization
and interpretation of suicide terrorism
▪ Highlight the processes involved
in the social construction of suicide terrorism

▪ Social constructionism
▪ Symbolic interactionism
▪ Interpretive tradition

Research Questions
▪ How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures
involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?
▫ How is suicide terrorism a political weapon?
▫ How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool?
▫ How is suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?

Methods

Validity

▪ Multi-case study
▪ In-depth interviewing
(phenomenological & elite)
▪ Document analysis
(general document review
& historical review)

▪ Prolonged investigation
▪ Triangulation of methods & sources
▪ Participant assessment of data
interpretation
▪ Collection of referential materials
to support on-site data

Figure 2: Research Design Concept Map
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“Naturalistic inquiry, thematic analysis, and interpretive description are methods
that depend on constant comparative analysis processes to develop ways of understanding
human phenomena within the context in which they are experienced” (2000:69). Constant
comparative analysis was initially “developed for use in the grounded theory
methodology of Glaser and Strauss, which itself evolved out of the sociological theory of
symbolic interactionism” (Ibid.). It consists of comparing individual parts of the data
(e.g., an interview, an article or a theme) with the rest of the records “in order to develop
conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces of data” (Ibid.). This
suits another important goal of the study: to generate findings and new knowledge about
common patterns and themes within human experience as relates to suicide terrorism.
Data Transcription and Storage
Collected data were systematically transcribed using a basic word processor
(Microsoft Word). This process yielded over 4,500 pages of notes. As explained before,
substantial amounts of data were gleaned from recorded observations (in-depth
interviews), texts and archival documents (hundreds of relevant articles compiled from
newspapers and magazines published since 1980), multi-media sources available in the
public domain (e.g., documentaries, recruitment videos, television news, Websites,
Internet documents), policy statements and governmental handbooks, and more.
Hypermedia data were transcribed into text and later analyzed and interpreted as was the
rest of the data. Hence both raw data (observations and comments as captured in notes
and on recording devices) and summary data (objective interpretations of the raw data,
including statements regarding emerging patterns) were transcribed and stored into a
database created to organize all the data and help with its analysis. A traditional filing
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technique (with a color-coded system and typed data summaries) was preferred over the
use of a computer software program. Although the technologically advanced option
would have been a time-saving one, many researchers – including this author – consider
the introduction of computerized qualitative data analysis as a menace to
“methodological purity” (Bourdon, 2002:1).
Codes and Analytic Categories
“A key ingredient in structuring collected data for analysis is how that data is [sic]
captured in the first place” (Kantner, Sova, & Anschuetz, 2005:1). The higher the quality
of the data and collection process is, the more reliable the interpretive understanding will
be. Text and sub-texts may thus be deconstructed more efficiently and multiple meanings
may be uncovered, which will in turn help deconstruct the meanings of the phenomenon
of interest and present an accurate representation of social reality. This all depends on the
quality of the thematic interpretation of meaning based on the data collected.
The difficulty, of course, is in the coding of texts and in finding the
patterns. . . . Deciding on themes or codes is an unmitigated, qualitative
act of analysis in the conduct of a particular study, guided by intuition and
experience about what is important and what is unimportant. (Bernard,
1996:2-3)
Interpreting the qualitative data gathered throughout the course of the project thus
required developing coherent coding and category systems. The data were coded to help
with their systematic analysis and to increase the overall reliability and validity of the
study. Variables (concepts) and values (positive, negative, neutral) were identified by
carefully examining indexed interview notes (transcripts), researcher memos, and all
other forms of data available. The data were then segmented into significant analytical
units and subsequently labeled with specific codes or category names, which were
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purposely selected to be short and mnemonic. The categories and codes of the words and
concepts present in the data are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6
Master List of Categories and Codes
Categories
Actors
Media
Public
Social control agents
Suicide bombers
Groups (terrorist or otherwise)
Political context
Terrorism
Separatism
Nationalism
Elections
Other
Religious context
Islam
Radical Islam
Other
Situational context
Civil war
War
Insurgency
Rebellion
Guerrilla
Democracy
Other
Stages of moral panic
Occurrence and signification
Social implications
Social control measures
Media coverage
Fact-based
Opinion
Contradiction
Distortion
Sensationalism
Moralization
Politicization
Demonization
Religiosity
Moral discourse
Agenda setting

Codes
ACT
MED
PUB
SC AGTS
SB
GRP
POL CON
TERR
SEPAR
NATIO
ELECT
AUTR
REL CON
ISL
RAD ISL
AUTR
SIT CON
CIV WAR
WAR
INSURG
REBEL
GUERR
DEMO
AUTR
MOR PAN
SIGNIF
SOC IMPL
SOC CTRL
MED COV
FACT
OPI
CONTRAD
DISTORT
SENSAS
MORAL
POLITZ
DEMON
RELIG
MORAL
AGDA
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Key concepts formed the master codes: actors (ACT), political context (POL
CON), religious context (REL CON), situational context (SIT CON), stages of moral
panic (MOR PAN), media coverage (MED COV), and politicization (POLITZ). Subcodes (second-level coding) emerged from these major analytic categories. A priori codes
were developed before examining the data, whereas inductive codes were created upon
examining the data. Co-occurring codes were observed where codes partially or
completely overlapped, i.e., where segments of data got coded with more than one code.
A codebook was then created following three different but complementary strategies that
fit the design and purpose of this study: coding according to theory, coding by induction,
and coding by ontological categories.
Coding according to theory consists of listing variables and corresponding codes
based upon theoretical reasoning: the analytical framework or research questions of the
study guided the creation of this part of the codebook. Such coding occurred in the
present study with concepts inherent in the constructionist and interactionist perspectives.
These codes include: actors (media, public, agents of social control) and stages of moral
panics (occurrence and signification, social implications, social control measures). They
refer to such concepts as the nature of the threat (episodic suicide bombing), the
signification of the threat as serious and violent (by the media to the community), the
ensuing galvanization and intensification of public attention and policymaking, the
claims-making process inherent in the construction of fear and social problems, risk
inflation, demonization (suicide bombers as folk devils), specific or radical rhetoric in
official statements and media reports, moral panic, agenda setting, rule creation and
enforcement, social control process, and so on.
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Coding by induction follows grounded theory principles and calls for the
incremental coding of the data set as theoretical questions emerge. It is rooted in four
general observation categories: conditions (causes of the perceived phenomenon),
interaction between actors, strategies and tactics used by actors, and consequences of
actions. On the other hand, coding by ontological categories, as a middle-ground
approach, borrows from the two previous types of coding and helps to focus on the
context of the events, objective actions, subjective interpretations, socio-political
processes, social structures, and strategies or responses. This type of coding was used to
label concepts related to: political context (terrorism, separatism, nationalism, elections,
other), religious context (Islam, radical Islam, other), situational context (civil war, war,
insurgency, rebellion, guerrilla, democracy, other), media coverage (fact-based, opinion,
contradiction, distortion, sensationalism, and moralization), and politicization
(demonization, religiosity, moral discourse, agenda setting).
Relationships among codes or between categories were also labeled using pattern
coding in order to detect and tag inter-thematic articulations, common characteristics,
discrepancies, and peculiarities (e.g., co-existence of two variables; exceptions to the
norm). Whatever trends and patterns emerged within the data structure were methodically
encoded and summarized to maximize the thoroughness and objectivity of the analysis.
Hence, certain words and concepts were coupled with the abovementioned coding
scheme in order to classify the concepts emerging from the data. Recurring words and
concepts were then color-coded, labeled, tallied up, and condensed into a frequency table
(Table 7).
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Table 7
Concept Frequencies, Count and Percentage By Categories
Categories
Actors
Media
Public
Social control agents
Suicide bombers
Groups (terrorist or otherwise)
Political context
Terrorism
Separatism
Nationalism
Elections
Other
Religious context
Islam
Radical Islam
Other
Situational context
Civil war
War
Insurgency
Rebellion
Guerrilla
Democracy
Other
Stages of moral panic
Occurrence and signification
Social implications
Social control measures
Media coverage
Fact-based
Opinion
Contradiction
Distortion
Sensationalism
Moralization
Politicization
Demonization
Religiosity
Moral discourse
Agenda setting

Codes
ACT
MED
PUB
SC AGTS
SB
GRP
POL CON
TERR
SEPAR
NATIO
ELECT
AUTR
REL CON
ISL
RAD ISL
AUTR
SIT CON
CIV WAR
WAR
INSURG
REBEL
GUERR
DEMO
AUTR
MOR PAN
SIGNIF
SOC IMPL
SOC CTRL
MED COV
FACT
OPI
CONTRAD
DISTORT
SENSAS
MORAL
POLITZ
DEMON
RELIG
MORAL
AGDA
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Count and Percentage
n=11163
1328 (11.9%)
947 (8.5%)
1423 (12.7%)
4179 (37.4%)
3286 (29.4%)
n=9553
8689 (90.9%)
234 (2.4%)
451 (4.7%)
156 (1.6%)
23 (0.2%)
n=2481
975 (39.3%)
1267 (51.1%)
239 (9.6%)
n=3399
206 (6.1%)
1374 (40.4%)
806 (23.7%)
234 (6.9%)
326 (9.6%)
164 (4.8%)
289 (8.5%)
n=7641
2181 (28.5%)
2896 (37.9%)
2564 (33.6%)
n=2676
364 (13.6%)
566 (21.1%)
98 (3.7%)
167 (6.2%)
983 (36.7%)
498 (18.6%)
n=2546
254 (10%)
365 (14.3%)
659 (25.9%)
1268 (49.8%)

Synthetic Network Diagram
A synthetic network diagram is a data-based analytic tool that helps to structure
the collected data and present them in a visually simplified fashion. Diagrams are useful
tools to identify and explicate relations between the various elements of a phenomenon of
interest. They also enable researchers and the reader to more clearly observe conceptual,
categorical, situational, temporal, and causal links. Figure 3 provides such a visual aid,
emphasizing the connections between the categories and concepts at stake in the current
multi-case study of the social construction of suicide terrorism.
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Suicide bombing (episodic threat)

Dramatic media coverage

Signification as violent and serious threat to community/society

Media exposure
of terrorist group

Galvanized attention
of policymakers

Increased public concern

Claims-making process

Threat inflation

Demonization

Fearmongering rhetoric

Constructed collective insecurity

Moral panic

Agenda setting and enforcement

Demand resolution of endemic crisis

Radical discourses

Social control mechanisms

Figure 3: Network Diagram for the Social Construction of Suicide Terrorism

101

Chapter Four
Findings
Overview of Patterns and Themes
The subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in the social
construction of suicide terrorism are evidenced by examining the comprehensive data
collected via in-depth interviews, as well as the general and historical review of public
and official documents. The outcome of the analysis, summed up below, indeed sheds
light on the symbolic interaction of socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms,
and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The use of
suicide terrorism as a political weapon, its exploitation as a communication tool, and its
politicization to fuel moral panics are discussed in details later on in this chapter.
Overall, the study findings show that representations and interpretations of suicide
bombings in public policy and the mass media are unrefined and overwhelmingly onedimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and
psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use
unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings as religiously motivated acts and usually
describe suicide terrorism as a mere manifestation of evil. However, suicide terrorism is
more a political act than a religious one and the main motivating factor of contemporary
suicide bombing campaigns has consistently been foreign occupation.
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News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized and uses
overly dramatic, newsworthy stories about selected incidents or conflicts. Suicide
bombers are selectively depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized
foes. The vast majority of cases that are publicly acknowledged and widely analyzed
concern Middle Eastern incidents involving Islamic fundamentalists. Likewise, public
policy is almost exclusively based on suicide terrorism by Middle Eastern, Islamist
groups or bombers that are described following an “Us vs. Them” outlook on the issue
within the greater “War on Terror” framework. Secular groups, however prolific in their
use of the deadly tactic, are seldom the focal point of policymaking efforts or media
exposure.
Media portrayals and public policy rely on radical perceptions and intrinsically
flawed interpretations of suicide terrorism. They usually hinge upon erroneous “typical
profiles” of the average bombers. Suicide attacks are thus presented as extremely violent
and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who are
distressed, wrathful, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also
habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the
fundamentalist precepts of Wahhabist Islam and the promise of a glorious afterlife. This
is in total contradiction with the reality of suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact,
characterized by a combination of primitive means and meticulous planning (recruitment,
formation, and training) that results in extensive physical and psychological harm.
Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily suicidal and generally do not suffer from
any diagnosable psychological disorders or cognitive impairments impeding effective
problem-solving skills. Not all suicide bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a
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fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any other religion, for that matter: some secular
groups have resorted to the tactic, including the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The
Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally,
women and children are increasingly recruited for suicide missions by several secular and
religious groups that view them as providing invaluable tactical advantages. Though
media coverage of these two rising types of bombers is growing, it usually misidentifies
their motivations for getting involved in suicide missions and minimizes their
involvement in such operations.
Suicide Bombings as Political Weapons
Suicide bombings have been a modus operandi for terrorist groups for centuries.
The contemporary wave of suicide terrorism started in the early 1980s and clearly
demonstrates that the phenomenon is not primarily religious, unlike what is described in
the Western news media. Indeed, as confirmed by a recent review of “every suicide
terrorist attack around the world since 1980” and over 460 suicide bombers, “what over
95 percent of suicide terrorist attacks since 1980 have in common is not religion, but a
clear strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the
territory that the terrorists view as their homeland or prize greatly” (Pape, 2005). Suicide
terrorism as a political weapon appears to be a strategically “logic” choice (Pape, 2003;
2005) that can result in mass casualty situations, causes extensive physical damage and
psychological harm, requires no escape plan for the bombers, and poses negligible
security threats to the group since suicide bombers characteristically die in the course of
the attacks and therefore cannot be interrogated by security forces afterward. In addition,
suicide terrorism is as inexpensive as it is effective.
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Estimates are that it can cost as little as $150 to conduct a suicide attack.
Although extremely complicated attacks may cost more, the effectiveness
of these attacks is usually worth the investment. For instance, the
estimated cost to plan and conduct the 9/11 attacks is between $400,000
and $500,000, yet the resulting massive casualties, economic expense to
the United States, and the notoriety received by al Qaeda made this attack
exceptional in terrorist value with minimal money cost. (U.S. Army,
2005:III-1)
As one interviewee (a former British military analyst) put it:
What you must remember is that suicide bombings constitute a form of
armed violence that is characteristic of asymmetric warfare... This
essentially means that suicide bombings will unmistakably happen in
violent, politically-based conflicts where one side does not have the same
means available to fight equitably – conventional weapons, expensive
tanks, cruise missiles, sophisticated helicopters, advanced technology, etc.
Martyrdom operations are much cheaper than conventional warfare and
they can cause extensive damage on the targets, whether it is material or
psychological damage, in addition to killing many people. It is easy to see
why they would be preferred as strategic weapons.
At the same time, suicide bombings do not happen in a vacuum. They become
political weapon as a result of the context they occur in, the way they are dealt with by
the various socio-political forces involved, and how the public reacts to them. According
to one of the British scholars interviewed:
A suicide attack only becomes a political weapon once it is publicized by
the media and people respond with a certain state of panic. The wave
propagates throughout the population and then you have people who have
never heard of a given group but fear for their life and want protection, a
solution.
“A suicide bombing is nothing more than an explosion in an enclosed or open
space,” another American scholar argued. “The initial response involves only first
responders: law enforcement and emergency services, really. The rest – the mass
hysteria, the fear that spreads like wildfires throughout the country like it did after 9/11 –
that’s a response we can thank the media for.” The same respondent later added: “Some
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bombings could be suicide terrorism, but no one will talk about them if they’re not
spectacular. You have two symbolic towers collapsing in New York, that’s news. That
sells. And it’s easier to convince people it could affect them all the way to Topeka,
Kansas.”
A top official from the French Ministry of Interior declared during his interview:
If someone crashes a plane into the Eiffel Tower tomorrow, we’ll treat the
scene as a plane crash. If a man goes into the metro and blows himself up,
we’ll dispatch police and emergency personnel. Nothing is a terrorist
incident until you label it as such, but what does that change for the first
response stage? Victims need to be treated, the scene needs to be
processed no matter who or why. If a building burns down, you send
firefighters whether it is arson or an accidental fire, don’t you? It’s the
same with terrorism. We don’t need to induce more chaos by frightening
the population with terrorism rhetoric and spectacular media coverage.
That would be like adding oil to the fire – and it would certainly serve the
purpose of the individual or group behind the attack or give ideas to other
groups. We basically withhold as much information as we can during the
investigation phase and do not overemphasize the human dimension of the
political act.
Hizballah’s Brand of Destruction
As mentioned earlier, the first attack in the contemporary wave of suicide
bombings occurred in the Middle East when the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed in
December 1981 by pro-Iranian terrorists. In September 1982, the potential of suicide
terrorism as an influential strategic political weapon was increased by the suicide-mission
assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. The suicide bombing
tactic was quickly transformed into a full-blown geopolitical tool by Hizballah, the Iranbacked Lebanese Party of God, during the Lebanese Civil War. Hizballah claimed
responsibility for the October 1983 Beirut barrack attacks against French and U.S. troops,
which led to the southward retreat of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and prompted the
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United States and France to withdraw their forces from Lebanon (Van de Voorde &
Mason, 2004). The systematic suicide attack campaign also forced “Israel to abandon
most of the territorial and political gains made during [its] 1982 invasion of Lebanon”
(Atran, 2004, August:2). By 1992, Hizballah “had dramatically lessened its strategic
reliance on suicide bombing . . . when it decided to participate in parliamentary elections
and become a ‘mainstream’ political party” (Ibid.).
LTTE Suicide Bombings and Sri Lankan Politics
In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, have
consistently been the most prolific users of suicide bombings since their first suicide
attack in 1987. Although many will argue that the LTTE terror campaign has been
essentially unsuccessful at bringing about the political change the Tamil Tigers have been
fighting for for decades – the creation of an independent Tamil state – their suicide terror
campaign has become a model and an inspiration for many groups across the globe.
Sporadic acts of violence have been increasingly documented in Sri Lanka since the late
2002 ceasefire. Since November 2005, violence has in fact been rising in the rebel-held
northeastern part of the island after LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran threatened to
take up the struggle for a Tamil homeland again if the Sri Lankan government failed to
attend to the LTTE’s grievances. On December 25, 2005, pro-rebel Tamil legislator
Joseph Pararajasingham was assassinated during midnight mass at a Christmas service in
eastern Sri Lanka. Following the shooting, for which responsibility was not immediately
claimed, a pro-LTTE Website, TamilNet, posted a statement by a Tamil National
Alliance parliamentarian placing the blame squarely on the government. The official
declared that “targeting key Tamil political actors to weaken the Tamil struggle” was
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typical of a state-sponsored action against the Tamils. He added, “This strategy will fail
and in its wake will likely bring an unprecedented catastrophe to Sri Lanka.” Later that
day, the Sri Lankan government responded in a similarly firm statement blaming the
LTTE for assassinating one of its own supporters: “The LTTE, closely judged by the
series of criminal acts being perpetrated in the northeast in recent few days, [was]
desperately trying to divert the attention elsewhere and create mayhem and havoc while
eschewing political discussions.” The building tension between the Tamil Tigers, the
Tamil community, and the Sri Lankan government may foreshadow a resurgence of
violence, especially a multiplication of suicide bombings, and possibly a resumption of
the civil war that tore the island apart for many years (see Van de Voorde, 2005; Van de
Voorde & Mason, 2004).
Chechen Suicide Bombing Operations
Chechen suicide bombings did not occur until 2000: before that, the tactic was not
once employed throughout the First Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996) or during the first
year of the second Russo-Chechen War. Two dozen such attacks have occurred since and
this emergence of suicide bombings can be attributed to war-related cultural and
demographic crises, extensive human rights violations by the Russian Forces against
Chechen civilians, and the radicalization of the resistance forces that has followed.
The October 2002 Moscow theater hostage-taking situation marked a turning
point in the fight between Chechen rebels and the Russian government. On October 23,
2002, three dozen Chechen rebels took control of a crowded theater and held over 700
people hostage. They threatened to execute the hostages if their demands were not met,
most notably the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. A two-and-a108

half-day siege followed and, on the morning of October 26, 2002, the theater was raided
by the Spetsnaz, an elite commando unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB, former
KGB). They pumped a powerful anesthetic gas into the structure and stormed the
building. They proceeded to shoot all the rebels in the head at close range. The gas also
killed 130 hostages, whereas two were killed by the hostage-takers, which means that
Russian forces were eventually responsible for over sixty times as many hostage deaths
as the Chechen rebels were. The Russian government backed the intervention despite the
outcry it caused in the international media and general public, justifying it by the fact that
the rebels had strapped explosive to themselves and the only way to prevent suicide
bombings, extensive structural damage and mass casualties was to take the terrorists out
fast and by any means necessary.
In September 2004, another highly-publicized hostage crisis took a disastrous turn
when Russian police and soldiers intervened to put a stop to the situation in Beslan,
Russia. Demanding the usual withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, rebel leader
Shamil Basayev and his fighters took hundreds of children and teachers hostage at a
school on September 1, 2004. Three days later, the building was stormed, 336 people
were killed, and 747 were injured. Thirty-two terrorists were killed in the explosive
standoff, including five women. All of them had been wearing explosive belts and other
devices. Regardless of the “imminent threat” of suicide terrorism, the intervention of the
Russian police and military was awfully criticized by the media, the public, and foreign
governments, including the United States and many Western European countries. A
parliamentary inquiry was launched after the siege, especially following widespread
accusations that the crime scenes had been arranged by the authorities and evidence
109

destroyed to cover up the abuses and failures of the officials in charge. The final report is
due in early 2006, but a preliminary report made available on December 28, 2005 puts
the blame squarely on Russian security forces. This has been a surprising development,
since most people “assumed that a parliamentary inquiry into the attack would play down
public accusations that Russian police and soldiers were partly to blame for the deaths of
hundreds of hostages” (Griffiths, 2005). However, the victims in Beslan still believe that
blame will be avoided in the end and that the officials responsible for the deadly siege
will not be held accountable:
I think that the parliamentary inquiry would like to disclose the truth, but I
believe they will fail to do so. They will not dare do it because revealing
the truth would implicate top officials, high echelons who are to blame,
who let the situation go, who are corrupt. So, they will probably not dare
give their names because of their high rank. (Ibid.)
It is important to note that religious extremism is almost nonexistent as a
motivation for Chechen suicide terrorism, which appears to above all be “a strategic
tactic” and a political weapon being used “in an increasingly asymmetrical struggle with
the Russians” (Reuter, 2004:2). The purpose of the Chechen suicide bombing campaign
is “to attract support while attempting to coerce Russia into leaving the Chechnya”
(Ibid.). Hence the major objective of Chechen implementers of suicide bombings is “a
combination of a genuine desire to liberate the Chechen homeland and the necessity to
attract supporters, recognition, and funding to continue their efforts” (2004:21). In 2003,
the leader of the Chechen separatists “warned that the Chechen opposition had enough
strength, finance and resolution to keep on fighting for people's freedom until Chechnya
was absolutely free” (Suicide, 2003). They view suicide bombings as the most effective
tool to achieve such goals while advancing their radical agendas. Incidentally, one of the
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staunchest supporters of the Chechen rebel cause has been the United States (Horton,
2005).
“Taking cues from the ‘successful’ suicide campaigns of Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Al-Qaeda, Chechen extremists came to view suicide terrorism as their last best option”
(Reuter, 2004:21). Nonetheless, there has been a decline in Chechen suicide bombing
operations since 2004. On the one hand, human rights abuses have decreased in both
amount and frequency. On the other hand, analysts argue, it is possible that “calculating
implementers realized that suicide terrorism was not achieving the ambitious goals that
they had envisioned” (Reuter, 2004:21).
The London Bombings and European Politics
Another recent example of the use – and relative success – of suicide terrorism as
a political weapon can be found in the suicide bombings that occurred in London,
England on July 11, 2005. The four coordinated bombings targeted the public
transportation infrastructure, namely the underground network (first three attacks) and the
bus system (fourth bombing). They killed 56 people and injured more than 700. Of the
four bombers involved, three were Britons. The attacks have been blamed on al-Qaeda,
which had previously publicly threatened the United Kingdom in widely broadcast
speeches attacking the British government for being a key member of the group of
countries supporting the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, also known as the
“Coalition of the Willing.” Osama bin Laden once stated: “We reserve the right to
retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved, especially
Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.”
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These suicide attacks were all the more significant as they were followed ten days
later by an attempt at another series of five bombings in central London, which proved
unsuccessful. As the bombers eluded the police, a manhunt was launched and panic
spread throughout the population. People feared more bombings would happen and, via
the media, began to pressure Prime Minister Blair to pull troops out of Iraq. Security
alerts reached their highest level throughout the United Kingdom and elsewhere in
Europe. The London attacks compounded the social and geopolitical consequences of the
ten coordinated train bombings of March 2004 in Madrid, Spain, which have the highest
toll of all European bombings thus far in terms of dead and injured (the Madrid
bombings, which have been attributed to al-Qaeda, had a direct impact on the outcome of
the Spanish general elections that month and prompted the new government to pull all
Spanish troops out of Iraq). Thus the London bombings illustrate the main political
objective of the uses of suicide terrorism: to combat (and ideally bring to an end) the
foreign occupation of one’s homeland or sacred land. Iraq is located in what used to be
Mesopotamia, the Cradle of Humanity, and part of the Arabian Peninsula, which is a
Holy Land for Muslim.
Suicide Terrorism as a Communication Tool
Suicide bombings are a spectacular weapon in the arsenal of terrorist groups today
more than ever. We are in a media-saturated era where global communication networks
make it possible to spread news of suicide terror attacks across the world in a matter of
seconds. “Propaganda by deed” has taken a whole new global meaning now that groups
can easily promote their agendas and share their accomplishments via satellite television,

112

the Internet, and more high-end technological tools. As one of the Interpol representatives
put it in his interview:
Terrorist groups have grown international by cleverly networking around
the world, with supporters, sympathizers, and other groups alike. They
have created a web that enables them to find well-wishers, new recruits,
financial assistance, or popular support far away from their base. Look at
Al-Qaeda, for instance, or the LTTE. They started out as small groups
fighting for a specific cause within a specific region or against a specific
ideology. Today, they are international organizations with roots in several
countries and tens of thousands of supporters worldwide. All of that
happened because they have mastered the use of the mass media,
particularly the news and the Internet, to serve their purpose. Same thing
with the Chechens. They came out of nowhere and became media icons
thanks to their constant use of television and newspapers to spread their
message against the Russian occupation.
Indeed, Chechen separatist leaders have repeatedly used the media, including the
Website of the Chechen-Press news agency, to call upon the international community to
interfere into the conflict in Chechnya (Suicide, 2003; Reuter, 2004). They have also
exploited the strategic advantage presented by female suicide bombers to cause greater
psychological harm on their targeted audience and “attract more publicity and attention”
(Reuter, 2004:27), as evidenced by the sudden increase in the summer of 2003 of
international media coverage of female suicide bombings. The Chechen suicide bombing
campaign thus illustrates the potential uses of the violent tactic as a communication tool.
Overview of Media Coverage of Suicide Bombings
The suicide attack method, favored to this day by military and paramilitary
groups, was introduced to the general public during World War II, when Japanese
kamikaze pilots crashed their airplanes into Allied military targets. The first use of the
phrase “suicide bombing” in the news can be traced back to an August 1940 New York
Times article about World War II German military tactics. In March 1942, the same
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newspaper ran an article about Japanese troops that had tried to carry out a “suicide
bombing” against a U.S. carrier. In August 1945, the London Times described a kamikaze
plane as a “suicide bomb.” In April 1947, referred to a new type of radio-controlled
missile in those terms: “designed originally as a counter-measure to the Japanese
‘suicide-bomber,’ it is now a potent weapon for defence or offence.”
The use of the expression “suicide bombing” in its current context dates back to
1981, when the Associated Press introduced it in relation to the first attack of the
contemporary wave of suicide bombings: the December 15, 1981 car-bomb destruction of
the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 61 people. It was then used heavily to
describe and analyze two major events of the Lebanese Civil War: the April 1983 U.S.
Embassy bombing perpetrated by Hizballah in Beirut, as well as the October 1983
barrack attacks against U.S. Marines and French Paratroopers who were part of the
international peacekeeping corps. These bombings claimed over 300 lives and left
hundreds of people injured.
Since the mid-1980s, suicide bombings have become prime weapons in the
arsenal of guerrilla, insurgent, and terrorist groups. Sri Lanka and the Middle East, as
explained earlier, have been pivotal regions for the development of the deadly tactic. Sri
Lanka, however, has not received nearly as much coverage in the news or official policy
as the Middle East, especially in recent years. Although the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) were
the main users of suicide bombings in the world until 2001 (in terms of both number of
attacks and death toll), little to no attention has been paid to their terrorist campaign in
the Western news media or official policy. They are never part of any “Global War on
Terror” speech and barely make the news when a bombing or any LTTE-related incident
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occurs. In fact, although the transnational organization has been listed as an FTO by the
U.S. Department of State (in contradiction with the policies of other Western countries),
it is not referred to as terrorist in U.S. news. The Tamil Tigers, including the Black Tigers
of the suicide bombing squad, are typically described more neutrally or positively as
“separatists,” “fighters,” “attackers,” “rebels” or “truce violators.”
As a top-ranking U.S. military officer stressed in his interview,
Words have an amazing power. We called them terrorists while they call
themselves freedom fighters. Israelis call suicide bombings mass murder
or crimes against humanity, whereas Palestinians argue that ‘martyrs don’t
commit murder.’ We consider the Tamil Tigers ‘rebels’ because they are
in Sri Lanka and our interests in the area are limited to nonexistent, but in
Iraq we fight the ‘War on Terror’ against immoral suicide bombers who
are hell bent on destroying freedom. Think about it… Who in the United
States would pay attention to news reports about suicide bombings by
Hindu nationalists in Sri Lanka? Most people equate terrorism with
Islamic extremists from the Middle-East and, if it happens elsewhere like
southeast Asia, it had to be perpetrated by Middle-Eastern fanatics. It’s
going to be hard to shake that out of people’s heads if they are bombarded
with the wrong information in the media.
Islamist terrorists do seem to have a monopoly on suicide bombings – at least in
today’s mainstream media and official policy. News coverage and governmental
guidelines tend to have adopted a myopic vision of suicide terrorism that focuses
predominantly – if not solely – upon radical Muslims or “fundamentalists.” In particular,
suicide bombings of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the Iraqi insurgency have dominated the
general, contemporary understanding of the concept of suicide terrorism. Although these
have been the most frequent and cumulatively damaging bombings since 2000, they
certainly should not obscure the significant global patterns and worldwide dynamics of
suicide terrorism.
As emphasized by one of the interviewees, a French anti-terrorism agent:
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Of course, there is a problem with Islamic militants. Of course, there are
growing issues throughout the Islamic world that ought not to be ignored.
However, suicide terrorism is not about Islamic world domination. There
are non-Muslim groups that have used this technique for years –and
successfully so in some cases, as shown by the LTTE. People need to be
very careful in their appraisal of what suicide terrorism entails. Once you
have labeled a certain group of people ‘evil’ or ‘crazy terrorists,’ as is the
case with Muslim extremists in Western politics and in our mass media,
you end up stigmatizing an entire population and you exacerbate tensions
between people who basically don’t know anything about each other’s
religions or cultures. The media – whether in the US or Western Europe –
always portray the ‘evil Islamists’ as the perpetrators of suicide bombings.
First in Israel, now in Iraq. They never really focus on the source of the
problem: why suicide bombings are considered by their perpetrators and
supporters to be legitimate weapons in a war where using conventional
tactics and strategies is simply impossible.
The Media as Publicity Agents
Television – both traditional networks and satellite television – is a primary tool
for communication between terrorist groups, the media, governments, and the general
public. “Suicide bombing is, after all, perfectly suited to the television age” (Brooks,
2002). Newspapers are also often used by terrorist groups to relay messages to the
general public or other members of the organization. For example, in recent years,
Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev has repeatedly used the mass media in order to
arouse public awareness of the Chechen cause and the state-sponsored acts of violence
committed by the Russian military against the Chechen population. In 2002, during the
Moscow theater hostage crisis mentioned above, Basayev issued the following videorecorded statement through the news media:
Every nation has the right to their fate. Russia has taken away this right
from the Chechens and today we want to reclaim these rights, which God
has given us, in the same way he has given it to other nations. God has
given us the right of freedom and the right to choose our destiny. And the
Russian occupiers have flooded our land with our children's blood. And
we have longed for a just solution. People are unaware of the innocent
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who are dying in Chechnya: the sheikhs, the women, the children and the
weak ones. And therefore, we have chosen this approach. This approach is
for the freedom of the Chechen people and there is no difference in where
we die, and therefore we have decided to die here, in Moscow. And we
will take with us the lives of hundreds of sinners. If we die, others will
come and follow us—our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice
their lives, in God's way, to liberate their nation. Our nationalists have
died but people have said that they, the nationalists, are terrorists and
criminals. But the truth is Russia is the true criminal.
Using the media can be an excellent tool for propaganda and publicity in general.
Osama Bin Laden has been consistently portrayed in Western news as a universal threat
to the very fabric of our free society. In the spring of 2003, one of the interviewees in
Turkey’s Ministry of Interior declared:
Bin Laden is going to take over airwaves one way or another. Since the
September 11 attacks, he has been omnipresent already, in news coverage,
special media reports, and with video and audio tapes of his messages.
That is not going to stop. The repercussions on September 11 are going to
be felt for many years, even if another spectacular attack against American
interests happens. The media will not let go of a story like that one. The
government, President Bush will not either. He is going to play with the
global fear of insecurity, inflate it, disseminate it with the help of the mass
media, and probably get re-elected because of all that. The invasion of Iraq
is a bonus. It shows the U.S. is actively doing something to fight terrorism.
In reality, however, none of it is true. They are fighting the wrong people
in the wrong region, but the public does not see that. They see action and
initiative: that is enough for them.
Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “Palestinian and Arabic
regional media outlets have followed the events of the Israeli-Palestinian clashes closely,
and the degree of media coverage reflects the immense impact that the clashes have had
on Palestinian and Arab society” (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). Palestinian media
outlets have been accused of actively encouraging support for suicide bombings. “Israeli
and other critics have argued that the Palestinian media contribute to suicide attacks on
civilians by placing an inappropriate, commendatory emphasis on martyrdom” (Ibid.).
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Due to curfews and limitations on movement in the Occupied Territories, “the
importance of media – and particularly television – as the primary source of public
information has increased” (Ibid.). Farewell or last-will videos made by the bombers
“provide compelling footage, as do the interviews with families. The bombings
themselves produce graphic images of body parts and devastated buildings” (Brooks,
2002). In effect, “vast segments of Palestinian culture have been given over to the
creation and nurturing of suicide bombers. Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian
independence as the main focus of the Arab media” (Ibid.).
Then there are the ‘weddings’ between the martyrs and dark-eyed virgins
in paradise (announcements that read like wedding invitations are printed
in local newspapers so that friends and neighbors can join in the
festivities), the marches and celebrations after each attack, and the
displays of things bought with the cash rewards to the families. Woven
together, these images make gripping packages that can be aired again and
again. (Ibid.)
Recruitment videos made by terrorist groups are also broadcast by certain
networks. In early July 2005, the Al-Arabiya television network aired a segment
“showing an Iranian suicide bomber recruiter drive” (Nahmias, 2005a). In the short piece,
the Iranian Movement of Martyrdom Seekers declared it had “40,000 ‘time bombs’ ready
to attack [and] carry out suicide bombings in Israel and the United States” (Ibid.).
Numerous Iranian youths can be seen training in a camp.
‘This is our choice and we have no fear,’ a masked woman told a reporter
from Al-Arabiya. ‘We adhere to the legacy of our late leader, Imam
Khomeini.’
‘There is no God but Allah!’ shout a group of women, covered in
hijabs, in unison.
‘These young women have forsaken the temptations of life, and have
chosen the hard way. Indeed, they have chosen martyrdom as a way of
liberating Islamic lands,’ says the Al-Arabiya reporter. ‘40,000 time
118

bombs in Iran – this is the number of volunteers so far, and the registration
is still open.’ (Ibid.)
On July 26, 2005, Iran publicly acknowledged it was running an official “suicide
column” program with full-blown training camps within its borders and actively
recruiting members of public to become suicide bombers across the country (Nahmias,
2005b). Officials of the Iranian government had denied for many years any involvement
in suicide bomber recruiting or training activities. The President of Iran himself has since
openly glorified suicide bombers. An article published in the London-based daily Asharq
Al Awsat reported that senior Iranian leader Ayatollah Muhammad Taki Misbah Yazari, a
spiritual counselor of President Muhammad Ahmadinejad, had used an Iranian
newspaper to call on the Iranian public “to join the swelling ranks of Iran’s homegrown
suicide bombers” (Ibid.). The message read as follows:
Suicide operations are the peak of the nation, and the height of its bravery
. . . Commander Khamani has announced that registration for the suicide
bomber force is open all over the country, and encourages Iranians to join
in order to safeguard Islam and fight against its enemies. This holy
organization of the Islamic Republic is aimed at those who are interested
in suicide. The volunteer will join specialist courses. Brothers and sisters
who believe and are interested in defending Islam are invited to get in
touch via P.O. Box Number 1653-664, Teheran, and are asked to send two
photos, a copy of their birth certificate. Please enlist in the suicide squad.
The suicide organization, Zaytoon, was created in early 2005 “for men and women who
wished to carry out suicide bombings against the enemies of Islam and the Iranian
revolution -- in particular, the Americans, British, and Israelis” as well as “Arab and
Muslim countries . . . considered friends of the United States” (Ibid.). It is purportedly
headed by Elias Nedran, who is the leader of the parliamentary conservative bloc and a
former intelligence officer in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Zaytoon has already
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held several rallies, which have each been attended by hundreds of men and women
usually between the ages of 14 and 30. During one of these meetings, Ayatollah Yazari,
who is firmly opposed to Iranian reformers, “emphasized the need to volunteer rapidly
and to attend specialist training courses which enable members to carry out suicide
bombings in Iraq and other areas, including Israel” (Ibid.). What the many volunteers are
usually told is that “the gates of heaven are open for you; there are beautiful, black-eyed
virgins there who are waiting for you on the banks of golden rivers” (Ibid.).
More recently, Iran also made international news following the October 28, 2005
broadcast of an animated movie on how to become a suicide bomber. The ten-minute
graphic cartoon was shown as an after-school special on Iran’s IRIB 3TV channel
(MEMRITV, 2005). It illustrates recent efforts by certain groups, including religious ones
in Palestine and secular ones such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to actively recruit children
to join the ranks of the suicide bombers. Like women, children present tactical and
strategic advantages that are not lost to terrorists.
The Use of the Internet
The World Wide Web has been used for years by terrorist groups and antiterrorist organizations alike. The former use its openness and instantaneous global reach
to get their message to millions of people across the globe, to recruit, advertise, and
otherwise communicate about their cause. The latter use the Internet in order to track the
activities of known or supposed terrorists around the world, be it “propaganda,”
recruiting activities, fundraising, secret communications via e-mail or instant messenger
(“increased chatter”), and so on.
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The Internet is also a fertile ground for political satire and is commonly used to
disseminate political caricatures and various forms of cartoons, images, and skits. For
instance, a Website called strangemilitary.com features a parody of a self-help book
entitled “Jihad for Dummies: The Fundamentals of Fundamentalism,” the cover of which
reads: “Thinking about SUICIDE BOMBING? Get it right the FIRST time!” or “Learn
how to declare your very own fatwa!” German carmaker Volkswagen recently used the
Internet to advertise for its new Polo, using the usual slogan “Small but tough” along with
a less usual mainstream television ad protagonist: a suicide bomber who detonates his
bomb belt inside the Polo without anyone noticing his actions outside the car. Thus
suicide bombers have entered the collective mind and are taking root as popular icons
even in Western culture.
More seriously, Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network has become a global jihadist
movement that has perfected the use of multimedia technology over the past few years.
Some argue that it is now essentially Web-directed and primarily steered by ideology and
the Internet. The spread of jihadist rhetoric and Wahhabist ideology has been
significantly facilitated by the World Wide Web. Al-Qaeda’s “online jihad” has in
essence provided a “virtual university of global jihad” (Pavlova, 2004). In recent years,
al-Qaeda has used the Internet for financing and publicity purposes, to organize
recruitment, to network and mobilize further support, and to collect and share information
somewhat effortlessly. Al-Qaeda’s many Websites, which appear and disappear in a
matter of seconds, as well as various related promotional Internet sites have been used
notably to post audio messages by Osama bin Laden and other leaders, so as to ensure
their worldwide dissemination without editing. In August 2004, al-Qaeda even created a
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special Website for women, calling upon them “to persuade their men to take up the
jihad. The pretty pink web site, which included beauty tips, did not call on women to
become bombers” (Bloom, 2005c) and yet, within a year, female Al-Qaeda fighters
began resorting to suicide bombings.
The distinctive dynamics of the Internet account for its widely popular use
amongst jihadists today and fit within more general media globalization trends:
The same forces that gave rise to the Al-Jazeera and the Al-Arabiya TV
networks are at play with jihadist web sites worldwide. In contrast to the
pre-September 11 pro-Bin Laden Internet pages – the majority of which
were hosted and maintained from within Europe and the United States –
the recent trend is that such web sites are more ‘localized.’ They are
hosted in countries as far apart as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Turkey, Bosnia, and Great Britain, and cater to domestic audiences on
their respective languages. The second fact to be observed is the
astounding technological advancement and professionalism of their
authors and creators. Graphical design is put o maximum effect, and often
pictures and videos – taken from their original web sites of appearance –
are refurbished into new formats and styles to evoke utmost possible
emotional response. (Pavlova, 2004)
Film Portrayals of Suicide Bombers
The Terrorist (1999) is an Indian film directed and written by Santosh Sivan. Shot
entirely in Tamil but not explicitly set in Sri Lanka, it follows Malli, a hardcore 19-yearold female terrorist who suddenly has reservations about her suicide assassination
mission and doubts the legitimacy of the ultimate sacrifice she has been asked to make.
Beyond an aesthetic achievement, this film is a powerful portrayal of Malli’s personal
struggle, from joining the terrorist group as a child following the death of her young
brother to her late teenage years. The story is neither apologetic nor politically charged
nor explicitly violent. Yet, the U.S. promotional campaign for the film, which was based
freely on the May 1991 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the
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LTTE’s Thenmuli “Dhanu” Rajaratnam, describes the heroine as “a natural born killer”
whose “death will not be ordinary.”
The War Within (2005) is an American film directed by Joseph Castelo, who cowrote it with Tom Glynn and Ayad Akhtar. Akhtar also plays the main character, a
Pakistani man who has a conscience crisis as he is about to carry out a suicide bombing
in New York City. Another recent feature film on suicide bombings, Paradise Now
(2005), tells the story of Said and Khaled, two Palestinian childhood friends who are
recruited to carry out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. The controversial film, which
follows the last two days of the young men and delves into the psyche of suicide
bombers, was directed by Palestinian and Israeli-born director Hany Abu-Assad, who cowrote the screenplay with Bero Beyer and Pierre Hodgson. So far, the Arabic-language
film has received nominations for several prizes and won 9 major awards, including the
Amnesty International Film Prize at the 2005 Berlin International Film Festival and the
2006 Golden Globe for Best Foreign Language Film. Interestingly, the latter was
awarded under the category “Palestine” even though the film was officially produced by
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel. Many have argued that Paradise Now –
much like the two movies mentioned above – humanizes suicide bombers and is nothing
more than a propaganda tool. On the other hand, film critic Roger Ebert (2005) argues:
On his video, Said articulates the Palestinian position, expressing anger
that the Israelis have stolen the status of victims he believes belongs by
right to his own people. Does this speech make the film propaganda, or
does it function simply as a record of what such a man would say on such
an occasion? I'm not sure it matters. If we are interested in a film that
takes us into the lives of suicide bombers, we must be prepared to regard
what we find there. Certainly what Said says will not come as a surprise to
any Israeli. It's simply that they disagree.
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We may disagree, too, and yet watch the film with a fearsome
fascination. The director and co-writer, Hany Abu-Assad, uses the
interesting device of undercutting the heroism of his martyrs with
everyday details. During one taping of a farewell message, the camera
malfunctions. During another, one of the bombers interrupts his political
sermon with a personal shopping reminder for his mother. . . .
It hardly matters, in a way, which side Abu-Assad's protagonists are
on; the film is dangerous because of its objectivity, its dispassionate
attention to the actual practical process by which volunteers are trained
and prepared for the act of destruction.
These three independent films have in common the fact that they put a face on the
suicide bombers and show us their human features and humane qualities. They also
illustrate the utter lack of suicidality (suicide attempts or ideation) of the bombers. Each
one focuses on the uncertainties and doubts of suicide bombers, thus indeed humanizing
them. However, though they avoid demonizing the terrorists, they do not glorify the
martyrs either. If anything, “that creates not sympathy, but pity; what a waste, to spend
your life and all your future on behalf of those who send you but do not go themselves”
(Ibid.).
An even more recent film hailing from the United States is Stephen Gaghan’s
Syriana (2005), a “politically-charged epic about the state of the oil industry” based on a
Robert Baer book (IMDb, 2005). The reason why this movie stands out is that it is the
first to fully integrate the suicide bomber at the core of the narrative. This introduction of
suicide terrorism as a major plotline in a big-budget Hollywood production marks a
milestone in the global entertainment enterprise. The film has received much praise
already, but its shortcomings have also drawn criticism. Ventura (2005) argues that
“Syriana offers American audiences a peek into the insidious work of fundamentalism on
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the idle minds. . . . While contextualizing the roots of discontent is a worthy goal, the
movie does so at the expense of shedding light on true fanaticism.”
Moral Panics and the Politicization of Suicide Terrorism
Suicide terrorism has been described as “the crack cocaine of warfare” (Brooks,
2002), a metaphor reminiscent of the pungent rhetoric used in the “War on Drugs.”
It doesn’t just inflict death and terror on its victims; it intoxicates the
people who sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human
passions – the thirst for vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the
longing for earthly glory and eternal salvation. Suicide bombing isn’t just
a tactic in a larger war; it overwhelms the political goals it is meant to
serve. It creates its own logic and transforms the culture of those who
employ it. (2002:18)
The occurrence of suicide terrorism, the signification of suicide bombings as a
particularly violent and pervasive threat, the wider social implications that have
galvanized public attention, and the measures of social control that have been adopted to
seek resolution of the crisis and greater societal malaise – all of these correspond to
stages of moral panics propagated by the media and resulting in sweeping policy reforms
to make the public feel empowered, safe, and satisfied. Major findings concerning the
interpretation of, overreaction to, and politicization of suicide terrorism are described
below.
Suicide Bombers as Contemporary Folk Devils
Suicide bombers are usually depicted in the media and public policy as irrational
individuals, crazed fanatics, immoral cowards, socially inadequate, economically
deprived, religious zealots, and suicidal young men who have been brainwashed by evil
Islamists to carry out suicide missions. The complex reality of suicide bombers and their
motivations is mostly ignored. These issues are further discussed below. One of the
125

Turkish scholars interviewed in mid-2004 for the G-CDMHA project described the issue
in these terms:
Suicide bombings are publicized in a very specific way in Western media.
The reports almost always provide the same image of the deranged
terrorist, the fanatic, the lunatic who had nothing to lose and everything to
win – namely, money for his family, eternal life and virgins for himself.
This is wrong. Completely wrong. It is a simplistic portrayal that
perpetuates stereotypes and misconceptions about suicide bombings.
However, it is acceptable from a political standpoint because it fits the
ongoing agenda of the self-proclaimed number one country in the world.
How are you going to fuel fears about terrorism and further justify a
‘global war on terror’ if you start broadcasting reports that try to really
decipher what lies behind the act. Most people would think that
decomposing motivation and analyzing the persona of the bomber could
somehow justify the act in the eyes of some people. God forbid we
humanize those evil people! They must be portrayed as mad, pitiless,
heartless, cold-blooded killers with nothing to live for. They are the
contemporary demons, the ‘evil’ empire that must be fought by the joined
forces of the ‘good’ coalition. That is what it boils down to, in U.S.
politics, in the media, in the public’s mind: a war between Good and Evil.
That is quite clever, you must admit, although not very original. First, it
sells news and that means ratings and money for media corporations,
especially the ones that side with Bush. Second, it justifies going after a
group or its sponsors as swiftly and as hard as possible. People want
retaliation, people want justice done. That is not going to happen if you
paint a meek picture of terrorists. You have to exploit their actions, beat
them at their own game, fire up everyone to ‘go and get them.’ You have
to exaggerate the threat to make sure people get scared about the ‘scourge’
of terrorism, the ‘epidemic’ of suicide bombings. Once they feel really
unsafe because of your radical talk, you can have them blindly agree to or
condone any kind of measure, even the most extreme ones like the use of
the atomic bomb in 1945, the war in Iraq today, nuclear war in the future –
who knows?
Typical profile of a suicide bomber. On December 12, 1983, the French and U.S.
Embassies in Kuwait City were partially destroyed by suicide truck bombs that killed 6
and injured dozens of people. Then a suicide bomber used a truck bomb and killed 15
people at a French Army building in Beirut on December 21, 1983. On December 26,
1983, Newsweek published the following ill-fated commentary:
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Experts in Israel, which has been subject to suicide terrorism for more
than a decade, believe the threat is not likely to spread beyond the Middle
East. The Israelis have drawn a psychological profile of the suicide
terrorist based on an analysis of more than a dozen who survived their
high-risk attacks on Israel, as well as a study of World War II Japanese
kamikaze strikes. Several characteristics stand out. Guerrillas who
undertake certain-death missions tend to have a cultural predisposition to
view suicide as an honorable way of entering the afterlife, and more
importantly, a psychopathological desire to die. Those elements must be
set into play by indoctrination from a highly respected authority figure.
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Iran would seem to be a perfect
breeding ground for such terrorists. According to Israeli findings, the more
time that elapses between the terrorist’s last exhortation and his arrival at
the target, the less likely he is to act. Even a determined terrorist can drop
his plans under the impact of such simple culture shock as landing at a
faraway airport. One Israeli specialist predicts that ‘there will be more
suicide strikes against the Americans and French in the Middle East, but
not many. There is still less danger that there will be attacks overseas.’
(Gelman, 1983)
Since then, suicide terrorism has spread overseas in a spectacular fashion, from
Israel to Indonesia, Kenya to Turkey, Tanzania to England and Morocco – and even the
United States. The desire has been strong to categorize suicide terrorists into certain
deviant types, not necessarily to help understand their motivations and actions but to at
least make their castigation easier. Typologies of suicide bombers have been developed
primarily to describe Palestinian suicide bombers acting against Israel. One such
typology was recently developed for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Kimhi &
Even, 2003) and rather inopportunely extended to non-Palestinian suicide bombers by
(amongst others) the U.S. military (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2005).
The classification distinguishes between four prototypes: the religious fanatic, the
nationalist fanatic, the avenger or revenge seeker, and the exploited. To each type
correspond certain prerequisites, supporting factors, and hypothetical dominant

127

personality traits (Table 8). These four profiles are adequate summaries of the ways that
suicide bombers are systematically portrayed in the media and public policy.
Table 8
Kimhi & Even’s Classification of Suicide Bomber Prototypes and their Correlates
Prototype

Prerequisites

Supporting Factors

Hypothetical Personality
Traits

Religious
Fanatic

- Religious indoctrination
encouraging and urging suicide
attacks
- Charismatic religious leaders with
great influence on candidates for
suicide operations

- Sympathetic public
atmosphere within the
religious community
that praises martyrs,
which includes
publicity, great honor,
and commemoration

Faithful, steadfast, goalfocused, belief in
divinely determined
fate, influenced by
people whom s/he
reveres, belief in the
world to come

Nationalist
Fanatic

- Well-developed political
consciousness, along with a sense of
an uncompromising struggle to
liberate the homeland
- A clear feeling that the armed
struggle and suicide attacks are an
effective and necessary weapon in
achieving political goals

- Participation of the
organization to which
the individual belongs in
the suicide attack
- Sympathetic public
atmosphere that praises
the sacrifice
- Media that ensures
wide coverage both in
local community and
internationally

Steadfast, sure in his/her
ways, willing to
sacrifice him/herself for
the general public
(idealist)

Avenger

Psychological injury based on one or
more of the following events:
- Death or serious injury of a family
member or another close individual
- Trauma related to foreign
occupation of homeland (personal
humiliation, or witnessing the
humiliation of a relative)
- Personal or family problems
resulting in an individual’s feeling
that his or her life is worthless
(culminating in or including
depression)

- Sympathetic public
atmosphere that praises
the martyrs, which
includes publicity of
names, great honor, and
commemoration
- Financial support for
the family of the
deceased suicide
terrorist

Hopeless, vengeful,
tendency to see their life
as worthless

Exploited

Suicide terrorists who are unable to
withstand the organization’s
pressures to “volunteer” for a suicide
operation, such as:
- Children and youth
- Adults in social distress
(collaborators, homosexuals, moral
offenders)
- People with weak personalities

- Sympathetic public
atmosphere that praises
the martyrs
- Suicide terrorists’
belief that all their sins
will become “white as
snow” and that they will
be granted full
atonement for their past

Dependent, anxious,
difficulty withstanding
pressure, recognition
seeking
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On the evening of October 1, 2005, a University of Oklahoma (OU) engineering
student strapped explosives to himself and detonated them 500 feet away from the
campus stadium in Norman, Oklahoma, which was filled with 84,000 college football
supporters. The bomb blast shook the stadium and was heard five miles away. The
bomber, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, was a 21-year-old white male who did not fit the typical
profile of the average suicide bomber. The case, officially described by the Norman
police as a suicide bombing, was reportedly investigated by Homeland Security, but then
quickly dropped from newscasts. As it turns out, the young man, originally from
Colorado, had tried to purchase ammonium nitrate, the same kind of fertilizer used in
April 1995 by Timothy McVeigh to destroy a federal building in Oklahoma City.
Hinrichs, who had a Pakistani roommate, had apparently converted to Islam and attended
the same Norman mosque as Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called “20th hijacker” of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Speculations about the motivation of the young man and his
possible ties to an Islamist network at OU and in the greater Norman area were
widespread in the local media following the bombing. Muslim students and citizens were
targeted by law enforcement (including the FBI) and others in the community. The
situation and related rumors worsened after local police and federal agents handcuffed
and held at gunpoint an Egyptian OU instructor and several other foreign individuals. To
this day, the case has not been clearly elucidated. However, Hinrichs has been
consistently described by the media and local authorities as a “loner” who was “deeply
depressed.” His suicide has now been classified as an “individual act of despair.”
The Hinrichs case, as many others, is representative of the discrepancy between
the reality of suicide bombings and the interpretation of suicide terrorism by the media
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and agents of social control. Media reports and political agendas are focused on a virulent
Middle Eastern brand of suicide terrorism that entails religious extremism and irrational,
delusional, brainwashed bombers with nothing to live for. The public has been sensitized
to perceive suicide bombers as “unbalanced sociopaths” and “uneducated religious
fanatics” (Bloom, 2005c). The media and political actors neglect the fact that suicide
bombings have no necessary connection to Islam and that bombers are by and large
“upper-middle class, well-educated, successful, socially connected people who know
exactly what they are doing” and who “give their lives to kill people as part of a strategic
campaign aimed at the people of the West, to turn us against our governments, and to
force them to end the occupations and protections” (Horton, 2005).
The use of women in suicide bombing missions. The Syrian Socialist National
Party (SSNP), a pro-Syrian, Lebanese secular terrorist group, was the first group to use a
female suicide bomber, seventeen-year-old Sana’a Mehaydali, against an Israeli convoy
in Lebanon in 1985. The SSNP soon became responsible for a total twelve suicide attacks
– five of which were carried out by women. Female bombers increasingly appeared in
others parts of the globe after the mid-1980s, including in Sri Lanka (most notably with
the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a teenaged female Tamil Tiger), Turkey, Israel
and the occupied territories, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Chechnya, and now Iraq. 34
percent of the suicide bombings carried out since 1985 have been perpetrated by women
(Gunaratna, 2000; Bloom, 2005c). “Most have belonged to secular separatist
organizations, such as the LTTE and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)” (Bloom,
2005b). In fact, only secular groups such as the SSNP, the LTTE or the PKK initially
recruited and used female bombers for suicide missions. In recent years, however, “the
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worrisome emergence of women suicide bombers in religious organizations” has been
observed (Bloom, 2005b).
The role of Palestinian women in suicide terror campaigns has now been strongly
established, especially within the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada where they became
known as the “Army of Roses” (Dickey, 2005; Victor, 2003). The first Palestinian female
suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, struck in Jerusalem in January 2002. More than 20 cases
involving women have thus far been documented (they constitute about 5 percent of all
attacks). As explained by Israeli security forces:
The terrorist organizations behind the attacks want to exploit the
advantages of dispatching females to perpetrate them, primarily within the
Green Line. This is under the assumption that a female is thought of as
soft, gentle, and innocent and therefore will arouse less suspicion than a
man. In the cases in which females were involved, the terrorists were
aware of their need for camouflage that would help them blend in on the
Israeli street. The female terrorists attempted to Westernize their
appearance, among other things wearing clothing that was not
conservative, such as short skirts, or maternity clothes, and having modern
haircuts. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003b)
These women typically “do not fit the accepted image of the ‘average Palestinian
woman’” (Ibid.) or, for that matter, that of the average suicide bomber. They come from a
variety of economic and social backgrounds, they are often well-educated, and some are
mothers with children. The motivational patterns of these women typically fit the
“avenger” type described above, though most media reports focus on women being
exploited, coerced, and otherwise blackmailed to “volunteer” for suicide missions.
Teenage girls especially have been the focus on much media and official scrutiny, since
they have been used increasingly as recruiters or facilitators and appear to be even more
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personally, emotionally, and socially vulnerable than adult women (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2003a).
The majority of Chechen suicide bombers are women. 68 percent of attacks
involve women and 50 percent of all attacks are carried out exclusively by female
bombers. They have been dubbed the “Black Widows” and have effectively altered the
face of female suicide terrorism over the past five years (Bloom, 2005c; Dickey, 2005;
Reuter, 2004). Their prevalence has been explained by a combination of factors: the
tactical advantage of their low suspiciousness level, the publicity- and attention-driven
strategic element derived from the “greater psychological impact on the target audience,”
and “the main undercurrent of the broader suicide terrorism phenomenon in Chechnya”
linked to “desperation and hopelessness” and “feelings of helpless anger” or anxiety that
are “easily exploited by recruiters” (Reuter, 2004). Since they target mainly Russian
objectives, their suicide bombings have not received much coverage in the Western news
media. Nonetheless, the Black Widows of Chechnya have become an “example among
heroines of jihad” and “an important factor in the spread of suicidal terror” (Dickey,
2005).
The tales of these Chechen women are as much about tawdry
victimization as battlefield heroics. They come from a rugged society
where an old tradition, made worse after years of gunslinging war and
anarchy, allows men to kidnap the bride of their choice. The kidnappers
can settle disputes with the woman’s family in cash, or with violence. . . .
[O]nce she’s been taken, she’s unlikely to find another husband. ‘No
intelligent, nice young man in Chechnya would marry a nonvirgin girl.’. . .
Some Chechen women who have lost husbands or sons in the war
want to live only long enough to take revenge. The first attack by a ‘black
widow,’ in the summer of 2000, killed 27 members of the Russian Special
Forces. Then the spectral, silent presence of 18 ‘widows’ during the
deadly hostage siege of a Moscow theater in 2002 heightened their
mystique. Over a four-month period in 2003, Chechen women carried out
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six out of seven suicide attacks on Russian targets, killing 165 people.
Women bombers allegedly brought down two Russian airliners last year,
killing all 90 passengers and crew. (Ibid.)
These two brands of suicide bombings – the Palestinian version and the Chechen
type – illustrate a significant characteristic of the peculiar rationale for the involvement of
Muslim women in suicide attacks. “The underlying message conveyed by female
bombers is: Terrorism has moved beyond a fringe phenomenon and insurgents are all
around you” (Dickey, 2005). Moreover, as explained by Bloom (2005c):
What is so compelling about why women become suicide bombers is that
so many claimed to have been raped or sexually abused by enemy forces,
according to interviews with those who knew them. Once dishonored, they
are no longer marriageable. Joining a terrorist group is one of the few
remaining options for women who, according to the strict honor code
followed in some Islamic societies, must otherwise be executed by their
own families. With their deaths they reinvent themselves as martyrs,
redeeming the family name and recouping lost honor.
In early November 2005, a young white woman and Islam convert from Belgium
made international news when she blew herself up in Baghdad. Described both as a “girl
next door” and “an Islamic extremist,” Muriel Degauque “achieved a grim milestone by
becoming the first female European convert to commit a suicide bombing in Iraq”
(Rotella, 2005). According to one article in the Los Angeles Times (Ibid.),
The 36-year-old woman died Nov. 9 in the car bombing of a U.S. military
convoy after traveling with her Moroccan-born husband to Iraq to join
other foreign fighters in a network led by militant kingpin Abu Musab
Zarqawi. . . .
Investigators said the incident illustrated the growing role of converts
and women in Europe’s increasingly fierce and violent Islamic networks.
It also apparently is the first suicide bombing anywhere by a female
Islamic convert of European descent.
The added significance of the Degauque incident is that it prompted Newsweek to
publish a well-timed special report entitled “Women of Al Qaeda” on December 12, 2005
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(Dickey, 2005) - the first notable attempt by a mainstream news media outlet at a
thorough analysis of the participation of women in suicide bombings. The report opens
with the following statement:
Jihad used to have a gender: male. The men who dominated the movement
exploited traditional attitudes about sex and the sexes to build their ranks.
They still do that, but with a difference: even Al Qaeda is using female
killers now, and goading the men. (Ibid.)
The report reviews the evolution of female suicide bombings over the past two
decades, from its SSNP origins to its perfection by the LTTE’s Black Tigers and
including the Palestinian Army of Roses and the Chechen Black Widow
bombings. It offers insight into the motivations of female bombers in the global
Islamist terrorist network, notably with regard to women and the promise of an
afterlife.
Reem Riashi, a mother of two, recorded a videotape before her mission,
saying she hoped her ‘organs would be scattered in the air’ and her soul
‘would reach paradise.’ Would there be 72 houris to greet her there? No.
The religious scholars who endorse suicide attacks have described an
alternative paradise for women. Thauria Hamur, a 26-year-old captured by
the Israelis before she could set off a bomb in May 2002, told
NEWSWEEK in a prison interview that women martyrs would ‘become
the purest and most beautiful form of angel at the highest level possible in
heaven.’ (Ibid.)
Meanwhile, although such investigative efforts as Newsweek’s recent report are needed
and welcome pieces of information, the recruitment, training and use of female bombers
by secular groups remains understudied by the media and neglected by policymakers.
The priorities in the current global “War on Terror” have been squarely set within an
agenda focused solely upon Islamist terrorism and, more specifically, Middle-Eastern-
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based or al-Qaeda-related terrorist initiatives. Within such a limited framework, the
perpetration of suicide bombings by secular groups.
Symbols and Demonization: The Post-September 11 Rhetoric
“This is not an isolated criminal act we are dealing with, it is an extreme and evil
ideology whose roots lie in a perverted and poisonous misinterpretation of the religion of
Islam.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair uttered that statement following the July 11,
2005 London bombings. His choice of words echoed speeches made after the September
2001 attacks in the United States. The dominant discourses, frames, and representations
that have informed the media and public debate over suicide terrorism are now presented
with a focus on the post-September 11 framework.
The clash of civilizations model. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, Israeli
leader Ariel Sharon appeared on television to convey his regret, condolences, and
assurance of Israel’s support in the war on terror. Sharon called for a coalition against
terrorist networks, setting the civilized world against the barbaric world of the terrorists
and pitting “the free world” against “the forces of darkness” that are trying to destroy
“freedom” and “our way of life.” Sharon declared “This is a war between good and evil
and between humanity and the bloodthirsty” and added that the attacks were “a turning
point in the war against international terror.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a
statement that described the attacks as “perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent
to the sanctity of human life” and continued to assert that “we, the democracies of this
world, are going to have to come together to fight it and eradicate this evil completely
from our world.” In German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s opinion, the attacks “were
not only attacks on the people in the United States, our friends in America, but also
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against the entire civilized world, against our own freedom, against our own values,
values which we share with the American people.” Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien called the attacks “a cowardly act of unspeakable violence . . . It is impossible to
fully comprehend the evil that would have conjured up such a cowardly and depraved
assault.” Even President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, one of three countries
then recognizing the Taliban government, criticized the attacks and asked for
international cooperation to fight the “modern-day evil” of terrorism. Pope John Paul II
qualified the attacks as an “unspeakable horror” and, during his weekly general audience
in St. Peter's Square, the pontiff told Americans that "those who believe in God know that
evil and death do not have the final say” (International, 2001).
On the evening of September 11, 2001, President Bush made a televised and
radio-broadcast address to the nation. His opening statement was: “Today, our fellow
citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and
deadly terrorist acts.” President Bush then declared: “Thousands of lives were suddenly
ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.” He went on to make the following statements:
America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for
freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light
from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.
. . . The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve
directed the full resources for our intelligence and law enforcement
communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
those who harbor them. . . . America and our friends and allies join with
all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together
to win the war against terrorism. Tonight I ask for your prayers for all
those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for
all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they
will be comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the
ages in Psalm 23: ‘Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of
death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.’ This is a day when all
136

Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and
peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this
time. None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend
freedom and all that is good and just in our world. (Text, 2001)
Bushspeak. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the rhetoric of the
Bush administration followed a pattern for which a precedent had been set throughout the
day by world leaders. Indeed, as illustrated by the abovementioned speech excerpt,
President Bush condemned the “evil” of terrorism and the evil terrorists, whom he
referred to as “a faceless coward” soon after the attacks (Bush, 2001). The word “evil”
itself was used four times in the very first official speech made on the eve of the attacks.
Moreover, President Bush repeatedly portrayed the conflict as a “war between good and
evil” in which the United States was going to “eradicate evil from the world” and to
“hunt down” and “smoke out evildoers,” those “barbaric people.” The President’s
vernacular style soon became referred to as “Bushspeak” and illustrated how he “rarely
puts ten words together in a major address without taking a position, passing a judgment,
or proclaiming a purpose” (Gourevitch, 2004).
The Bush administration also used various cowboy metaphors (calling for Osama
bin Laden “dead or alive” for example), as well as several figures of speech with heavy
religious overtones. The most documented one is President Bush’s initial description of
the anti-terrorism campaign as a “crusade.” Although it was in line with his “good vs.
evil” interpretation of the situation, he was advised that the term carried a highly
offensive historical connotation in connection with earlier wars between Christians and
Muslims. At the outset of the campaign, the Pentagon named the war against terror
“Operation Infinite Justice.” They, too, were advised that only God could dispense such
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“infinite justice” and that Americans and others could be troubled by a war expanding to
infinity. In outlining the goals of the war, not once did President Bush mention
democracy. The new name for the war on terrorism became “Operation Enduring
Freedom.” From that point on, the Bush administration mantra frequently reaffirmed that
the global war against terrorism was being fought “for freedom.”
The “terrorist” label. An important issue related to the role of the media and their
coverage of suicide bombing events relates to the labeling of certain groups as “terrorist”
whereas others are continuously referred to in more positive or simply neutral terms –
even if they are listed as FTOs in the United States for instance. This has been a point of
contention amongst political and media analysts, as well as military experts, for many
years. Terrorism, as explained earlier, has yet to be clearly and uniformly defined and
remains, as a result, a very subjective concept influenced by socio-political conditions,
cultural circumstances, and political agendas. After the September 2001 attacks,
President Bush declared open season on terrorists, “freedom haters,” and various
“evildoers” who instantly became the prime targets of his “War on Terror.” Incidentally,
President Bush, his administration, and the mass media have failed to include most
terrorist groups, as defined by the U.S. Department of State itself, in this global war on
terrorism. Any reference to the “War on Terror” usually implicitly refers to “sub-state
movements like al-Qaeda whose activities [are] directed against the West, often with the
support of radical Middle Eastern governments and intelligence services” (Jenkins,
2003:20). That has prompted many to criticize the new Bush Terror Doctrine as a
prejudiced and potentially harmful campaign against an inflated threat that should not
have superseded other pressing national or foreign policy issues – including blatant and
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documented terrorism problems elsewhere in the world. Moreover, some were quick to
argue that the United States was “as truly a rogue state as Libya or Iraq” and that, as far
as causing harm was concerned, terrorist groups did “not approach the scale of savagery
of states, including the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. thus had no moral authority to
denounce anyone else as a terrorist” (Ibid.).
The Council on Foreign Relations (2004) argues that “being saddled with the
pejorative label ‘terrorist’ focuses attention on a group’s methods, not its message, and
can delegitimize its cause in the public eye.” Some fighters may welcome the expression,
on the other hand, as Jenkins (2003) notes about an Algerian member of al-Qaeda:
My ideological commitment is total and the reward of glory for this
relentless battle is to be called a terrorist. I accept the name of terrorist if it
is used to mean that I terrorize a one-sided system of iniquitous power and
a perversity that comes in many forms. (2003:17)
As far as suicide bombings are concerned, several alternate expressions have been
used to describe essentially similar actions while subjectively framing them in a different
way. Western (English-language) media and governmental documents choose the terms
“suicide attacks,” “suicide terror attacks,” or “suicidal bombings” to refer to events
involving “suicide terrorism.” On the other hand, the same incidents are described in
Middle Eastern (Arabic) media and official policies as “martyrdom operations”
perpetrated by “liberation fighters” or “resistance movements.” For instance,
[i]n Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for a bombing attack in which the
perpetrator is killed is an amaliyya istishhadiyya, a ‘martyrdom operation,’
or an amaliyya fida’iyya, a ‘sacrificaial operation.’ In the Israeli Arabiclanguage media, the preferred term is an amaliyya intihariyya, a ‘suicide
operation.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36).
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This lends a special meaning to the popular saying “One man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter.” This qualification is evidently more positive and lays emphasis on the
glorified notion of self-sacrifice of the bomber, who is called a shahid (martyr) or
shahida for a woman (shuhada in the plural). One of the goals of such a positive
construal of the act is to provide an incentive for future recruits or bombers currently in
training. Another major justification for the use of the martyrdom concept is that it
clearly defines the operation as a testament of one’s faith in Allah. As explained in
Chapter Two, the legitimacy of suicide bombings has been highly debated among Islamic
scholars: while some view it as a purely suicidal act that is in contradiction with the
Qur’anic prescription against suicide, others perceive it as a selfless act of someone
willing to die while fighting the Cause of God (jihad fi sabilillah) through a just jihad
(struggle) by the sword (jihad bis saif). The latter interpretation justifies the
rationalization of suicide bombings as martyrdom operations, as adopted by Hamas, the
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and other Palestinian
factions known for perpetrating suicide bombings. Secular groups involved in suicide
bombings, such as the LTTE and the PKK (today’s KONGRA-GEL or KGK), also refer
to their suicide bombing operatives as martyrs and the suicide missions are also described
as martyrdom operations in order to give special emphasis to the fact that the bomber
gave his or her life in defense of the noble and greater cause fought by the group.
Likewise, there is a strong tendency to describe suicide bombers as “terrorists,”
“Islamic fundamentalists,” “crazed fanatics,” and “evildoers” or “evil cowards” who
either strike in the Middle East, typically in Israel, or perpetrate attacks in the name of alQaeda. Iraqi insurgents, also known alternatively as “freedom haters” and “enemies of
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freedom,” are also graced with the same labels, though the Bush administration and the
mainstream media have significantly reduced their unfortunate amalgam of war and
terrorism in public discourse over the past few months. Other suicide bombers (e.g.,
Tamil Tigers, Chechens) are described as “rebels,” “insurgents,” “radicals,” “separatists,”
“revolutionaries,” and so on. Such terms, though mostly accurate in principle, draw
attention away from the – technically-speaking – terrorist activities perpetrated by the
suicide bombers and backed by whichever groups they belong to. Such subdued
phraseology also serves the essential purpose of not calling the attention of the general
public to political struggles outside the realm of the paradoxically Middle-East-based
“Global War on Terror.”
A terminology twist worthy of attention can be found in French-speaking news
(e.g., in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Québec). Following a trend that started in France,
suicide bombers are described as “terrorists” and sometimes as “human bombs.” More
importantly, they are referred to as “kamikazes,” which evidence a patent
misunderstanding of the historical background and intrinsic features of suicide bombings.
As explained in Chapter Two, “kamikaze” is a Japanese term that means “divine wind”
and was used to characterize World War II Japanese pilots who were recruited for suicide
missions against key military targets. They were used for the first time in the November
1944 Battle of the Philippines. Convinced that conventional warfare could not guarantee
success, most volunteered for the suicide missions, which were called tokkotai (“special
attacks”). In the April 1945 Battle of Okinawa, more than 2,000 kamikazes crashed fully
fueled fighter planes into over 300 ships, killing 5,000 Americans, which prompted the
U.S. government to approve the use of the atomic bomb to bring the war to an end. Taken
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out of its inherently Far-Eastern context, the term “kamikaze” has obviously little to no
meaning when applied to Middle-Eastern, Chechen or Sri Lankan suicide bombers who
strap explosives around their waist or drive explosive-laden trucks into buildings. To
some extent, the comparison could undergo a test of congruence when the label is applied
to the September 11 hijackers, but their actions were not sponsored by a state or a formal
government and therefore do not justify such a figure of speech.
Another noteworthy politicized issue that emerged in recent years is that of
homicide bombers. In an April 12, 2002 press briefing, former White House Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer expressly referred to a suicide bombing that had occurred in
Jerusalem that morning as a “homicide bombing”:
From there, the President had his intelligence briefings with the CIA and
then the FBI. He convened a meeting of the National Security Council. At
which point, in the middle of the meeting, the President was informed
about this morning's homicide bombing in Jerusalem. (Fleischer, 2002;
emphasis added)
He then went on to declare:
The President condemns this morning's homicide bombing in Jerusalem.
There are clearly people in the region who want to disrupt Secretary
Powell's peace mission. And the President will not be deterred from
seeking peace. There are people who don't want peace. The President
wants peace, and that's why he condemns in the strongest terms possible
this morning's homicide attack. (Ibid.)
Following Mr. Fleischer’s remarks, a journalist aptly asked for clarification. Mr.
Fleischer thus explained the White House’s new terminology of choice as part of an
effort to underscore the negative overtones while putting less emphasis on the notion of
self-sacrifice inherent in the tactic of suicide bombing:
Journalist - Q At the same time that conservative Republicans are sharply
criticizing this President for his Mideast policy, which they describe as
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being too tough on Israel, you, the President, others in this White House
have adopted a term called homicide bombings instead of suicide
bombings. Is that a coincidence, or is this an attempt to pacify his political
base that's criticizing him?
Mr. Fleischer - David, I don't think pacification comes from lexicon. I
think people support the President -Journalist - Then why change the term, why adopt this -Mr. Fleischer - I think people support the President because of the
principles that he has so strongly stood for in the war against terrorism and
in his actions here in the Middle East. But the reason I started to use that
term is because it's a more accurate description. These are not suicide
bombings. These are not people who just kill themselves. These are people
who deliberately go to murder others, with no regard to the values of their
own life. These are murderers. The President has said that in the Rose
Garden. And I think that is just a more accurate description of what these
people are doing. It's not suicide, it's murder. (Ibid.)
According to the St. Pete Times of April 13, 2002 (New, 2002):
Fox News Channel began using ‘homicide bombing’ to refer to Friday's
Jerusalem attack almost as soon as the news broke. Dennis Murray,
executive producer of daytime programming, said executives there had
heard the phrase being used by administration officials in recent days and
thought it was a good idea.
CNN and MSNBC used ‘suicide bomber’ to refer to Friday's attack.
ABC News also plans to stick with ‘suicide bomber.’ ‘We believe that is a
more descriptive term,’ CNN spokeswoman Christa Robinson said. ‘A
homicide bomber could refer to someone planting a bomb in a trash can.’
CNN mentioned the briefing and the adoption of the new label, along with a
report that U.S. officials had confirmed that very same day that Israel had “shared with
the administration new documents Israel says show high-level Palestinian Authority
involvement in financing and supporting terror strikes on Israel” (King, 2002). However,
official attempts to make the phrase “homicide bombing” popular in the news and the
mind of the general public failed. Most major news companies dropped the phrase within
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weeks of Ari Fleischer’s briefing. Only News Corp outlets, such as FoxNews and the
New York Post, have consistently used the phrase since.
Summary of Findings
As highlighted by these results, the social construction of suicide terrorism
involves several key players: the suicide bombers and their supporters (i.e., the folk
devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, law makers, law
enforcement, and action groups). Various socio-political processes, bureaucratic
mechanisms, and media structures interact to shape suicide terrorism as a social problem,
a threat to society and civilization as a whole, and a pressing issue that can only be solved
with immediate, drastic measures. Suicide terrorism is used as a political weapon to
promote ideological agendas on both sides of the terrorism equation. It is also exploited
as a communication tool and politicized in order to feed into moral panics and the politics
of fear. Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are very much onedimensional and present the issue as a monolithic way. Simplistic portrayals of bombing
attacks and suicide bombers are used to depict suicide terrorism as a pure manifestation
of evil. News coverage of suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized to
capitalize on feelings of collective insecurity and warmongering policies.
The results of this study in effect provide a canvas for an in-depth discussion of
the data collected, which shall make it possible to not only derive meaningful conclusions
from its theoretical import but also make informed policy recommendations based on its
practical and empirical significance. The following chapter presents such discussion,
conclusions, and recommendations. Suggestions for future research are also mentioned.
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Chapter Five
Discussion & Conclusions
Summary of Study
The focal point of this study is suicide terrorism, a violent, complex, and highly
adaptable form of terrorism that has received extensive media coverage over the past few
years and has become a key issue in contemporary political agendas. More specifically,
this study provides an analysis of the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes
involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The goal of the constructionist
approach, strengthened by a symbolic interactionist perspective, was to demonstrate that
suicide terrorism is essentially a subjective concept and a socially constructed problem.
In effect, the study was designed to move the analysis of suicide terrorism beyond
traditional essentialist debates and into more nuanced understandings of cultural
meaning, human action, and human interaction. Hence the study focused on determining
(a) how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a subjective
representation of events and their alleged causes and (b) how such biased representation
is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate
public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. Consequently, the main
research question was: “How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and
media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism?” A three-fold
subset of questions was then developed: (a) “How is suicide terrorism used as a political
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weapon?”; (b) How is suicide terrorism used as a communication tool?”; and (c) “How is
suicide terrorism a politicized issue that fits into the moral panic framework?”.
The study was designed as a qualitative research project in order to fulfill the
main objective of improving our understanding of the complex phenomenon of suicide
bombings. Such a research design helped to fully capture the definitional and rhetorical
mechanisms at play while taking into account the multifarious context in which suicide
terrorism is profoundly rooted. The overall strategy favored for this study was a multicase study, an adaptive and innovative qualitative approach specifically intended to
provide an in-depth knowledge of an organizational phenomenon. The instrumental
collective case study thus developed allowed the observation and assessment of several
sites using cross-case comparisons and explanation-building techniques to analyze the
data. Patterns and themes were subsequently discerned across cases, which added depth
to the study and solidified its findings. Cases were identified via purposeful sampling,
which consisted of sampling unique research sites and key participants, that is,
information-rich cases particularly well-suited for the in-depth study of the social
construction of suicide terrorism. Data collection methods relied on a triangulation of
ideas, that is, a convergence if data sources, theories, and methodologies, in order to help
develop themes. Case studies also allowed for extensive data collection drawing on
multiple sources of information, including extensive field research, in-depth expert
interviews, and analysis of public and official documents. Such a diversity of sources and
collected data guaranteed a more complete depiction of the phenomenon.
The study findings, which are recapitulated following the main research questions
in the preceding chapter, highlight that many actors are involved in the social
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construction of suicide terrorism: the suicide bombers and their supporters (the folk
devils), the media, the public, and agents of social control. As a result, the social
construction of suicide terrorism is conditioned and influenced by the interaction sociopolitical processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures. Suicide bombings are
political weapons, used as a communication tool and exploited as a politicized issue that
fuels moral panics and the politics (and marketing) of fear surrounding suicide terrorism.
Representations and interpretations of suicide bombings are overwhelmingly onedimensional: they ignore the dynamics of the historical, social, cultural, economic, and
psychological dimensions of the events. The media and agents of social control use
unsophisticated portrayals of suicide bombings and usually describe suicide terrorism as
a mere manifestation of evil. Terrorist groups and suicide bombers are selectively
depicted as simplistic enemies, crazed cowards, and demonized foes. News coverage of
suicide bombings is characteristically sensationalized: they are presented as extremely
violent and elaborate propaganda tools in the hands of dangerous religious fanatics who
are distressed, unstable and suicidal, and have nothing to lose. Bombers are also
habitually described as poor, uneducated, young males who were brainwashed by the
fundamentalist precepts of radical Islam. This is in total contradiction with the reality of
suicide bombings. The latter are, in fact, characterized by a combination of primitive
means and meticulous planning (recruitment, formation, and training) that results in
extensive physical and psychological harm. Moreover, suicide bombers are not primarily
suicidal and generally do not suffer from any diagnosable psychological disorders or
cognitive impairments impeding effective problem-solving skills. Not all suicide
bombings are perpetrated by exponents of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam or any
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other religion, for that matter: some secular groups have resorted to the tactic, including
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Tigers, in fact, are to this day the most
prolific users of suicide bombings. Finally, women and children are increasingly
recruited for suicide missions by several secular and religious groups that view them as
providing invaluable tactical advantages, but their presence in the media and public
policy is still scant.
Such findings are particularly meaningful today, all the more as suicide terrorism
has gained in both sustainability and popularity worldwide and the fast-growing
radicalization of opposing factions and terrorist cells has increasingly become a concern
for policymakers and other agents of social control. More than two thirds of
contemporary suicide bombings have occurred since 2000 and at least one suicide
bombing is reported about in international news every day. The timeliness and relevance
of this study is indisputable. It is therefore critical to thoroughly explore and reflect upon
its essential findings, as well as its overall contribution to both knowledge and practice.
Theoretical Implications of Results
Appropriateness of the Theoretical Framework
As evidenced by the findings presented in the previous chapter, the moral
signification of suicide terrorism can be successfully illustrated via a social
constructionist study of suicide bombings. More specifically, this study shows that the
construction of suicide terrorism as a new social problem and burning policy issue, as
well as the contested claims made within that framework by the variety of actors
involved, can be effectively analyzed and better understood within Cohen’s moral panic
framework. Consequently, a social constructionist perspective makes it possible to
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understand not only the emergence of suicide bombers as contemporary folk devils, but
also the moral crusade and the moral panic that resulted from it. Additionally, social
constructionism does seem to allow us to emphasize the negative and not necessarily
anticipated effects of social control policy with regard to suicide terrorism, including the
greater cohesion of terrorist groups and their increased polarization against the rest of
society and the agents of control (politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement, and action
groups) actively involved in the “War on Terror.” This methodical social constructionist
investigation also enables us to focus on the role played by the mass media – both news
and entertainment outlets – in publicizing and sensationalizing suicide bombings, setting
off a contagion effect, and promoting the ideological and commercial exploitation of
suicide terrorism.
This study further illustrates the meaning and significance of symbols. Symbols
are social objects that are “used to represent . . . whatever people agree they shall
represent” (Charon, 2004:47-48). Words and acts are symbols. As such, they are social,
“defined in interaction, not established in nature” (2004:48). Additionally, they are
meaningful: their users clearly understand what the words or acts represent.
Consequently, words and acts are also significant. People use certain words or resort to
certain actions deliberately, not unintentionally, so as “to give off meaning to others”
(2004:49). In concordance with the symbolic interactionist perspective, this study thus
shows that the use of language should not be taken for granted. Symbolic communication
is inherent in human life and necessary for social reality to develop from human
interaction (2004:43). As explained earlier, physical objective reality, which refers to the
“situation as it exists” (Ibid.), is subject to interpretation and objective acts are
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systematically defined within a working context – a socially defined reality. Upon that
social reality people also build their personal reality in interaction with themselves to
reach their own interpretation and understanding of the physical world and human lived
experience. Hence people interpret the reality of suicide terrorism within their own
symbolic framework. Their perspectives evolve as they interact with others and within
their social worlds or reference groups.
Hence the study findings outlined in Chapter Four coincide with the theoretical
framework guiding this research. The analysis of the socio-political processes,
bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social construction of
suicide terrorism is discussed in detail below. In particular, the use of suicide bombings
as a political weapon, their exploitation as a communication tool, and their politicization
in order to feed into moral panics are dissected in an attempt to fully grasp the
conceptualization and interpretation processes associated with this violent tactic and
thereby improve our understanding of suicide terrorism.
The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Political Weapon
Suicide bombings as a winning practice of asymmetrical warfare. Regarding the
success of suicide bombings as political weapons, ICT Education Project head and senior
researcher Yoram Schweitzer (2000) once stated that, from the Israeli perspective of now
twenty-two years of suicide terrorism,
one may conclude that it has not been a ‘winning card’ in the hands of
terror organizations, nor has it changed dramatically the inherent
imbalance between states and terror organizations in favor of the terrorists.
However, it was proven to be an effective instrument in the service of the
terrorists’ agenda.
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On the other hand, Pape (2005) argues that “as we saw in the recent London attacks,
suicide terrorism works, particularly against democracies.” Likewise, suicide terrorism
arguably “worked” for the PKK in Turkey or Hizballah in Lebanon and it is currently the
best strategic weapon available to Chechen terrorists. Yet, the concrete political outcome
of a suicide terror campaign is unimportant compared to the fundamental appeal of the
method as a persuasive political weapon against foreign occupation and other sorts of
politically-based conflicts. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the “ultimate weapon”
(Schweitzer, 2001) and “the most politically destabilizing” form of terrorism (Atran,
2004, August:1). Over the last few years, it has been used increasingly across the world
by secular and religious groups that construe it as their most promising tool for political
change and promote it – with the welcome though not always intentional help of the
media and agents of social control – as the most effective weapon in their arsenal.
Strategic and tactical usefulness. Suicide bombings are characterized by the use
of rather primitive means which, thanks to meticulous planning (including the
recruitment, formation, and training of the bombers or attack teams), result in
considerable physical and psychological harm. Suicide bombings happen without
warning and are virtually always successful in wreaking utter chaos upon entire
populations. They are prime weapons of psychological warfare and, as such, constitute
one of the most dangerous weapons available to terrorists today. Their political nature is
enhanced by the fact that terrorists (notably Islamic extremists in recent years) turn their
attacks into spectacles of terror and huge media events for the main purpose of promoting
their political agenda. The strategic and tactical usefulness of suicide bombings as
outstanding political weapons is therefore emphasized in our media-saturated society. In
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today’s global politics and global media world, the purpose of such extravagant terror
spectacles as the September 2001 attacks is not only to gain worldwide attention, but also
to dramatize the issues and grievances of the groups involved and to achieve specific
political goals. The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks has also shown how
spectacles of terror can also be used by democratic leaders (for instance, the Bush
administration) to promote their own geopolitical agendas.
The Use of Suicide Bombings as a Communication Tool
The mass media can be powerful actors in the long-standing battle between
terrorist groups and governments. The media can indeed have an effect on public
perception of terrorist acts and government actions. This, in turn, may affect the latter, as
well as the operations and agenda of the terrorist groups.
Terrorists, governments, and the media see the function, roles and
responsibilities of the media when covering terrorist events from differing
and often competing perspectives. Such perspectives drive behavior
during terrorist incidents--often resulting in both tactical and strategic
gains to the terrorist operation and the overall terrorist cause. The
challenge to both the governmental and press communities is to
understand the dynamics of terrorist enterprise and to develop policy
options designed to serve the interests of government, the media, and the
society. (Perl, 1997)
The media’s perspective. What news media outlets strive to accomplish by
covering suicide bombings so considerably is quite simple: they want to beat the
competition, be the first to cover a breaking story, and present it as dramatically as
possible. “Breaking news” has become the catchphrase and the main objective of news
coverage today. “Old news is no news” and “pressure to transmit real time news instantly
in today’s competitive hi-tech communication environment is at an all-time high” (Perl,
1997). Wilkinson (1997) further argues that
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major US networks all compete fiercely for an increased market share of
the audience and for the higher advertising revenue they can gain through
exploiting the public’s insatiable interest in the coverage of major terrorist
‘pseudo-events.’ (1997:57).
The faster you can provide background information on the “terrorist group” supposedly
involved, the more trustworthy and thorough your newscast will be perceived by the
audience. It does not much matter if you are providing incorrect information, as long as
the news bit sounds persuasive enough. For instance, immediately following the suicide
bombings of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, newsrooms across the world, from
Europe to the United States, were focusing their special editions on the Basque separatist
group ETA, which had been blamed by the Spanish Prime Minister and was quickly
found to have had nothing to do with the al-Qaeda-sponsored synchronized attacks.
Sensationalizing a well-timed story is another important element of contemporary
news making that also is characteristic of the creation and diffusion of moral panics
(which will be discussed in details below). Spectacular footage, dramatic music, and
striking visual effects are used to ensure the news is not only informative but also
thrilling to watch. FoxNews and CNN have seemingly entered a “graphics war” to show
which network can have the most gripping, enthralling news production of flashy short
sequences, occasionally inaccurate information, and strings of interviews with highlypaid “terrorism experts.” Other programs, such as Democracy Now for instance, would
rather focus on a low-budget, objective (and therefore more ethical) presentation of
factual news based on sources that have been carefully double-checked and are then
dissected by low-profile yet reliable political analysts or military historians. As
Wilkinson (1997) explains:
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The free media clearly do not represent terrorist values. Generally they
tend to reflect the underlying values of the democratic society. But the
media in an open society are in a fiercely competitive market for their
audiences, constantly under pressure to be first with the news and to
provide more information, excitement and entertainment than their rivals.
Hence they almost bound [sic] to respond to terrorist propaganda of the
deed because it is dramatic bad news) (1997:54).
Some news media outlets justify their theatrical or sometimes shocking coverage of
suicide bombings with a common “people have the right to know” argument. Yet, the
hypocrisy of such a statement becomes obvious when a brief analysis of such sensational
coverage shows a deliberate attempt to subjectively and arbitrarily select certain pieces
while deliberately censoring actual footage of perpetrators at the preparation stage, actual
suicide bombings or their bloody aftermath. U.S. coverage of such events, for example, is
typically limited to clouds of smoke, gutted buses, and speeding ambulances – but no
bodies or severely injured victims are ever shown. The “right to know” argument is
usually countered here by an active effort to preserve the psychological well-being of all
direct and indirect victims (including viewers or readers). In Europe or Asia, on the other
hand, blown up bodies and whatever remains of the suicide bomber(s) are frequently
pictured on television or in printed news in order to display the full horror of the
bombings and illustrate the gravity of the incidents.
The media additionally try to safeguard their free operation throughout their
operations. One of the pillars of democratic societies is freedom of the press. Many
journalists covering terrorism and suicide bombings in particular have complained that
they have been unable to report the news as accurately and objectively as their
professional and ethical standards dictate. This has been especially true for coverage of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, considering the close ties of the U.S. government with its
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Israeli counterpart, and the Iraqi insurgency. Regarding the latter, claims have multiplied
over the past two years concerning restraints imposed on news agencies with regards to
producing stories portraying the Bush administration and its so-called “liberation efforts”
in a negative light. Freedom of the press has also been jeopardized by terrorist groups
who have retaliated against journalists and other members of the press corps involved in
terrorism coverage.
Journalists generally want the freedom to cover an issue without external
restraint--whether it comes media owners, advertisers, editors, or from the
government. . . . In many instances, this concern goes beyond protecting
their legal right to publish relatively unrestrained; it includes personal
physical security. They want protection from threat, harassment, or violent
assault during operations, and protection from subsequent murder by
terrorists in retaliation providing unfavorable coverage (the latter
occurring more often abroad than in the United States). (Perl, 1997)
The terrorist perspective. Terrorists essentially want people to have an auspicious,
if not sympathetic, view of their cause. Although people who are aware of suicide
bombings may not believe the end justifies the means, they may sympathize – or even
empathize – with the predicament of the groups resorting to the deadly tactic. “Terrorists
believe the public ‘needs help’ in understanding that their cause is just and terrorist
violence is the only course of action available to them against the superior evil forces of
state and establishment” (Perl, 1997). Therefore, they must make sure that they establish
and preserve healthy, steady relations with the media. Terrorist groups sometimes get
directly involved in news media structures, especially small ones they can control by
providing financial support, or pursue more sensitive or supportive press personnel who
may portray them in a less negative fashion.
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The main purpose of these groups is to ensure the news media portray them and
their cause in a more sensible way. “Terrorist causes want the press to give legitimacy to
what is often portrayed as ideological or personality feuds or divisions between armed
groups and political wings” (Perl, 1997). They usually believe that a more objective
portrayal of the armed struggle on the one hand and the political activities on the other
will help them find more supporters, recruit additional followers, and secure more
external financial backing.
Terrorist groups further covet media reporting that harms or is in any way
detrimental to their enemies. This is especially true when a group does not claim
responsibility for a suicide bombing or does not explicitly provide a rationale for it. AlQaeda, for instance, has mastered this approach in recent years. This ensures maximum
media coverage, the amplification of the feeling of collective insecurity, as well as the
intensification of fear and the ensuing moral panic. In addition, such “anonymous
terrorism” may cause significant short- or long-term economic losses. It may also “make
populations loose faith in their governments’ ability to protect them” and “trigger
government and popular overreaction to specific incidents and the overall threat of
terrorism” (Perl, 1997). This was clearly illustrated in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 attacks in the United States.
The key element here is publicity. Terrorist groups are extremely keen on
publicity and will exploit media infrastructures to maximize it, even if it is not always
positive publicity. As Brian Jenkins once emphasized, “terrorism is theatre” (Council on
Foreign Relations, 2004). In the late nineteenth century, Anarchist terrorists of
Narodnaya Volya famously described their violent activities as “propaganda by deed.”
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For decades now, “terrorists have tailored their attacks to maximize publicity and get
their messages out through all available channels” (Ibid.). Thus the media play a crucial
role in the spectacle of terrorism. As Wilkinson (1997) explains:
In dealing with the relationship between terrorism and the mass media, the
most useful approach is to attempt to understand the terrorist view of the
problem of communications. It cannot be denied that although terrorism
has proved remarkably ineffective as the major weapon for toppling
governments and capturing political power, it has been a remarkably
successful means of publicizing a political cause and relaying the terrorist
threat to a wider audience, particularly in the open and pluralistic countries
of the West. When one says ‘terrorism’ in a democratic society, one says
‘media’. For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which
depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. (1997:53)
Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once declared that “publicity is
the oxygen of terrorism” (Perl, 1997; Wilkinson, 1997), which illustrated that public
opinion was a foremost terrorist target and how the media provided essential tools to
influence and alter it. This may have changed since. While it could have been argued a
decade ago that
terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead . . . the
emergence of religious terror groups with apocalyptic outlooks and the
availability of weapons of mass destruction may indicate that inflicting
mass casualties has supplanted publicity as the primary goal of some
terrorist campaigns. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004)
Suicide bombings appear to be incidents that are particularly tailored to the
media. The purpose of groups that use this tactic is to get the attention of governments
and the general public, which is facilitated by the mass media. Attracting media attention
is a rather easy task for terrorist groups and organizations. They often plan the timing and
location of their attacks to ensure maximum media coverage. For instance, many analysts
have argued that the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in
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September 2001 were specifically “designed to provide billions of television viewers
with pictures symbolizing U.S. vulnerability, and they prompted extensive reporting on
al-Qaeda and its Islamist agenda” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Terrorist groups
analyze the media closely and learn from their operations and processes. Some – like the
Tamil Tigers (LTTE), Lebanon’s Hizballah, or the Kurdish KGK (former PKK) – have
even put in place their very own media structures, radio broadcasts, and sponsored
Websites.
Suicide bombings are glaring examples of premeditated violence targeting
symbols (political, economic, religious or otherwise) and sending a political or religious
message. “[G]oals might also include winning popular support, provoking the attacked
country to act rashly, attracting recruits, polarizing public opinion, demonstrating their
ability to cause pain, or undermining governments” (Ibid.). This is clearly illustrated by
Israel’s typical reaction to Palestinian suicide bombings, which usually consists of
immediate retaliation, especially against the families of the bombers, and heavy military
intervention, including targeted missile strikes.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extensive media coverage it has generated
further illustrate how media attention can actually benefit terrorist groups. “From the
terrorist perspective, media coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist
act or campaign” (Perl, 1997). Even if the only casualty in a suicide attack is the bomber
himself or herself, the incident will garner attention and be broadcast worldwide.
Responsibility will be claimed and announced in the news within seconds, which
guarantees immediate attention to the claims and overall cause of the group implicated in
the bombing. Intensive public opinion debates will ensue and policymakers will also get
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involved worldwide, which may speed up the political process necessary to legitimately
achieve the goals the group is fighting for. Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
several other Palestinian groups have received as much worldwide attention for deadly
bombings that claimed dozens of deaths and injured scores of bystanders as they have for
attacks that resulted in the sole death of the bomber and some material destruction.
Conversely, it has also been argued that media coverage can harm the cause of a
group that resorts to suicide bombings. Indeed, if an attack does not go according to plan,
it can easily backfire on the group or organization:
Attacks can spin out of control or have unintended consequences; too
much slaughter can alienate potential supporters and sympathizers;
terrorist activities have different meanings for different audiences; and
even when terrorists’ attack plans work, they cannot necessarily control
how their actions are covered or perceived. (Council on Foreign Relations,
2004)
Either way, many groups have learned to use the media to their advantage
whenever necessary and thus have turned suicide bombings into a powerful
communication tool. Transnational organizations like the LTTE and al-Qaeda
have adapted to new technologies and successfully broadcast messages via
satellite television or the World Wide Web. It should be noted that the use of the
Internet, in particular, has made it possible for these organizations to extend their
global network and deliver their ideology to millions of passive and active
supporters they would have had great difficulty reaching only a decade ago. They
have also been able to communicate furtively via Internet portals, virtual chat
rooms or instant messaging services, and to use pseudo-charitable Websites to
raise funds for their violent campaigns. Video broadcasts via satellite television
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(e.g., al-Jazeera, the Arabic cable news network) have included recordings of the
last testaments of Palestinian suicide bombers and gruesome footage of suicide
bombing scenes in Israel or Sri Lanka, which are typically censored in the United
States, as well as statements by leaders of the al-Qaeda terror network, including
Osama bin Laden. Another example of a valuable instrument in al-Qaeda’s public
relations arsenal has been their tendency not to claim responsibility for suicide
bombings and other types of attacks, which has helped to disseminate and
maintain general feelings of insecurity while compelling more media coverage.
The governmental perspective. What governments fighting suicide terrorism
essentially look for is “understanding, cooperation, restraint, and loyalty from the media
in efforts to limit terrorist harm to society” (Perl, 1997). Governments overtly want to
capture and punish people responsible for suicide bombings or other types of terrorist
acts. As a result, they seek coverage that will promote governmental priorities, not
terrorist agendas.
Governments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion
against the country or group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and
the media can also be used to mobilize public opinion in other countries to
pressure governments to take, or reject, action against terrorism. (Ibid.)
Therefore, governments tend to view mainstream news media outlets as an
instrument of public policy, a mere extension of their official agendas. The media should
thus serve as mouthpieces for governments and never as platforms (voluntary or
otherwise) for terrorist groups – unless of course if doing so were to hasten the
impending doom of the terrorist group. The purpose of such an interpretation of the role
of the media is to clearly segregate media structures and terrorist groups and ensure
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neither one uses the other to their advantage. Governments also use suicide terrorism
coverage (or lack thereof) to guard against “disinformation from terrorist allies,
sympathizers, or others who gain from its broadcast and publication” (Ibid.). This
constitutes a basic damage control technique, in a sense, and illustrates the determination
of governments not to provide any mainstream media platforms for terrorist claims
making – whether the claims are true or not.
From a governmental (and fundamentally Occidental) viewpoint, the media are
also supposed to portray suicide bombers and related terrorist groups as criminals. Media
coverage should therefore never promote sympathetic or empathetic reactions in the
public. Suicide bombers should not be glamorized, bombings need not be sensationalized.
Yet, as explained above, sensationalizing a newsworthy story is a major component of
contemporary news making. The objectives of governments and the imperatives of the
media sometimes clash as a result of these opposing realities. Governments often
disapprove of media representations that may distract attention away from the criminal
actions and focus instead on the cause being fought with the help of – amongst other
methods – suicide bombings. As a result, governments may seek to control, directly or
indirectly, the production and dissemination of news by certain media outlets. This is
illustrated by the close ties between the Bush administration and right-wing network
FoxNews, which is part of Bush supporter Rupert Murdoch’s planetary media
conglomerate, and the open reprisal campaign against journalists whose style of reporting
was not fully in line with White House policies. Of course, this is in total contradiction
with basic but non-negligible (and therefore constitutionally protected) rights such as
freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
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Overall, governments may benefit from regulating how much information
terrorists can gain access to. Ongoing and future anti-terrorism measures, for instance, are
typically not divulged to the media in order to ensure they remain known only to people
directly involved in their development and implementation. Likewise, vulnerability
assessments are not – or should not – be made public, or else the media could
inadvertently inspire or even facilitate future bombings. That would undoubtedly
represent a perverse effect of the media’s “right to know” approach to public news
reporting. In recent months for instance, public officials harshly attacked continuous
coverage of all the “weak points” and other “high-risk potential targets” still left
unprotected in the United States and abroad that could be “easy objectives” for suicide
bombers. That denoted again how governmental strategic or tactical priorities can easily
conflict with the propensity of the media to saturate their coverage with whatever is
sensational enough to be deemed newsworthy and likely to generate more ratings (and
therefore more money).
In hostage-taking crises, the news media are often the only instrument available
for terrorists to both follow outside events as they unfold and get information on how
much exposure their actions are receiving. News coverage can therefore make rescue
operations (or military intervention) difficult if too much information is provided to the
hostage takers. Consequently, governments may decide to prohibit the media from
accessing the immediate area or covering the story live altogether. On the other hand, if
journalists gain access to the scene, governments typically demand live information be
communicated to them first. This is generally justified by a willingness to efficiently
diffuse the situation as peacefully as possible. In recent years, as explained in the
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previous chapter, critical hostage-taking incidents involving Chechen suicide bombers in
Russia have illustrated how such events can take an exceptionally deadly turn if they are
not handled properly by the media and government authorities alike.
With a related security goal in mind, governmental officials usually do not
disclose any sensitive or classified information about preventive or operational measures
related to suicide bombings. Fruitful counterterrorism operations are seldom publicized
and details almost never provided to the media or the general public. We may know that
“dozens of attacks have been thwarted” but we will not know how, when, and where or
who was involved. Not only does this give the public a false sense of reassurance that
whatever policies are in place are indeed working, it also supposedly prevents would-be
suicide bombers to imitate the disrupted attack in the future. One may want to argue,
however, that terrorist groups that recruit and train suicide bombers are resourceful and
creative enough to figure out how to conduct destructive attacks and wage an efficient
psychological warfare. The use of fully-fueled jetliners in high-profile suicide attacks, for
example, was not heavily publicized after attempts in Israel and France, and yet, al-Qaeda
successfully coordinated devastating attacks in the United States years later.
The media may also be exploited by politicians and government agencies needing
to improve their public image or looking for a complete public relations makeover. Thus
certain politically favorable news outlets or journalists may be favored over others for
“exclusive interviews” or “breaking news” coverage. This recurring practice effectively
turns the network into a political platform – but in an ironically acceptable fashion since
it serves the interests of the governments involved.
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Governments also benefit heavily from the process of demonization that media
portrayals of suicide bombers and supporters of suicide terrorism feed into. This is
encouraged by media saturation: the more the news features stories about suicide
bombers, casting them as folk devils and “freedom haters,” the more persuasively the
media will convey their message of fear, global threat, and collective insecurity to the
general public. Once public concern and media attention are galvanized, the
demonization of suicide bombers and related terrorist groups is emphasized by the use of
threatening metaphors and simplistic statements, the construal of suicide terrorism as a
scourge or an epidemic, the construction and propagation of fear, the warrior mentality
and “War on Terror” rhetoric of the social control agents, and the politicization of the
issue. These concepts are henceforth discussed in more details within the moral panic
framework.
The Politicization of Suicide Terrorism and Moral Panics
Suicide terrorism and moral panics. “The American public has been inundated
with highly mediated images of terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001”
(Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004:327). The complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its
social construction can be analyzed from the moral panics perspective, as explained in
Chapter Two, and broken down into five overlapping phases that apply to crime and
criminality in other studies (see Buffington, 2003; Cohen, 2002):
1) A period of social upheaval produced by and contributing to a major
shift in the nation’s political economy.
2) The generalized perception of endemic crises, represented in public
opinion as a crime wave, and taking the form of a series of moral
panics about the state of the nation.
3) A concerted response (especially but not exclusively on the part of
state policymakers), represented in public opinion as a war on crime
164

and taking the form of “new” discourses, practices, institutions, and
technologies of social control.
4) The consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, often in the
form of new laws and institutions, along with its inevitable
contestation and negotiation by vested elite interest groups and the
often targeted popular classes.
5) The accumulation of “anomalies” – inconsistencies, contradictions,
failures – in the dominant criminal justice paradigm that render it
unstable and thus vulnerable to the next sustained period of social
upheaval (which restarts the cycle). (Buffington, 2003)
The social, political, and legal climate of the United States since September 11,
2001, in addition to its avowed fight against terrorism, is a perfect illustration of this fivephase cycle. Without over-simplifying the events leading up to the September 2001
attacks on U.S. soil or their significant short- and long-term outcomes, one can find
explanations for each phase in any and all manifestations of today’s U.S.-led War on
Terror. The September 11 events characterize Phase One, following several suicide terror
attacks against U.S. interests abroad over previous years (e.g., 1998 West Africa attacks
against U.S. Embassies, 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen).
Phase One (notwithstanding the attacks that occurred abroad) was a spectacular,
brief stage, not a continued period of social turmoil per se (such as the Lebanese Civil
War, for instance, which began in 1975 and laid the foundation for Hizballah’s
unprecedented 1980s suicide bombing campaign). Phase Two, the crime wave and
subsequent moral panics, was encouraged by official speeches and fueled by the
mainstream media. The crisis was emphasized by expressions like “the scourge of suicide
terrorism” or “the terrorist cancer,” as well as scores of articles presenting suicide
terrorism as an “epidemic” that had to be contained by any means necessary.
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Phase Three, the concerted response, was the product of President Bush’s
infamous comeback about “hunting down evil cowards” and “smoking out evildoers.”
Declaring the dawn of a “War on Terror” in the post-9/11 world, much like President
Nixon had declared a “War on Drugs” three decades earlier, President Bush introduced a
new discourse of fear and warmongering in foreign policy and international relations.
Innovative technologies also emerged in the wake of the September 2001 attacks.
Security measures and techniques were altered in mass-transit hubs throughout the
United States, mainly at airports. Procedures and infrastructures were heavily modified to
ensure the public believed maximum security had been achieved and that public spaces
were safe again. For instance, airline pilots are now allowed to carry guns for their
personal safety and more armed sky marshals are supposedly randomly assigned to
domestic and international flights than before the fall of 2001.
Phase Four, the consolidation of a new criminal justice paradigm, quickly
followed. In an obvious knee-jerk reaction, a new federal legislation was passed
immediately after September 11: the USA PATRIOT Act, also known as the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. The official purpose of this controversial Act is to “deter
and punish American terrorists in the United States and around the world, to enhance law
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes” (United States Senate, 2001).
The noticeably problematic and contentious phrase “for other purposes” encompasses the
detection by any means (including illegal or unconstitutional ones) and the prosecution of
alleged future crimes that are not terrorist in nature. The extension and renewal of the Act
has been fought vehemently in Congress. Another major institutional change that was a
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direct result of the September 2001 suicide terror attacks was the creation of the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a Cabinet department of the U.S.
federal government. The DHS mission is to safeguard the people of America from harm
and to protect American property from damage or destruction. The reforms it has
introduced have been forcefully contested. Nonetheless, government officials have
consistently reported successful counterterrorism operations (without further details).
Suicide bombers as folk devils. It is much easier to condemn suicide terrorism
than to try to understand it. Likewise, it is easier to attribute devastating suicide bombings
to “folk devils” and ascribe a moral meaning to the acts. This helps to amplify the threat,
exploit the panic it creates in the public, and market the fear it produces. It also helps
propagate war fever, encourages retaliatory feelings and discourses, and promotes
military solutions as relevant, proportionate, and necessary ones. Finally, it opens the
door for dangerous measures, such as shifty legislative reforms (e.g., the USA PATRIOT
Act) and dubious policies (e.g., racial and ethnic profiling).
A common notion in the U.S. administration and media spin on the war
against terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded or homicidal
misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy. This portrayal lends
a sense of hopelessness to any attempt to address root causes because
some individuals will always be desperate or deranged enough to conduct
suicide attacks. But as logical as the poverty-breeds-terrorism argument
may seem, study after study shows that suicide attackers and their
supporters are rarely ignorant or impoverished. Nor are they crazed,
cowardly, apathetic or asocial. The common misconception
underestimates the central role that organizational factors play in the
appeal of terrorist networks. A better understanding of such causes reveals
that the challenge is actually manageable: the key is not to profile and
target the most despairing or deranged individual but to understand and
undermine the organizational and institutional appeal of terrorists’
motivations and networks. (Atran, 2004, August:5)
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The politicization of religion and religiosity that has characterized agenda setting
and policymaking since September 2001 is a precarious choice and a misleading
approach at best. “When religion is involved, it sidesteps the issue, since religion
provides an absolute rationale” (Ebert, 2005). The Bush administration should not
emphasize that it is the responsibility of the United States “to rid the world of Evil,” as
President Bush has repeatedly declared. Labeling suicide terrorists as “evildoers” or “evil
cowards” contributes nothing positive or productive to the fight against suicide terrorism
or global terrorism. It shows a profound misunderstanding of the “enemy” and its goals,
which goes against any basic military strategies. Publicly pitting the moral world of
Good, as defined by the United States, versus the amoral world of Evil of the terrorists
only promotes a reductionist and simplistic rhetorical style that actually feeds into the
similarly dichotomous Islamic worldview setting the House of God against the House of
War that fundamentalists exploit with their radical interpretation of Islam. Additionally,
in view of the principle of separation of Church and State, it seems rather misguided for
President Bush to rely on scriptures in official terrorism-related speeches. Christian
metaphors (such as the crusade imagery that followed the September 2001 suicide
attacks) can only exacerbate tensions and further dichotomize the forces at play. Instead
of imposing an American style of democracy onto others as the one and only sustainable
mode of civilization across the globe, the United States must work towards better
understanding the socio-cultural context, the political processes and claims, and the
religious values of the countries where suicide bombers and their supporters flourish.
Regarding the introduction of the phrase “homicide bomber” by the White House
in 2002 and its subsequent adoption by News Corp media outlets, it appears that they
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were anything but innocuous. What should not be overlooked here is that Rupert
Murdoch’s News Corp is one of the largest media corporations on the planet and a major
right-wing actor in today’s global communications world. Its socio-political and
economic influence extends across the world via a multitude of powerful holdings. The
latter include the Fox Broadcasting Company, a US-based nationwide broadcast
television company, and Fox Television station groups, in addition to major North
American, South American, European, Asian, and Australian satellite television
providers and cable television services, dozens of key newspapers and magazines
worldwide, Internet portals, major movie studios and film production companies, book
publishing companies, and more. The adoption and, in effect, promotion of the phrase
“homicide bombing” can be criticized as directly supporting attempts by the Bush
Administration to not merely clarify its “Terror Doctrine” but shape public perceptions of
suicide terrorism and influence national policy through the deliberate and cunning use of
doublespeak and dysphemisms. By introducing this new phrase, the Bush administration
also tried to produce a new reality in order to influence how people would view
bombings and suicide terrorism in general. This seemingly innocent rhetorical device was
in fact a premeditated effort to ensure the news media would detect the new catchphrase,
disseminate it, and abuse it until it became engrained in public consciousness that the key
feature of these bombings was the fact they were perpetrated by terrorists and killed
innocent victims. By obliterating an essential feature of suicide bombings – the ensured
death of the bomber – and explicitly targeting Palestinian terrorist groups (and especially
Arafat), all that the Bush administration, FoxNews, and the like accomplished was
refusing even more categorically to legitimize the cause or consider the bombers
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sensibly. This is not to say that it would have been preferable or more productive to
declare the actions of the bombers to be justifiable or legitimate. The peace process could
have been improved, however, if the fundamentally valid political claims of the groups
and their fighters (namely, the independence of their state) had been considered
dispassionately by all involved – while remembering that the end certainly was not
justifying the means.
Collective insecurity and the politics of fear. The mass media play a significant
role in providing, maintaining, and regulating the available frameworks and definitions of
suicide terrorism. As a result, they help structure both public awareness of and attitudes
towards suicide bombing campaigns. The mass media, however, are not the only actors
involved in influencing the public’s perception of suicide terrorism as a critical collective
threat. Political actors are also key participants in the social construction of suicide
terrorism, the construction and advertising of collective insecurity within a wider threat
structure, as well as the marketing of fear. Political actors and strategies help guarantee
that “repressive fear” remains “an enduring tool of economic and political domination in
the United States (Béland, 2005:2) and to ensure that the fear and collective insecurity
that are associated with suicide terrorism (or terrorism in general) supply an impetus for
electoral support. This was illustrated by President Bush’s heavy “War on Terror”
rhetoric during his 2004 reelection campaign.
The context of collective insecurity and the politics of fear is suited for the
analysis of the social construction of suicide terrorism (and vice versa):
Collective insecurity is a social and political construction. Far from
meaning that people live in a world of pure illusions, the idea of social and
political construction of reality refers to the manner in which actors
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collectively make sense of the world in which they live. . . .[C]ollective
insecurity first emerges through the transformation of personal and
environmental matters into social and political issues. . . . [It] is ‘the
product of processes by which groups and individuals learn to acquire or
create interpretations of risk. . . . After perceived sources of insecurity are
defined as collective problems affecting a significant segment of the
population, they can enter the policy agenda. (2005:4)
Suicide terrorism represents a highly episodic threat (as opposed to a structural
one, such as unemployment or lack of healthcare coverage). Within the threat
infrastructure, suicide terrorism is therefore more conducive of moral panics and it allows
politicians to easily inflate the threat it poses or exploit the feelings of collective
insecurity it generates. What political actors want is to shape the threat of suicide
terrorism and spread fear among the public, so they can later gain electoral support and
influence policy outcomes.
In liberal democracies, politicians pursue at least four main goals within
the political field (i.e. the structured arena of political competition). First,
they seek election and reelection. Second, once elected, they attempt to
increase their institutional power within their party or government. Third,
they seek to build a political legacy that could make them look good to
their contemporaries and to future generations. Fourth, in some contexts,
politicians promote an ideological agenda or a certain vision of ‘public
interest’ in a manner that may prove unpopular and, consequently,
detrimental to the attainment of the three others goals.” (2005:10)
Two important stratagems come into play here: credit claiming and blame
avoidance. They are used by politicians either to claim responsibility for “good news”
related to the fight against terrorism or to protect elected officials from getting blamed for
“bad news,” such as further suicide bombing attacks, which could “exacerbate economic,
social, and environmental insecurity” (2005:11). Unfavorable news are politically
hazardous since “elected officials are regularly blamed for ‘bad news’ even when it is not
directly related to their decisions” (Ibid.). After the September 11, 2001 events, for
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instance, the Bush administration was heavily criticized for its reluctance or inability to
prevent the attacks. A national bipartisan commission, commonly known as the “9/11
Commission,” was even specially appointed to investigate the “terrorist attacks upon the
United States” and the failures of the administration (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks, 2004). Therefore, blame avoidance strategies are useful when suicide bombings
or other terrorist incidents occur as they enable politicians to “blame their predecessors
for the gaps in the security apparatus that could have facilitated terrorist actions” (Béland,
2005:12-13). This is exactly what President Bush did by blaming the Clinton
administration for laying a solid foundation for the massive intelligence failure that
precipitated the September 2001 attacks.
In addition, the threat of suicide terrorism is bound to be the center of political
attention since it saturates contemporary media coverage. Government officials and the
public are seemingly passionate about finding an immediate solution to the crisis and
imposing severe punishment on the cowardly and evil culprits, regardless of the inherent
complexities of suicide terrorism. “Violent, spectacular, and highly episodic threats like
terrorism are quicker to stimulate sweeping legislative actions” (2005:15) and a prefect
illustration of this knee-jerk reaction is the enactment (and recent relative extension) of
the infamous USA PATRIOT Act, a 342-page document that became law on October 24,
2001 (United States Senate, 2001).
Finally, the social construction of suicide terrorism, the amplification of the
threat, and the increase in insecurity and fear related to it clearly influence how political
agendas are established and outlined. The public interpretation of the suicide terrorist
threat is what politicians rely on “to depict themselves as the best providers of collective
172

protection in order to increase their popular support and shape a positive and lasting
legacy” (2005:15-16). This is arguably what happened after the September 2001 attacks
when President Bush chose to depict the whole world as a dangerous place and military
force as the only logical – not only justified but also mandatory – option against
international terrorism. As a decisive stage in the social construction of suicide terrorism,
agenda setting and execution “constitutes a key phase of the policymaking process”
(Béland, 2005:15). Hence it is essential to further probe the significant practical
implications of the results this research project has yielded.
Practical Implications of the Results
Specifying and exploring the findings of this qualitative study is a difficult task
that requires a prudent appraisal of their relevance and application to everyday
policymaking or practice and a certain reserve concerning their relative significance. This
innovative study neither provides definitive answers nor aspires to be the ultimate
analysis of suicide terrorism. One of the major strengths of this study is its potential for
significantly contributing to our empirical understanding of suicide terrorism. This
empirical and interpretive research was designed to substantively advance our knowledge
about the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and its socially constructed nature. As such,
although it is not purely empirical, it could yield empirically significant results by
providing researchers and policymakers with much insight into the phenomenon of
suicide terrorism and its prevention. There is no panacea for suicide terrorism and the
purpose of this research project was certainly not to find or even suggest a universal
remedy for suicide bombings. Nevertheless, much practical wisdom can be derived from
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this theoretical contribution as a whole and, more specifically, from the results that arose
from a cunning combination of complementary research instruments.
Countering Suicide Terrorism
Contrary to common belief and what policymakers and the media have insinuated
in the past few years, suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It originated in ancient
times and has simply evolved over time, developing as other forms of terrorism have.
Thus, rather than a new weapon in the arsenal of terrorists groups, suicide terrorism is a
long-standing, highly adaptive and extremely violent tool of propaganda by deed that is
constantly reshaped by technological advances and contemporary social events. Its
causes, manifestations, and ramifications vary across time, countries, cultures, and
groups. The use of fully-fueled commercial jetliners in the September 2001 attacks, for
example, proves how adaptable and destructive suicide terrorism can be and how the
phenomenon is all but dwindling away. This is also confirmed by the increasing number
of suicide bombing operations, most notably in the Middle East and Western Europe, in
response to the U.S.-led “War on Terror” and the illegal occupation of Iraq.
The urgency of developing efficient preventive measures to uncompromisingly
combat suicide terrorism was evidenced by the unprecedented attacks orchestrated by alQaeda in the United States in September 2001. By proving its ability to permeate U.S.
defensive measures and reach almost all of its intended symbolic targets, al-Qaeda
showed the United States and other Western countries just how vulnerable they truly
were to suicide terrorism.
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Suicide Terrorism Prevention: Why Preventive Measures Have Not Worked
The findings of this study (and history, incidentally) illustrate the fact that certain
counter-terrorism measures, though favored by some countries, do not work to fight and
prevent suicide terrorism. First of all, conventional top-heavy coercive methods (e.g.,
strategic bombardment, invasion, occupation) cannot efficiently reduce popular support
for suicide bombers, help capture the latter, or help eliminate such a complex and
adaptable phenomenon as suicide terrorism. Coercive and repressive measures in both
Israel and Russia, for instance, have failed to stop Palestinian and Chechen suicide
bombings. It appears that army intervention usually feeds into the problem instead of
helping solve it. Indeed, it usually results in an upsurge in popular support for terrorist
groups favoring suicide bombings. As a result, the impact of such groups on the larger
society (notably its ruling elites) becomes greater. Preemptive strikes against wrongly
perceived supporters of suicide terrorism typically increase the incidence of and support
for suicide terror attacks. As for heavy retaliation campaigns following suicide bombings,
they generally reinforce and intensify people’s sense of victimization and readiness to
behave according to organizational doctrines and policies structured to take advantage of
such feelings. Finally, it should be noted that the outcome of the study also demonstrates
why fundamentally ill-advised ethnic or racial profiling techniques and practices can only
exacerbate ethno-cultural tensions and eventually encourage support for suicide terrorist
campaigns. They also take attention and resources away from homegrown terrorists who
may be appealed by the overall ideology opposed to President Bush’s outlook on the
“War on Terror” and may be enticed by the strategic and tactical advantages presented by
suicide bombings.
175

Social control policies are futile unless they address the actual threat objectively
and take into account all its complexities. Three possible lines of defense are possible
against suicide terrorism. The last line of defense consists of drastically reducing
receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. The middle line of defense
requires infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and isolating group leaders.
The first line of defense involves preventing suicide bombers from reaching their
intended targets. Each line shows potential for effective prevention, but certain
impediments may render them useless.
The last line of defense (preventing suicide bombers from reaching their intended
targets) is the most expensive and least likely to succeed. Setting up checkpoints and
conducting more random bag or body searches are not very effective security measures
against people determined to die. Vulnerable and accessible targets will always be found
by determined suicide bombers. Furthermore, deploying uniformed soldiers or police
officers, creating covert observation stations or using complex surveillance systems in
order to intercept potential bombers requires a great deal of human, technological, and
financial resources that may not always be available.
The middle line of defense (infiltrating and breaking up recruiting institutions and
isolating group leaders) may be a valuable short-term option. However, it can easily
backfire considering it is likely to lead to the growth of more opposition groups or
factions dedicated to the same greater cause. Still, this approach and the previous one are
the most popular in today’s War on Terror.
The first – and most propitious – line of defense (significantly decreasing the
responsiveness of prospective recruits) requires overcoming various obstacles for positive
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outcomes to be reached. The first hurdle is reducing poverty, which may be ineffective
and could be counterproductive if a decline in poverty for the entire population results in
a reallocation of resources that takes away some people’s wealth. Boosting literacy rates
is another issue to tackle: it may prove ineffective and could hinder the attainment of
desired goals if improving literacy enables more people to get a hold of terrorist
propaganda. Finally, putting an end to occupation or alleviating perceived degradation is
a promising approach that may be ineffective if people believe the victory to have been
brought about by terror (see Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon following a string of
suicide bombings).
Some Promising Counterterrorism Practices
Suicide terrorism is first and foremost an institution-level phenomenon.
Countering and preventing suicide terrorism may therefore involve finding a balance
between a reasonable amount of coercion and adequate incentives, so as to induce change
and lead communities to stop supporting institutions that recruit suicide attackers. There
are of course several pitfalls to watch for. First of all, destroying the social fabric or the
political structure until people stop backing suicide terrorism operations (or their
sponsors) is not only difficult to achieve but also morally unacceptable. For instance, the
Kamikaze pilots met their demise at the end of World War II, but only after the 1945
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, retaliation is morally
objectionable, especially if the retaliating party is looking for allies in its fight against
terrorism. For example, Israel’s systematic military strikes following suicide bombings
have not garnered many supporters and Israel is often pointed at as the terrorist actor in
the Israelo-Palestinian conflict. Finally, coercive tactics or military strategies alone can
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intensify the problem of suicide terrorism instead of providing any immediate or longterm solution. The example of the U.S.-led war in Iraq and the ensuing relentless suicide
bombing campaign organized by the Iraqi insurgency is emblematic of the harmful
consequences such interventions may have.
Another important point to consider is that terrorist groups obtain information,
recruit new members, and essentially survive owing to their ethnic, political, and
religious connections. Terrorist groups consequently cannot prosper unless they get
support from the community. Hence the foundation of community support for groups and
organizations sponsoring suicide bombing operations must be the major long-term
priority of those who want to counter suicide terrorism. It is also crucial to understand
and take into consideration that popular backing of suicide terrorism will not cease to
exist on its own and people will not spontaneously stop being influenced by promises of
spiritual or financial rewards.
What the United States and its allies in the “War on Terror” should focus on, as
should any other countries involved in the actual fight against suicide terrorism
worldwide, is the dynamics of the phenomenon and the complex socio-cultural context it
is rooted in. Scrutinizing political and economic conditions is critical but not enough.
Identifying sacred values in different cultures and the dynamic mechanisms through
which they win people over is what will allow for a comprehensive understanding of how
to keep such values from degenerating and leading to conflict between people. Sacred
values strengthen cultural identity and faith in society. Where suicide terrorism is
motivated by religion, for instance, these feelings are affected and reshaped by terrorist
group leaders, recruiters, and trainers, typically to the advantage of the group and not the
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individual. Suicide terrorism prevention will thus require collaborative efforts by
international policymakers in order to fully comprehend the socio-historical, political,
and cultural circumstances and recruitment methods that motivate people to sacrifice
their own lives in support of a greater cause.
Informing the general public is also important, insofar as people will become
desensitized and more confident if they are aware of the nature of the threat and can
readily access reliable information. Working with the media in a concerted effort to
decrease popular support of suicide terrorism is therefore primordial. Above all, the
media should avoid: providing sensational coverage of suicide bombing operations;
presenting suicide bombings as an effective tactic and a winning strategy for achieving
political goals; glorifying suicide bombers; presenting simplistic, one-dimensional
explanations for suicide bombings; and illustrating or reporting “how to” descriptions of
suicide bombing techniques.
The top priorities to successfully combat and prevent suicide terrorism should be:
1. Working with the international community to address the real or perceived
historical and personal grievances of populations that have been unable to fulfill
basic objectives, such as personal safety, cultural recognition, social stability, and
collective peace;
2. Encouraging Muslim communities to stop supporting religious schools and
charities that play a part in terrorist networks;
3. Financing civic education and interfaith programs;
4. Creating sustained dialogue lines with Muslim religious leaders and community
notables in order to ensure that Islamic customs and religious law better
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correspond to international legal principles of crime, punishment, and human
rights;
5. Encouraging moderates in the community to consider other fruitful options for a
new social order.
6. Allowing moderate members of the terrorist groups to challenge the
contradictions or shortcomings of their own worldviews (e.g., viewing others as
evil), values (e.g., lack of respect for life), and behavior (e.g., support for killing),
and to confront other group members in order to bring about long-term changes;
7. Supporting democratic self-determination, which will reduce suicide terrorism
more efficiently than further military intervention or counterinsurgency aid;
8. Promoting economic choice without forcing people to radically alter their
business traditions (people should not have to renounce newly acquired economic
freedom for a system of privatization, “free market” or globalization);
9. Actively opposing violations of civil liberties and human rights by refusing the
political or military support of the countries that officially back the U.S. “war on
terrorism” but steadily violate the fundamental human rights of their people and
reject any free political expression. In such countries as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, the practices of extremely
repressive regimes can only spawn more popular resentment and terrorism – and
therefore should not be supported.
Using Intelligence: Why Might Is Not Always Right
Suicide terrorism should be fought with intelligence, not use of force. Under the
Bush administration, Cold War intelligence policies regarding national security
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information have been thoroughly modified in response to ongoing terrorist threats
against the United States. The suicide terrorist attacks of September 2001 shed light on
the deficiencies of the counterterrorism apparatus of the United States and the failures of
its own intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. The homeland security plan
subsequently devised by the Bush administration entails innovative intelligence efforts
aimed at quashing threats within the United States, protecting U.S. borders, reducing
infrastructure vulnerabilities, and improving emergency responses. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is now responsible for organizing such strategies and ensuring
that detailed and comprehensive information reaches the people who need it.
Until recently, intelligence gathering and analysis was perceived as hermetically
separate from the policymaking community and the rest of the government. It has now
become painfully obvious that such separation hinders counterterrorism efforts. The
intelligence community must therefore strive to provide useful, timely, and accurate
intelligence that meets the needs of civilian and military policymakers, as well as
strategic and tactical decision-makers. The processes involved are part of what is
commonly referred to as the Intelligence Cycle, which consists of six phases: collection,
evaluation, collation, analysis, production, and dissemination of information. Both the
White House and the intelligence community face a slew of coordination issues in their
efforts to avoid errors, missed opportunities, as well as contradictory policies or
superfluous measures.
All actors concerned with the fight against suicide terrorism should keep in mind
that intelligence is not purely domestic and unilateral. It must be construed within an
international and multilateral framework. As the U.S. counterterrorism intelligence
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structure is being wholly reshaped, it is important to remember that a lot can be learned
from the successes and failures experienced by America’s allies in their fight against
terrorism. Valuable counterterrorism lessons can be learned from the experience of the
domestic intelligence agencies of such countries as the United Kingdom, France, Turkey,
or even Israel. Optimizing information-gathering techniques is consequently of utmost
importance if governments want to develop effective and efficient preventive security
measures to counter suicide terrorism worldwide.
To avoid intelligence and communication breakdowns between all the actors
involved in the intelligence community, it is indispensable to ensure the highest levels of
coordination between all the agencies involved in the intelligence cycle around the world.
The U.S. federal government is striving to improve how threat information is analyzed
and disseminated, although much more progress is needed. A potentially useful initiative
that could enhance government performance is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC), which was introduced by President Bush in early 2003 (see Appendix C).
Improving terrorism warnings and sharing actionable intelligence may also prove
beneficial. For example, the DHS color-coded national threat level system, known as the
Homeland Security System (see Appendix D) has been sharpened over the past couple of
years in order to guarantee more reliable information specific to certain geographic areas
and based on both actual and potential threats.
It is crucial to develop not only more threat assessments but also more
vulnerability assessments. Improving threat and vulnerability assessments makes it
possible to develop national risk assessments for critical target sets (e.g., social or
economic infrastructures, U.S. landmarks). Moreover, this could help State and local
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governments in high-risk areas to conduct location- or community-specific risk
assessments (including real-time risk assessments in response to actionable intelligence).
At the same time, such assessments and the funding they generate must of course not
exclude low-risk target areas. Hence the way the DHS decides on or heightens alert levels
must be reliable and invariable. Flexibility in handling alerts is good; inconsistency is
not.
Adjusting Priorities and Re-Setting Agendas
Suicide terrorism is arguably the most serious threat in today’s war on terrorism.
In order to counter and pre-empt suicide terrorism, the international intelligence
community and governments around the world must concentrate their counterterrorism
efforts on interrupting suicide terror attacks in their preparatory phase. Interrupting
suicide terrorism at the planning and preparation stage is essential.
It is impossible to assert or even envisage that terrorism, especially suicide
terrorism, will ever be eradicated. People have fought over religious, political, and other
ideological causes for centuries and it would be naïve to trust that they will some day
spontaneously stop doing so. Nonetheless, focused and concerted counterterrorism efforts
are critically needed to concretely curtail the increasing success and popularity of suicide
bombing operations and, ultimately, prevent or even interdict suicide terrorism. Ever
since the early 1980s, policymakers have clearly struggled with the problems posed by
the resurgence and gradual metamorphosis of terrorist suicide attacks. The challenge is
getting even more complex today as terrorist groups use creative ways of reaching out to
new recruits, garnering community support, and taking advantage of technology to attain
their goals, while guaranteeing maximum destruction and casualties. The demise of
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suicide terrorism may in fact depend on the willingness of Western governments to
promote substantial reforms of their own political and socioeconomic structures.
In order to prevent suicide terrorism, it is crucial to fully comprehend what
combination of psychological and social-cultural factors exhorts people to join a terrorist
group and unites them behind common ideologies and grievances. It is furthermore
important to bear in mind that radicalization and the sustainability and growing
popularity of suicide terrorism are directly affected by the foreign policies of the Western
nations leading the “global war on terrorism,” as well as their overall social, political,
economic, and cultural agendas.
Since it is a prime and avowed enemy of terrorist groups today, especially those
resorting to suicide terrorism, the United States has a momentous responsibility to ensure
that multilateral and international counterterrorism efforts are well-directed, productive,
and uniform across the globe (i.e., not focused solely upon countries where special
interests are to be preserved or advanced). The etiology and dynamics of suicide
terrorism as a complex, extremely violent, and highly adaptive form of terrorism must be
thoroughly studied and clearly understood. Target hardening, intelligence gathering and
analysis, as well as reducing community support for suicide bombings should be top
priorities. The U.S. and others in the intelligence community must further take into
account the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other
unconventional tactics in conjunction with the perpetration of suicide terror attacks.
Acting unilaterally and relying heavily on military intervention are not acceptable
or productive solutions against suicide terrorism. Governments and the intelligence
community must instead consider alternatives that will prove more sensible and useful in
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the short and long term. They must take into account that supporters of suicide terrorism
may be highly receptive to what soft-power options entail, which most Muslims are
actually favorable to, such as democratically electing a government, enjoying civil
liberties and human rights, exercising freedom of expression, celebrating a cultural
heritage, taking advantage of educational opportunities, and having unlimited economic
choices.
In order to build these substantial conclusions into findings that genuinely have a
practical significance, much future research is needed. Suicide terrorism has become one
of the most massively debated issues in the media and political agendas today, both in the
United States and abroad. Only through rigorous scholarly research will we be able to
improve our insight into suicide bombings and to resourcefully impinge upon the
misrepresentation of and overreaction to suicide terrorism as a pressing socio-political
problem.
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The main objective of this research project was to provide a theoretical
framework to help answer key questions on the complex subject of suicide terrorism.
How is it used as a political weapon? How is it exploited as a communication tool? How
is it a politicized issue that fuels moral panics? This study, inasmuch as it is essentially
exploratory, does not offer final answers to these important questions. It does, however,
offer a set of theoretical remarks based on a social constructionist approach and a
symbolic interactionist perspective that may well guide future scholarship about this most
important issue. This study additionally derives its strength from its potential to inform
practice and effect major policy changes thanks to a sound theoretical input. Nonetheless,
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in order to stimulate further research about the social construction of suicide terrorism
and the symbolism of social reality, it is important to highlight the main limitations of
this contribution. Following this overview of study limitations, suggestions for future
research will be offered.
Limitations
As stated earlier in this study, the credibility of a qualitative study depends upon
the common understanding and interpretation of concepts by the researcher and the study
participants. Qualitative studies, by definition, call for a more personal analysis of the
data collected. One may then reasonably argue that the integrity of the data collected for
this study could have been compromised by researcher bias. In addition, the study
distinctively focuses on the subjective definitional and rhetorical processes involved in
the social construction of suicide terrorism. This increases the likelihood of bias in the
analysis phase. For example, with media sources alone, analytical procedures had to be
constantly adapted to check for accuracy (factual and technical errors), bias and distortion
(media accounts are rarely neutral), and audience context (potential misinterpretation by
an outsider). Ensuring the credibility of the analysis and the findings was therefore
fraught with obstacles. However, each of them was conscientiously and methodically
surmounted.
First of all, credibility was optimized by conducting prolonged fieldwork during
the initial G-CDMHA grant project on the phenomenology and etiology of suicide
terrorism. Interim data analysis and data substantiation ensured that study findings
matched participant reality. Precise accounts of interviews using verbatim statements
made by the interviewees, in addition to strictly quoted excerpts from documents ensured
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that the exact language used by the participants or in the analyzed documents were
transformed into objective data. Likewise, low-inference descriptors were used, so as to
accurately record detailed descriptions of specific situations. The use of mechanically
recorded data (through the extensive use of digital voice recorders, videotapes, and
photographs) further ensured the accuracy and easy corroboration of the data collected.
Interviewees were asked to double-check the accuracy of the information collected. After
each interview, participants were also asked to review the exactness of the information
gathered and transcribed during their interview(s). Finally, negative cases or conflicting
data likely to either stand out as exceptions to observed patterns or alter data patterns, if
any, were controlled for, recorded, analyzed, and reported.
From a purely methodological standpoint, it should further be noted that a
thorough symbolic interactionist study of the construction of suicide terrorism, in order to
be true to the Blumerian tradition, should include extensive fieldwork within the secular
and religious groups that have been stigmatized and, in essence, demonized as fanatical
terrorists. To fully comprehend the transactional or interactionist nature of the
phenomenon, researchers should invest their scholarly efforts in an objective analysis of
the folk devils, their identity and status, their actions, their environments, and the various
symbols attached to them. Such approach would be costly and time-consuming, not to
mention extremely dangerous, but it would undoubtedly enrich our knowledge and
understanding of suicide bombings worldwide and, as a result, promote more productive
and effective measures to prevent suicide terror attacks.
The limitations of the chosen purposeful sampling technique were considered, as
clarified in Chapter Three, as was the subsequent likelihood of error inherent in the
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qualitative study design. However, the sampling breadth of this study was wide enough
that it included cases from very diverse areas of the world, political or religious
backgrounds, socio-cultural frameworks, and more. Changes over time were not a
significant risk factor insofar as the socially constructed understanding of the
phenomenon of suicide terrorism appears constant regardless of time and place. As for
case-specific data collection methods, they were as thorough as possible, including all
available and accessible information sources. In retrospect, it seems that snowball
sampling and informal enquiries would also be useful techniques, all the more as
bureaucratic hurdles and the clandestine nature of most groups studied can occasionally
make it difficult to access informants.
As for the transferability of the findings of this study, it depends on their
usefulness to other qualitative researchers who would approach the analysis of suicide
bombings with comparable research questions or practical inquiries. As explained in
earlier descriptions of pertinent methodological concerns, the generalizability of the
findings requires their applicability as an analytic synthesis or as grounded theory. This is
necessary for other researchers to conduct further research on the social construction of
suicide terrorism. Knowledge may thus be generated not by replicating this study but,
rather, where extensive corroborating data becomes available through additional case
studies of the social construction of suicide terrorism.
In this study, finding transferability was maximized by paying special attention to:
(a) the researcher’s role and relationship with the study participants; (b) the site and key
informant selection process via purposeful sampling; (c) the social context of both the
phenomenon and the study itself; (d) the data collection and analysis strategies (including
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the triangulation of data and methods); (e) the accuracy of the narrative data; (f) the
typicality of the selected groups or sites; (g) the specificity and flexibility of the analytic
framework; and (h) potential alternative interpretations. It is important to note that the
chosen intellectual framework of this study ensures that both the collection and the
analysis of the data are constantly steered by the use of specific theoretical concepts and
models. Since this study is explicitly informed by a body of theory – namely social
constructionism and, more specifically, symbolic interactionism – researchers or
policymakers focusing on similar parameters are ultimately free to decide if the cases
presented in this analysis are transferable to new and comparable research settings, or
generalizable for policymaking purposes. Ultimately, what is most important to
remember here is that the need for generalization of these qualitative findings is
secondary – or almost insignificant – compared to the significance of the in-depth
understanding and the wealth of knowledge obtained on the phenomenon of interest.
Future Research
First and foremost, future research on suicide terrorism and its social construction
should rely more steadily on the collection of raw data to contribute original information
to our knowledge base of the phenomenon on the whole. Researchers should recoil from
the literature integration trend that is plaguing suicide terrorism research today. Such
approach is intellectually questionable and does not contribute to the advancement of the
scholarly study of suicide terrorism. More multiple-case studies including in-depth
interviews instead of mere historical surveys should be developed in order to extend the
findings of this study and continue to enrich our understanding of the reality of suicide
bombings. Overall, more qualitative studies involving triangulation of data and methods
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appear to be crucial to the formation of a methodologically sound, reliable body of
scholarly literature on this highly relevant socio-political issue.
Moreover, it is of utmost importance today to favor methodological designs that
will enable researchers to integrate micro and macro levels of analysis in order to study
suicide bombings and bombers more comprehensively, both at the individual level and at
the institutional or structural level. Viewing suicide terrorism as the sole outcome of
individual rational choice is simplistic. Likewise, interpreting suicide bombings as the
manifestations of structural dysfunction is dubious at best. In order to be comprehensive
and reliable scholarly research should, instead of opting for one-dimensional
explanations, delve into individual motivational factors while incorporating group
dynamics and social or institutional elements as well. Terrorist campaigns never happen
in a vacuum: the importance of individual factors must be evaluated against the
significance of structural ones and vice versa. Future research must therefore integrate a
combination of psychological, political, historical, economic, and socio-cultural factors to
explicate what exhort people to join a terrorist group, unite behind common ideologies
and grievances, and give their own life for what they perceive to be a noble cause.
A related and potentially promising research endeavor would consist of studying
suicide bombings from a perspective focusing on the social causes of the act of suicide
itself. Instead of concentrating on or exaggerating the individual motivations of the
bombers, such as suicidality or other pathological or clinical features, informed
researchers should favor a more pragmatic methodology based on the fundamentally
selfless nature of the act. Give up one’s life in a suicide bombing is more an expressive
act than an instrumental one. It is the expression of an emotion resulting from group
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dynamics and ideological motivation to fight for a just cause and die a noble death.
Researchers should not consider suicide bombings as the outcome of a cost-benefit
calculation or as a means to an end, as is regularly the case in the extant literature. In
order to be fruitful, scholarly efforts should instead be focused on analyzing suicide
bombings as ultimate examples of altruistic suicide, in the Durkheimian sense, not
manifestations of egoistic, anomic, or fatalistic types of suicide characterized by lack of
status or religious integration or by the state of social regulation.
The political ramifications of the social construction of suicide terrorism deserve
much more attention in scholarly writings. Specifically, more studies need to investigate
the politicization of suicide bombings and their resonance within more general trends: the
politicization of law and order and the politicization of religion and religiosity. These are
significant elements of today’s U.S.-led “War on Terror” and foreign policy as a whole,
both inside and outside of the United States. Researchers should try to determine how
these multiple facets of politicization affect public policy regarding terrorism in general
and suicide terrorism in particular, all the more as the sustainability and increasing
popularity of the tactic are significantly conditioned by the foreign policies of the
Western nations implicated in the “War on Terror.”
Similarly, the threat infrastructure of anti-terrorism policies is worthy of further
analysis as well. The research community and policymakers (and ultimately society at
large) would greatly benefit from a careful examination of the reasons why suicide
terrorism has generated such a moral panic while other insecurity episodes have not (and
probably never will). It would also be tremendously worthwhile to scrutinize why suicide
bombings have been only marginalized and essentially minimized in some areas of the
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world, while they have resulted in outbursts of fear, anger, and anxiety elsewhere. Future
studies should therefore probe not only the role of the mass media in the social
construction of suicide terrorism and the creation of synthetic panics that stigmatize and
demonize “the Other,” but also how political actors actively contribute to the politics of
collective insecurity, including the subjective or selective formation of the threats and the
propagation and marketing of fear. Such studies could focus on both proactive
involvement (political actors who are influential in getting a threat on the policy agenda)
and reactive roles (political actors who try to influence the threat awareness and
assessment once others have turned the threat into a key socio-political issue).
Scholars should earnestly endeavor to contribute to the development of a more
impartial analysis of suicide terrorism and its social construction not only by contributing
sound research to academic journals with a limited readership, but also by offering their
scientific, unbiased knowledge to the media and policymakers. Newsmaking
criminologists, for instance, could play a significant role in the presentation of a more
objective interpretation of suicide bombings and a more realistic image of the dynamics
involved. This would help demystify the phenomenon by offsetting the subjective and
overdramatic nature of contemporary media coverage of suicide bombings, which
typically favors the sensationalistic and highly selective treatment of events in regions of
the world where the United States has political or economic interests. Truly fair and
balanced information would finally take over the promotion of self-interests.
Above all, principled scholars must strive to develop an original and cohesive
research agenda to not only ensure fruitful investigative efforts but also promote a
thorough, objective investigation of the complex dynamics of suicide bombings. Suicide
192

terrorism must be analyzed methodically and – above all – dispassionately, as a relative
phenomenon that occurs within diverse cultures and evolves within a variety of symbolic
frameworks and moral universes. More studies of suicide bombings should focus on the
dynamics of the phenomenon, as well as the dynamics of human interaction in general as
it influences people’s symbolic framework for interpreting and understanding this violent
tactic. Suicide terrorism should not be viewed as a static or monolithic social problem
that does not vary across countries or cultures. Only a dispassionate and methodically
sound analysis including a variety of perspectives on the issue will foster a clear
understanding of the reality and dynamics of suicide bombings.
Only objective, elaborate scholarly studies and methodical investigations of the
phenomenon and its intricate context can effectively filter through the socio-political
processes, bureaucratic mechanisms, and media structures involved in the social
construction of suicide terrorism. Such analyses have the potential to significantly affect
all major actors in the moral panic surrounding suicide bombings today: the folk devils,
the media, the public, and the agents of social control involved in rule creation and
enforcement. Today, the dominant interpretational framework promotes a simplistic
dualism of suicide terrorism as a violent political and religious weapon that evidences a
fundamental misunderstanding of suicide bombings, in addition to a misleading,
counterproductive, and therefore harmful construal of the threat they pose worldwide.
This has already had serious adverse consequences: a chronic lack of knowledge about
the context and symbols of suicide terrorism; the trivialization and misrepresentation of
meanings and beliefs associated with suicide bombers; a mass media and ideological
exploitation of suicide bombings as deviant or even evil acts; extreme perceptions and
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moral campaigns that spill into subjective interpretations of the actors behind the violence
(on both sides) and result in moral panics; the adoption of misguided, inappropriate, and
arbitrary policies; the polarization of demonized deviants against the rest of society; and
the increased cohesion of terrorist groups in response to misguided counterterrorism
measures or suppression attempts by ill-advised agents of social control. Still, amidst all
these negative outcomes is a fantastically fertile ground for excellent research in the near
future. May the high potential for controversy not be a deterrent.

194

References
Abuza, Z. (2004). Tentacles of terror: Al-Qaeda’s southeast Asian network. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Adler, P., & Adler, P. (Eds.) (2003). Constructions of deviance: Social power, context,
and interaction (4th edition). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Ali, T. (2002). The clash of fundamentalisms: Crusades, jihads and modernity. New
York: Verso.
Almogy, G., Belzberg, H., Mintz, Y., Pikarsky, A. K., Zamir, G., & Rivkind, A. I.
(2004). Suicide bombing attacks: Update and modifications to the protocol.
Annals of Surgery, 239(3), 295-303.
Almogy, G., Luria, T., Richter, E., Pizov, R., Bdolah-Abram, T., Mintz, Y., Zamir, G., &
Rivkind, A. I. (2005). Can external signs of trauma guide management? Lessons
learned from suicide bombing attacks in Israel. Archives of Surgery, 140, 390393.
Archick, K. (2003). Europe and counterterrorism: Strengthening police and judicial
cooperation. In K. Archick & P. Gallis (Eds.), Europe and counterterrorism
(pp.1-34). New York: Nova Science.
Archick, K., & Gallis, P. (Eds.) (2003). Europe and counterterrorism. New York: Nova
Science.
Arena, M. P., & Arrigo, B. A. (2005). Social psychology, terorrism, and identity: A
preliminary re-examination of theory, culture, self, and society. Behavioral
Sciences and the Law, 23, 485-506.
Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science, 299, 1534-1539.
Atran, S. (2004). Mishandling suicide terrorism. The Washington Quarterly, 27(3), 6790.
Atran, S. (2004, August). Trends in suicide terrorism: Sense and nonsense. Paper
presented at the meeting of the World Federation of Scientists Permanent
Monitoring Panel on Terrorism, Erice, Italy.
195

Audet, J., & d’Amboise, G. (2001, June). The multi-site study: An innovative research
methodology. The Qualitative Report, 6(2). Retrieved January 15, 2005, from
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR6-2/audet.html
Barak, G. (Ed.) (1994). Media, process, and the social construction of crime: Studies in
newsmaking criminology. New York: Garland Publishing.
Bassiouni, M. C. (1981). Terrorism, law enforcement, and the mass media: Perspectives,
problems, proposals. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 72(1), 1-51.
Becker, H. S. (1988). Herbert Blumer’s conceptual impact. Symbolic Interaction, 11(1),
13-21.
Becker, H. S. (1994). Outsiders. In J. E. Jacoby (Ed.), Classics of Criminology (2nd
edition) (pp. 264-271). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
Becker, H. S. (2003). Labeling theory. In P. Adler & P. Adler (Eds.), Constructions of
deviance: Social power, context, and interaction (4th edition) (pp.70-74).
Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Becker, H. S., & McCall, M. M. (Eds.) (1990). Symbolic interaction and cultural studies.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Béland, D. (2005). The political construction of collective insecurity: From moral panic
to blame avoidance and organized irresponsibility. Retrieved November 30,
2005, from http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/Beland.pdf
Ben-Yehuda, N. (1993). Political assassinations by Jews. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press.
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the
sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Berko, A. (2004). The moral infrastructure of chief perpetrators of suicide terrorism: An
analysis in terms of moral judgment. Retrieved June 20, 2004, from
http://www.ict.org.il
Bernard, H. R. (1996). Qualitative data, quantitative analysis. Cultural Anthropology
Methods Journal, 8 (1), 9-11.
Best, J. (1995). Random violence: How we talk about new crimes and new victims.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

196

Best, J. (2003). Deviance: The constructionist stance. In P. Adler & P. Adler (Eds.),
Constructions of deviance: Social power, context, and interaction (4th edition)
(pp. 90-93). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Beyler, C. (2003a). Chronology of suicide bombings carried out by women. Retrieved
April 4, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il
Beyler, C. (2003b). Messengers of death: Female suicide bombers. Retrieved April 4,
2003, from http://www.ict.org.il
Bloom, M. (2005a). Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Bloom, M. (2005b). Mother. Daughter. Sister. Bomber. Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists,
61(6), 54-62.
Bloom, M. (2005c). Terror’s stealth weapon: Women. The St. Petersburg Times.
Retrieved December 12, 2005, from http://www.sptimesrussia.com/story/16262
Blumer, H. (1956). Sociological analysis and the variable. American Sociological
Review, 21, 683-690.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bond, M. (2004). The making of a suicide bomber. New Scientist, 182, 34-37.
Bourdon, S. (2002, May). The integration of qualitative data analysis software in research
strategies: Resistance and possibilities. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 3(2).
Retrieved July 10, 2005, from http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs
Brooks, D. (2002, June). The culture of martyrdom. The Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved
December 27, 2004, from http://www.theatlantic.com
Buffington, R. (2003, May). Periodization and its discontents: The social construction of
crime and criminality in modern Mexico. Paper presented at the Conference on
Reforming the Adminstration of Justice in Mexico, La Jolla, CA.
Busch, K. G., & Weissman, S. H. (2005). The intelligence community and the war on
teror: The role of behavioral science. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23, 559571.
Bush, G. W. (2001). U.S. feels ‘quiet, unyielding anger.’ Retrieved September 12, 2004,
from http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/white.house/

197

Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1966). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs
for research on teaching. In N. L. Gage (Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching.
Chicago: Rand NcNally.
Caracci, G. (2002). Cultural and contextual aspects of terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The
psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical understanding and perspectives (pp.
57-82). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Charon, J. M. (2004). Symbolic interactionism: An introduction, an interpretation, an
integration (8th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Chechnya’s ‘black widow’ bombers (2003). Retrieved December 13, 2004, from
http://www.cnn.com
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk devils and moral panics (3rd edition). London: Routledge.
Council on Foreign Relations (2004). Suicide terror: Was 9/11 something new? Retrieved
November 12, 2004, from http://cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/suicide.html
Crenshaw, M. (1992). Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective. Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, 15(1), 1-12.
Creswell, J. W. (1997). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
traditions. London: Sage Publications.
Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the
research process. London: Sage Publications.
Dale, S. F. (1988). Religious suicide in Islamic Asia: Anticolonial terrorism in India,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32(1), 37-59.
Davidson, L. (1986, Spring). Terrorism in context: The case of the West Bank. Jounral of
Palestine Studies, 15(3): 109-124.
Dickey, C. (2005, December). Women of al-Qaeda. Newsweek. Retrieved December 5,
2005, from http://www.newsweek.com
Eshel, D. (2001). Israel reviews profile of suicide bombers. Jane’s Intelligence Review,
13, 20-21.
Farberman, H. A. (1985). The foundations of symbolic interaction: James, Cooley, and
Mead. In H. A. Farberman & R. S. Perinbanayagam (Eds.), Studies in Symbolic
Interaction: Supplement 1 – Foundations of interpretive sociology: Original
essays in symbolic interaction (pp. 13-27). Greenwich, CT: Jai Press.
198

Farberman, H. A., & Perinbanayagam, R. S. (Eds.) (1985). Studies in Symbolic
Interaction: Supplement 1 – Foundations of interpretive sociology: Original
essays in symbolic interaction. Greenwich, CT: Jai Press.
Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. (Eds.) (1991). A case for case study. Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Fighel, J. (2002). Top Muslim clerics endorse suicide attacks - A challenge to the United
States? Retrieved April 4, 2003, from http://www.ict.org.il
Fine, G. A., & Kleinman, S. (1968). Interpreting the sociological classics: Can there be a
“true” meaning of Mead? Symbolic Interaction, 9(1), 129-146.
Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1979a). George Herbet Mead and the Chicago tradition
of sociology (Part one). Symbolic Interaction, 2(1), 9-25.
Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1979b). George Herbet Mead and the Chicago tradition
of sociology (Part two). Symbolic Interaction, 2(2), 9-20.
Fleischer, A. (2002, April 12). Press briefing. Retrieved May 7, 2003, from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020412-1.html
Fontana, A., & Frey, J. H. (1994). Interviewing: The art of science. In N. K. Denzin & Y.
S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 361-376). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Fuller, R., & Myers, R. (1941). The Natural History of a Social Problem. American
Sociological Review, 6, 320-329.
Ganor, B. (2002a). Suicide attacks in Israel. In International Policy Insitute for CounterTerrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 140-153). New York: AntiDefamation League.
Ganor, B. (2002b). Suicide terrorism after September 11. In International Policy Insitute
for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 167-176). New
York: Anti-Defamation League.
Gergen, K. J. (1999). An invitation to social construction. London: Sage Publications.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago:
Aldine de Gruyter.
Glausiusz, J. (2003). The surprises of suicide terrorism: An anthropological take on
suicide terrorism. Discover. Retrieved September 16, 2004, from
http://www.discover.com
199

Goode, E., & Ben-Yehuda, N. (1994). Moral panics: The social construction of deviance.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Gourevitch, P. (2004). Bushspeak: The President’s vernacular style. The New Yorker.
Retrieved October 27, 2004, from http://www.newyorker.com
Griffiths, E. (2005, December 28). Russian security forces under fire over Beslan siege.
Retrieved December 28, 2005, from http://www.abc.net.au
Griset, P. L., & Mahan, S. (2003). Terrorism in perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Gunaratna, R. (2000). Suicide terrorism: A global threat. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 12,
52-55.
Gunaratna, R. (2001). Terror from the sky. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13, 6-9.
Gunaratna, R. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka and India. In International Policy
Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 101-108).
New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Hacking, I. (2000). The social construction of what? Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Hawkins, R., & Tiedeman, G. (1975). The creation of deviance: Interpersonal and
organizational determinants. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing.
Hewitt, C. (2000). Patterns of American terrorism, 1955-1998: A historical perspective
on terrorism-related fatalities. Terrorism and Political Violence, 12(1), 1-14.
Hoepfl, M. C. (1997). Choosing qualitative research: A primer for technology education
researchers. Journal of technology Education, 9(1). Retrieved January 13, 2005,
from http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v9n1/hoepfl.html
Hoffman, B. (2003). The logic of suicide terrorism. Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved
November 7, 2004, from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200306/hoffman
Hoffman, B., & McCormick, G. H. (2004). Terrorism, signaling, and suicide attack.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 243-281.
Holsti, O.R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.

200

Horton, S. (2005, July 23). Poisonous misinterpretations. Retrieved September 13, 2005,
from http://www.antiwar.com
Hudson, R. A. (2000). Who becomes a terrorist and why: The 1999 government report on
profiling terrorists. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press.
Human Rights Watch (2002). Erased in a moment: Suicide bobming attacks against
Israeli civilians. Retrieved November 27, 2003 from http://www.hrw.org
International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.) (2002). Countering suicide
terrorism. New York: Anti-Defamation League.
International reactions to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and the
Pentagon in Washington (2001). Retrieved April 13, 2004, from
http://www.september11news.com/InternationalReaction.htm
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003a). Blackmailing young women into suicide
terrorism. Retrieved October 24, 2004, from http://www.mfa.gov.il
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003b). The role of Palestinian women in suicide
terrorism. Retrieved October 24, 2004, from http://www.mfa.gov.il
Israeli, R. (2002). A manual of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 14, 23-40.
Israeli, R. (2003). Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic martyrology. London: Frank
Cass.
Jacobs, J. B., & Henry, J. S. (1996). The social construction of the hate crime epidemic.
The Journal of Criminal law and Criminology, 86(2), 366-391.
Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. A. (1998). Hate crimes: Criminal law and identity politics.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Jacinto, L. (2002). Death wish: Suicide Bombers have historic links and tactical
advantages. Retrieved April 30, 2002, from
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/suicide 020416.html
Jenkins, P. (1994a). The ‘ice age’ – The social construction of a drug panic. Justice
Quarterly, 11, 7-31.
Jenkins, P. (1994b). Using murder: The social construction of serial homicide. New
York: Aldine de Gruyter.

201

Jenkins, P. (2003). Images of terror: What we can and can’t know about terrorism. New
York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious
violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Kantner, L., Sova, D., & Anschuetz, L. (2005). Organizing qualitative data from lab and
field: Challenges and methods. Retrieved December 1, 2005, from
http://www.teced.com
Kimhi, S., & Even, S. (2003). Who are the Palestinian suicide terrorists? Retrieved
April 4, 2004, from http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v6n2p5Kim.html
King, J. (2002). White House condemns 'homicide bombing.' Retrieved June 30, 2005,
from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/04/12/Bush.mideast.reax/
Kitsuse, J. I., & Spector, M. (1995). The definition of social problems. In E. Rubington &
M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), The study of social problems: Seven perspectives (5th
edition) (pp. 294-301). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kluger, Y., Mayo, A., Hiss, J., Ashkenazi, E., Bendahan, J., Blumenfeld, A., Michaelson,
M., Stein, M., Simon, D., Schwartz, I., & Alfici, R. (2005). Medical consequences
of terrorist bombs containing spherical metal pellets: Analysis of a suicide
terrorism event. European Journal of Emergency Medicine, 12, 19-23.
Kondaki, C. (2001). Suicide terrorism, an age-old weapon, adds technology. Defense and
Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 29, 8-9.
Kushner, H. W. (1996). Suicide bombers: Business as usual. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 19, 329-337.
Kushner, S., & Norris, N. (1981). Interpretation, negotiation and validity in naturalistic
research. Interchange, 11, 26-36.
Laqueur, W. (2003). No end to war: Terrorism in the twenty-first century. New York:
Continuum.
LeCompte, M. D. (1993). A framework for hearing silence: What does telling stories
mean when we are supposed to be doing science? In D. McLaughlin & W.
Tierney (Eds.), Naming silenced lives: Personal narratives and the process of
educational change (pp. 9-27). New York: Routledge.
Lewis, J. D. (1976). The classic American pragmatists as forerunners to symbolic
interactionism. Sociological Quarterly, 17, 347-359.
202

Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications.
Loseke, D. R., & Best, J. (Eds.) (2003). Social problems: Constructionist readings. New
York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Luft, G. (2002). The Palestinian H-bomb. Foreign Affairs, 81, 2-8.
Maines, D. R., Sugrue, N. M., & Katovich, M. A. (1983). The sociological import of G.
H. Mead’s theory of the past. American Sociological Review, 48, 161-173.
Mansdorf, I. J. (2003). The psychological framework of suicide terrorism. Retrieved
April 4, 2004, from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp496.htm
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1998). Designing qualitative research (3rd edition).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
McKinney, J. C. (1991). The contribution of George H. Mead to the sociology of
knowledge. In K. Plummer (Ed.), Symbolic interactionism – Volume I (pp. 113118). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.
McMillan, J. H., & Schumacher, S. S. (1997). Research in education: A conceptual
introduction. New York: Longman.
Meltzer, B. N., Petras, J. W., & Reynolds, L. T. (1991). Criticisms of symbolic
interactionism. In K. Plummer (Ed.), Symbolic interactionism – Volume II (pp.
23-63). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.
MEMRITV (2005, October 28). IRIB 3TV Iranian animated after-school special.
Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://www.memritv.org
Miller, D. L. (1973). George Herbert Mead: Symbolic interaction and social change. The
Psychological Record, 23, 294-304.
Miller, M. M., & Riechert, B. P. (1994, August). Identifying themes via concept mapping:
A new method of content analysis. Paper presented at the meeting of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Knoxville,
TN.
Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second Intifada: Motivations
and organizational aspects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26, 65-92.
Mrena, R., Paakkonen, R., Back, L., Pirvola, U., & Ylikoski, J. (2004). Otologic
consequences of blast exposure: A Finnish case study of a shopping mall bomb
explosion. Acta Oto-Laryngologica, 124(8), 946-952.
203

Nahmias, R. (2005a). ‘40,000 time bombs in Iran.’ Retrieved September 12, 2005, from
http://www.ynetnews.com
Nahmias, R. (2005b). Iran admits ‘suicide column’ program. Retrieved September 12,
2005, from http://www.ynetnews.com
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final
report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Nyatepe-Coo A. A., & Zeisler-Vralsted, D. (Eds.) (2004). Understanding terrorism:
Threats in an uncertain world. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson / Prentice Hall.
Pape, R. (2005). Causes of global suicide terrorism. Retrieved November 12, 2005, from
http://www.washingtonpost.com
Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science
Review, 97(3), 1-19.
Patton, M. Q. (2001). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd edition).
London: Sage Publications.
Pavlova, E. (2004). Jihad online: The public face of al-Qaeda? Retrieved April 13, 2005,
from http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo04/paper/andalo04-pavlova.pdf
Paz, R. (2001). The Saudi fatwah against suicide terrorism. Peacewatch, 323. Retrieved
September 15, 2002, from
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/323.htm
Perina, K. (2002). Suicide terrorism: Seeking motives beyond mental illness. Psychology
Today, 35, 15-24.
Perl, R. F. (1997). Terrorism, the media, and the government: Perspectives, trends, and
options for policymakers. Retrieved November 1, 2005, from
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-terror.htm
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York:
Viking.
Pipes, D. (1986, Summer). The scourge of suicide terrorism. National Interest. Retrieved
August 13, 2003, from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175
Plummer, K. (Ed.) (1991a). Symbolic interactionism – Volume I. Brookfield, VT: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
204

Plummer, K. (Ed.) (1991b). Symbolic interactionism – Volume II. Brookfield, VT:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Poland, J. M. (2004). Understanding terrorism: Groups, strategies, and responses (2nd
edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
Prus, R. (1996). Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research: Intersubjectivity and
the study of human lived experience. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Reinharz, S. (1992). Feminist methods in social research. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Reuter, J. (2004). Chechnya’s suicide bombers: Desperate, devout, or deceived?
Retrieved April 13, 2005, from http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/reports/
Ropers, R. (1973). Mead, Marx and social psychology. Catalyst, 7, 42-61.
Rotella, S. (2005, December 1). Female Belgian suicide bomber in Iraq marks grim first.
Los Angeles Times. Retrieved December 2, 2005, from http://www.latimes.com
Rothe, D., & Muzzatti, S. L. (2004). Enemies everywhere: Terrorism, moral panic, and
US civil society. Critical Criminology, 12, 327-350.
Schwandt, T. (1997). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Schweitzer, Y. (2001). Suicide bombings – The ultimate weapon? Retrieved September
30, 2002, from http://www.ict.org.il
Schweitzer, Y. (2002). Suicide terrorism: Development and main characteristics. In
International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide
terrorism (pp. 77-88). New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. New York: Free Press.
Selegut, C. (2003). Sacred fury: Understanding religious violence. Walnut Creek, CA:
AltaMira Press.
Shadish, W. R. (1995b). Philosophy of science and the quantitative-qualitative debates:
Thirteen common errors. Evaluation and Program Planning, 18(1), 63-75.
Shibutani, T. (1988). Herbert Blumer’s contributions to twentieth-century sociology.
Symbolic Interaction, 11(1), 23-31.
205

Shott, S. (1976). Society, self and mind in moral philosophy: The Scottish moralists as
precursors of symbolic interactionism. Journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences, 12, 39-46.
Siegel-Itzkovich, J. (2001). Israeli minister orders hepatitis B vaccine for survivors of
suicide bomb attacks. British Medical Journal, 323, 417.
Silke, A. (2004). Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements & Failures. London:
Frank Cass.
Simon, S., & Stevenson, J. (2003, Winter). Confronting Hamas. National Interest, 74, 5969.
Simonsen, C. E., & Spindlove, J. R. (2003). Terrorism today: The past, the players, the
future (2nd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Smith, B. (1998). ‘It doesn’t count because it’s subjective!’ (Re)conceptualising the
qualitative researcher role as ‘validity’ embraces subjectivity. Paper presented in
the Advance Paper section of the AARE Annual Conference, Adelaide, Australia,
September 1998. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://www.aare.edu.au
Smith, J. (1992). Interpretive inquiry: A practical and moral activity. Theory Into
Practice, 31(2), 100-106.
Spector, M., & Kitsuse, J. I. (1977). Constructing social problems. Menlo Park, CA:
Cummings.
Sprinzak, E. (1998, Autumn). The great superterrorism scare. Foreign Policy, 112, 110124.
Sprinzak, E. (2000a). Extremism and violence in Israeli democracy. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 12(3/4), 209-236.
Sprinzak, E. (2000b). Outsmarting suicide terrorists. Christian Science Monitor.
Retrieved January 4, 2003, from http://csmonitor.com
Stemler, E. (2001). An introduction to content analysis. Retrieved January 11, 2004, from
http://www.ericdigests.org/2002-2/content.htm
Stigler, J. W., Gonzales, P., Kawanaka, T., Knoll, S., & Serrano, A. (1999). The TIMSS
Videotape Classroom Study: Methods and Findings from an Exploratory
Research Project on Eighth-Grade Mathematics Instruction in Germany, Japan,
and the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
206

Stork, J. (2002). Erased in a moment: Suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians.
New York: Human Rights Watch.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory
procedures and techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Strenski, I. (2003). Sacrifice, gift and the social logic of Muslim ‘Human
Bombers.’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 1-34.
Stryker, S. (1980). Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version. Menlo Park, CA:
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing.
Suicide terrorists hunted in Chechnya (2003, July 24). Pravda. Retrieved April 13, 2005,
from http://english.pravda.ru/accidents/21/93/374/10575_chechnya.html
Telhami, S. (2002). Why suicide terrorism takes root. The New York Times, A23.
Waldman, A. (2003). Masters of suicide bombing: Tamil guerrillas of Sri Lanka.
The New York Times, A1.
Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to case study. The Qualitative Report, 3(2). Retrieved
January 29, 2006, from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-2/tellis1.html
Text of Bush’s address (2001, September 11). Retrieved September 11, 2004 from
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/
Thorne, S. (2000). Data analysis in qualitative research. Evidence-Based Nursing, 3, 6870.
Turk, A. T. (2002a). Terrorism. In J. Dressler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
Volume 4 (2nd edition) (pp. 1549-1556). New York: MacMillan.
Turk, A. T. (2004). Sociology of terrorism. Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 271-286.
United States Senate (2001). The USA PATRIOT Act. Retrieved November 2003, from
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf
US Army Training and Doctrine Command (2005). Suicide bombing in the COE.
Retrieved August 22, 2005, from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup3.pdf
van Biema, D. (2001, December 17). Why the bombers keep coming. Time Atlantic.
Retrieved August 15, 2003, from http://www.timeatlantic.com
Van de Voorde, C. (2005). Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the
Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Police Practice and
Research, 6(2), 181-199.
207

Van de Voorde, C. V., & Mason, T. J. (2004). Countering suicide terrorism:
Phenomenology, etiology, risk assessment, and prevention. Tampa, FL: Global
Center for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action.
van Leeuwen, M. (Ed.) (2003c). Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat
perceptions and policies. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Victor, B. (2002). Shahidas: Les femmes kamikazes de Palestine [Shahidas: The female
kamikaze of Palestine]. Paris : Flammarion.
Victor, B. (2003). Army of roses: Inside the world of Palestinian women suicide bombers.
New York: Rodale.
Waskul, D. D. (2002). The naked self: Being a body in televideo cybersex. Symbolic
Interaction, 25(2), 199-227.
Waskul, D. D. (2003). Self-games and body-play: Personhood in online chat and
cybersex. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
White, J. R. (2003). Terrorism: An introduction (4th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Thomson/Wadsworth.
Whittaker, D. J. (2001). The terrorism reader. New York: Routledge.
Whittaker, D. J. (2002). Terrorism: Understanding the global threat. London: Pearson
Education.
Wilkinson, P. (1997). The media and terrorism: A reassessment. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 9(2), 51-64.
Wolfson, A. (2003, September 16). Demystify it: How to defeat suicide terrorism.
National Review Online. Retrieved December 12, 2004, from
http://www.nationalreview.com
Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications.
Young, J. (2005). Constructing the paradigm of violence: Mass media, violence and
youth. Retrieved November 30, 2005, from http://www.ukobservatory.com
Zafar, H., Rehmani, R., Chawla, T., Umer, M., & e-Azam, M. (2005). Suicidal bus
bombing of French national in Pakistan: physical injuries and management of
survivors. Journal of Emergency Medicine, 12, 163-167.
208

Zwi, A. B. (2002). Studying political violence: We should push for more from
epidemiology. International Journal of Epidemiology, 31, 585-586.

209

Bibliography
Abrams, P. (1991). The historical sociology of individuals – Monsters and heroes:
Careers and contigencies. In K. Plummer (Ed.), Symbolic interactionism – Volume
II (pp. 223-255). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Adler, P., Adler, P., & Fontana, A. (1987). Everyday life sociology. Annual Review of
Sociology, 13, 217-235.
Akers, R. L., & Sellers, C. S. (2004). Criminological theories: Introduction, evaluation,
and application (4th edition). Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Al-Hail, A. (2004, November 4). In the midst of terror phobia and the ‘war on
terrorism’: A pause should be considered to read into Islamic ideology. Retrieved
November 14, 2004, from http://www.aljazeerah.info
Al-Hasan, B. (1986). Who has the right to condemn terrorism? Journal of Palestine
Studies, 15(3), 150-151.
Alexander, Y., & Kilmarx, R. A. (Eds.) (1979). Political terrorism and business: The
threat and response. New York: Praeger.
Amnesty International (2005). Sri Lanka: Act now to prevent escalation of violence and
abuse. Retrieved December 5, 2005, from http://news.amnesty.org
Anderson, G. (2001). A lesson in modern terrorism. Vital Speeches of the Day, 68(4),
117-124.
Anti-Defamation League (2002). Arab leaders glorify suicide terrorism. Retrieved
October 15, 2002 from http://www.adl.org/israel/israel_suicide_terror.asp
Apter, D. (1997). The legitimization of violence. New York: New York University Press.
Archick, K. (2003). Europe and counterterrorism: Strengthening police and judicial
cooperation. In K. Archick & P. Gallis (Eds.), Europe and counterterrorism
(pp.1-34). New York: Nova Science.
Ardila, R. (2002). The psychology of the terrorist: Behavioral perspectives. In C. E. Stout
(Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1. A public understanding (pp. 9-16).
Westport, CT: Praeger.
210

Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Arnold, T. E. (1988). The violence formula: Why people lend sympathy and support to
terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Arosalo, S. (1998). Social conditions for political violence: Red and white terror in the
Finnish civil war of 1918. Journal of Peace and Research, 35(2), 147-166.
Ashenberg-Straussner, S. L., & Kolko Phillips, N. (2004). Understanding mass violence:
A social work perspective. Boston: Pearson.
Assaf, M. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second Intifada: Motivations and
organizational aspects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26, 65-92.
Aughey, A. (1988). Political violence in Northern Ireland. In H. H. Tucker (Ed.),
Combating the terrorists: Democratic responses to political violence (pp. 75111). New York: Facts on File.
Auvinen, J. (1997). Political conflict in less developed countries, 1981-1989. Journal of
Peace Research, 34(2), 177-195.
Aya, R. (1979). Theories of revolution reconsidered: Contrasting models of collective
violence. Theory and Society, 8(1), 39-99.
Azam, J.-P. (2005). Suicide bombing as inter-generational investment. Public Choice,
122(1-2), 177-198.
Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1973). Values and violence: A test of the subculture of violence
thesis. American Sociological Review, 38(6), 736-749.
Bandura, A. (1990). Mechanisms of moral disengagement. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of
terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 161-191).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Barkan, S. E., & Snowden, L. L. (2001). Collective violence. Needham Heights, MA:
Allyn & Bacon.
Barkun, M. (2000). Violence in the name of democracy: Justifications for separatism on
the radical right. Terrorism and Political Violence, 12(3/4), 193-208.
Barry, R. (1980). Just war theory and the logic of reconciliation. New Scholasticism, 54,
129-152.

211

Baruch, E. H. (2003). Psychoanalysis and terrorism: The need for a global ‘talking cure.’
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20(4), 698-700.
Beck, J. M. (2000). The continuity of Basque political violence: A geographical
perspective on the legitimisation of violence. GeoJournal, 48, 109-121.
Beer, F. A. (1979). The epidemiology of peace and war. International Studies Quarterly,
23(1), 45-86.
Beinin, J., & Stork, J. (Eds.) (1997). Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Belsey, A., & Chadwick, R. (Eds.) (1992). Ethical issues in journalism and the media.
London: Routledge.
Benson, M., & Kugler, J. (1998). Power parity, democracy, and the severity of internal
violence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(2), 196-209.
Benzies, K. M., & Allen, M. N. (2001). Symbolic interactionism as a theoretical
perspective for multiple method research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 33(4),
541-547.
Blalock, H. M. (1989). Power and conflict: Toward a general theory. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publications.
Blossfeld, H. P. (1996). Macro-sociology, rational choice theory, and time: A theoretical
perspective on the empirical analysis of social processes. European Sociological
Review, 12(2), 181-206.
Bonanate, L. (1979). Some unanticipated consequences of terrorism. Journal of Peace
Research, 16(3), 197-211.
Bonner, J. (1986). Introduction to the theory of social choice. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Borum, R., & Gelles, M. (2005). Al-Qaeda’s operational evolution: Behavioral and
organizational perspectives. Behavioral Science and the Law, 23, 467-483.
Boswell, T., & Dixon, W. J. (1990). Dependency and rebellion: A cross-national analysis.
American Sociological Review, 55(4), 540-559.
Boswell, T., & Dixon, W. J. (1993). Marx’s theory of rebellion: A cross-national analysis
of class exploitation, economic development, and violent revolt. American
Sociological Review, 58(5), 681-702.
212

Brady, M. P. (2002). Quotidian warfare. Signs, 28(1), 446-447.
Brass, P. R. (1997). Theft of an idol: Text and context in the representation of collective
violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brindle, D. (1999). Media coverage of social policy: A journalist’s perspectiv. In B.
Fanklin (Ed.), Social policy, the media and misrepresentation (pp. 39-50). New
York: Routledge.
Brownfield, D. (1986). Social class and violent behavior. Criminology, 24, 421-437.
Brubaker, R., & Laitin, D. D. (1998). Ethnic and nationalist violence. Annual Review of
Sociology, 24, 423-452.
Brush, S. G. (1996). Dynamics of theory change in the social sciences: Relative
deprivation and collective violence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4),
523-545.
Buchanan, A. (1979). Revolutionary motivation and rationality. Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 9(1), 59-82.
Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2003). The quality of terror. Retrieved January 10, 2004, from
http://www.princeton.edu/~pegrad/papers/bueno.pdf
Busch, K. G., & Weissman, S. H. (2005). The intelligence community and the war on
teror: The role of behavioral science. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23, 559571.
Byman, D. (1998). The logic of ethnic terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21,
149-169.
Cairns, E. (1996). Children and political violence. Oxford, England: Blackwell
Publishers.
Carey, B. (2002). Are suicide bombers insane? Los Angeles Times, August 18, 2002.
Retrieved September 16, 2002, from
http://www.supportisrael.info/are_suicide_bombers_insane.htm
Carey, J. W., Morgan, M., & Oxtoby, M. J. (1996). Intercoder agreement in analysis of
responses to open-ended interview questions: Examples from tuberculosis
research. Cultural Anthropology Methods, 8(3), 1-5.
Cettina, N. (2003). The French approach: Vigour and vigilance. In M. van Leeuwen
(Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and
policies (pp.57-70). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
213

Chadwick, E. (1997). Terrorism and the law: Historical contexts, contemporary
dilemmas, and the end(s) of democracy. Crime Law and Social Change, 26(4),
329-350.
Chai, S. K. (1993). An organizational economics theory of antigovernment violence.
Comparative Politics, 26(1), 99-110.
Chechnya’s ‘black widow’ bombers (2003). Retrieved December 13, 2004, from
http://www.cnn.com
Chermak, S. (1994). Crime in the news media: A refined understanding of how crimes
become news. In G. Barak (Ed.), Media, process,and the social construction of
crime: Studies in newsmaking criminology (pp. 95-129). New York: Garland
Publishing.
Chermak, S. (2003). Marketing fear: Representing terrorism after September 11. Journal
of Crime, Conflict and the Media, 1(1), 5-22.
Chernick, M. W. (1988). Negotiated settlement to armed conflict: Lessons from the
Colombian peace process. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,
30(4), 53-88.
Chosak, J., & Sawyer, J. (2005). Hamas’s tactics: Lessons from recent attacks. Retrieved
November 2, 2005, from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org
Chowdhari Tremblay, R. (1996). Nation, identity and the intervening role of the state: A
study of the secessionist movement in Kashmir. Pacific Affairs, 69(4), 471-497.
Chowning Davies, J. (1974). The J-curve and power struggle theories of collective
violence. American Sociological Review, 39(4), 607-610.
Clarke, A. E., & Gerson, E. M. (1990). Symbolic interactionism in social studies of
science. In H. S. Becker & M. M. McCall (Eds.), Symbolic interaction and
cultural studies (pp. 179-214). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clarke, R. A. (2004). Against all enemies: Inside America’s war on terror. New York:
Free Press.
Claster, D. S. (1992). Bad guys and good guys: Moral polarization and crime. Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press.
Clutterbuck, R. (Ed.) (1986). The future of political violence: Destabilization, disorder
and terrorism. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.
Cohen, S. (1972). Folk devils and moral panics. London: McGibbon and Kee.
214

Cohen, S., & Young, J. (Eds.) (1973). The manufacture of news: A reader. Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publications.
Cohen, S., & Young, J. (Eds.) (1981). The manufacture of news: Social problems,
deviance and the mass media. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Collier, P. (2000, March). Policy for post-conflict societies: Reducing the risks of
renewed conflict. Paper presented at the Economics of Political Violence
conference, Princeton, NJ.
Collins, R. (1983). Micromethods as a basis for macrosociology. Urban Life, 12(2), 184202.
Combs, C. C. (1997). Terrorism in the twenty-first century. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Conboy, M. (2002). The press and popular culture. London: Sage Publications.
Cone, J. D., & Foster, S. L. (1993). Dissertations and theses from start to finish:
Psychology and related fields. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Conteh-Morgan, E. (2004). Collective political violence. New York: Routledge.
Cooper, C. D. (2001). Not just a numbers thing: Tactics for improving reliability and
validity in qualitative research. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from
http://www.aom.pace.edu/rmd/ 2001forum/methods_article_with_refs.pdf
Coronil, F., & Skurski, J. (1991). Dismembering and remembering the nation: The
semantics of political violence in Venezuela. Comparative Studies in Society and
History, 33(2), 288-337.
Corsi, J. R. (1981). Terrorism as a desperate game: Fear, barganing, and communication
in the terrorist event. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(1), 47-85.
Corsun, A. (2003). Political violence against Americans 2002. Washington, DC: Office
of Intelligence and Threat Analysis.
Craig, S. C., & Wald, K. D. (1985). Whose ox to gore? A comment on the relationship
between political discontent and political violence. The Western Political
Quarterly, 38(4), 652-662.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379-399.
215

Crenshaw, M. (1985). An organizational approach to the analysis of political terrorism.
Orbis, 29, 465-489.
Crenshaw, M. (1988). Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches.
In D. C. Rapoport, Inside terrorist organizations (pp.13-31). New York:
Columbia University Press.
Crenshaw, M. (1990). The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic
choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies,
theologies, states of mind (pp. 7-24). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crenshaw, M. (2000). Democracy, commitment problems and managing ethnic violence:
The case of India and Sri Lanka. Terrorism and Political Violence, 12(3/4), 135159.
Crenshaw, M. (2002). “Suicide” terrorism in comparative perspective. In International
Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 2129). New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Crenshaw, M. (Ed.) (1983). Terrorism, legitimacy, and power: The consequences of
political violence. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Crenshaw Hutchinson, M. (1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 16(3), 383-396.
Cullen, F. T., & Agnew, R. (Eds.) (1999). Criminological theory: Past to present –
Essential readings. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Cullen, S. M. (1993). Political violence: The case of the British Union of Fascists.
Journal of Contemporary History, 28(2), 245-267.
Dartnell, M. Y. (1995). Action Directe: Ultra-left terrorism in France, 1979-1987.
London: Frank Cass.
Davidson, S. G. (1993). Canada’s counter-terrorism experience. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 5(1), 83-105.
Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review,
27(1), 5-19.
Davies, J. C. (1969). The J-curve of rising and declining satisfaction as a cause of some
great revolutions and a contained rebellion. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.),
The history of violence in America (pp. 690-739). New York: Bantam.

216

Davies, J. C. (1974). The J-curve and power struggle theories of collective violence.
American Sociological Review, 39(4), 607-610.
Davis, J. M. (2003). Martyrs : Innocence, vengeance and despair in the Middle East.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
de Figueiredo, R. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2001). Vicious cycles: Endogenous political
extremism and political violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies.
Deacon, D. (1999). Charitable images: The construction of voluntary sector news. In B.
Fanklin (Ed.), Social policy, the media and misrepresentation (pp. 51-68). New
York: Routledge.
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Williams, B. A. (1987). Television and terrorism: Patterns of
presentation and occurrence, 1969 to 1980. The Western Political Quarterly,
40(1), 45-64.
DeFronzo, J. (1996). Revolutions and revolutionary movements. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
den Boer, M. (2003). The EU counter-terrorism wave: Window of opportunity or
profound policy transformation? In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting
terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies (pp.185-206).
The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Denny, F. M. (2002). September 11, 2001: Percussion and transition in America’s view
of the world. September 11 and Beyond: Prentice Hall Authors Speak Out (pp. 3538). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Denzin, N. K. (1988). Blue velvet: Postmodern contradictions. Theory, Culture and
Society, 5, 461-473.
Denzin, N. L. (2000). Handbook of qualitative research (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
Desjarlais, R., & Klienman, A. (1994). Violence and demoralization in the New World
Disorder. Anthropology Today, 10(5), 9-12.
Deutsch, K. (1954). Nationalism and social communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Diener, E. (1976). Effects of prior destructive behavior, anonymity, and group presence
on deindividuation and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology,33, 497-507.

217

Diener, E. (1979). Deindividuation, self-awareness, and disinhibition. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1160-1171.
Diener, E., Lusk, R., DeFour, D., & Flax, R. (1980). Deindividuation: Effects of group
size, density, number of observers, and group member similarity on selfconsciousness and disinhibited behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39, 449-459.
Dolnik, A. (2003). Die and let die: Exploring links between suicide terrorism and terrorist
use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 26(2), 17-35.
Donohue, L. K. (2001). In the name of national security: U.S. counterterrorist measures,
1960-2000. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3), 15-60.
Douglass, W. A., & Zulaika, J. (1990). On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA
and the Basque political process. Comparative Studies in Society and History,
32(2), 238-257.
Dressler, J. (Ed.) (2002). Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Volume 4 (2nd edition).
New York: MacMillan.
Drummond, J. T. (2002). From the northwest imperative to global jihad: Social
psychological aspects of the construction of the enemy, political violence, and
terror. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1. A public
understanding (pp. 9-16). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Du Toit, A. B. (1990). Discourses on political violence: The problem of coherence. South
African Journal of Philosophy, November, 91-213.
Durkheim, E. (1951). Suicide: A study in sociology. New York: Free Press.
Ebert, R. (2005). Paradise Now: Questions, from here to eternity. Retrieved November
30, 2005, from http://rogerebert.suntimes.com
Eckstein, H. (1965). On the etiology of internal wars. History and Theory, 4(2), 133-163.
Eckstein, H. (1980). Theoretical approaches to explaining collective political violence. In
T. R. Gurr (Ed.), Handbook of political conflict. New York: Free Press.
Edgerton, R. B. (1976). Deviance: A cross-cultural perspective. Menlo Park, CA:
Cummings Publishing.
Eggen, D., & Wilson, S. (2005). Suicide bombs potent tools of terrorists. Retrieved
November 2, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com
218

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550.
Eisenman, D. P., Gelberg, L., Liu, H., & Shapiro, M. F. (2003). Mental health and healthrelated quality of life among adult Latino primary care patients living in the
United States with previous exposure to political violence. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 290(5), 627-634.
Ekblad, S. (2002). Ethnopolitical warfare, traumatic family stress, and the mental health
of refugee children. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 2.
Clinical aspects and responses (pp. 27-48). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Elazar, D. S. (2000). Electoral democracy, revolutionary politics, and political violence:
The emergence of Fascism in Italy, 1920-1921. British Journal of Sociology,
51(3), 461-487.
Ellens, J. H. (2002). Psychological legitimization of violence by religious archetypes. In
C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical understanding
and perspectives (pp. 149-162). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Ellina, M., & Moore, W. H. (1990). Discrimination and political violence: A crossnational study with two time periods. The Western Political Quarterly, 43(2),
267-278.
Elster, J. (1985). Rationality, morality, and collective action. Ethics, 96(1), 136-155.
Emmanuel, S. (2002). The female militant romanticised. Women in Action, 15(4).
Retrieved December 8, 2003, from http://www.isiswomen.org
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2000). Is transnational terrorism becoming more threatening?
A time-series investigation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(3), 307-332.
Englander, E. K. (2003). Understanding violence (2nd edition). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Ergil, D. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Turkey: The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan. In
International Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide
terrorism (pp. 109-133). New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Ericson, R. V. (1992). Media, State and nation: Political violence and collective
identities. The British Journal of Sociology, 43(3), 506-508.
Esposito, J. L. (2002). Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam. New York: Oxford
University Press.
219

Esquith, S. L. (2000). War, political violence, and service learning. Teaching Philosophy,
23(3), 241-254.
Esquith, S. L. (2003). Re-enacting mass violence. Polity, 35(4), 513-536.
Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(1), 155-164.
Eyre, L. A. (1984). Political violence and urban geography in Kingston, Jamaica.
Geographical Review, 74(1), 24-37.
Ezeldin, A. G. (1987). Terrorism and political violence: An Egyptian perspective.
Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at
Chicago.
Fanklin, B. (Ed.) (1999b). Social policy, the media and misrepresentation. New York:
Routledge.
Fashina, O. (1989). Frantz Fanon and the ethical justification of anti-colonial violence.
Social Theory and Practice, 15, 179-212.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Ethnic war as a commitment problem. Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (September), New
York.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organizations, 49,
379-414.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. American
Political Science review, 90(4), 715-735.
Feierabend, I. K., Feierabend, R. L., & Nesvold, B. A. (1969). Social change and political
violence: Cross-national patterns. In H. D. Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), Violence
in America: Historical and comparative perspectives (pp. 632-681). New York:
Bantam Books.
Feierabend, I. K., Feierabend, R. L., & Nesvold, B. A. (1973). The comparative study of
revolution and violence. Comparative Politics, 5(3), 393-424.
Felson, R. B. (1996). Mass media effects on violent behavior. Annual Review of
Sociology, 22, 103-128.
Ferracuti, F. (1981). On violence: Paradoxes and antinomies. Social Research, 48(1), 3222.
220

Ferrell, J. (2003). Cultural criminology. In M. D. Schwartz & S. E. Hatty, Controversies
in critical criminology (pp. 71-84). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing.
Filler, D. M. (2003). Terrorism, panic and pedophilia. Virginia Journal of Social Policy
and the Law, 10(3), 345-382.
Fine, S. (1955). Anarchism and the assassination of McKinley. The American Historical
Review, 60(4), 777-799.
Finkel, S. E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rational choice and the dynamics of collective
political action: Evaluating alternative models with panel data. American Political
Science Review, 92(1), 37-49.
Finkel, S. E., Muller, E. N., & Opp, K. D. (1989). Personal influences, collective
rationality, and mass political action. The American Political Science Review,
83(3), 885-903.
Fisher, B. M., & Strauss, A. L. (1978). The Chicago tradition and social change: Thomas,
Park and their successors. Symbolic Interaction, 1(2), 5-23.
Flanigan, W. H., & Fogelman, E. (1970). Patterns of political violence in comparative
historical perspective. Comparative Politics, 3(1), 1-20.
Foran, J. (1993). Theories of revolution revisited: Toward a fourth generation?
Sociological Theory, 11(1), 1-20.
Fording, R. C. (1997). The conditional effect of violence as a political tactic: Mass
insurgency, welfare generosity, and electoral context in the American States.
American Journal of Political Science, 41(1), 1-29.
Fox, J. (2003). Are religious minorities more militant than other ethnic minorities?
Alternatives: Global, local, political, 28(1), 92-117.
Fox, J., & Squires, J. (2001). Threats to primal identities: A comparison of nationalism
and religion as impacts on ethnic protest and rebellion. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 13(1), 87-102.
Franklin, B. (1999a). Soft-soaping the public? The government and media promotion of
socil policy. In B. Fanklin (Ed.), Social policy, the media and misrepresentation
(pp. 17-38). New York: Routledge.
Freeman, M. (1972). Theories of revolution. British Journal of Political Science, 2(3),
339-359.

221

Freeman, M. (1978). Edmund Burke and the theory of revolution. Political Theory, 6(3),
277-297.
Friedman, D., & Hechter, M. (1988). The contribution of rational choice theory to
macrosociological research. Sociological Theory, 6(2), 201-218.
Funes, M.J. (1998). Social responses to political violence in the Basque Country: Peace
movements and their audience. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(4), 493510.
Gage, N. L. (Ed.). (1966). Handbook of research on teaching. Chicago: Rand NcNally.
Gartner, S. S., & Regan, P. M. (1996). Threat and repression: The non-linear relationship
between government and oppositional violence. Journal of Peace Research,
33(3), 273-287.
Gates, J. M. (1986). Toward a history of revolution. Comparative Studies in Society and
History, 28(3), 535-544.
Gautier, C. (2002). Some problems in the characterisation of violence in politics: The
example of fanaticism and its causes. Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell
Publishers.
Geller, D. S. (1987). The impact of political system structure on probability patterns of
internal disorder. American Journal of Political Science, 31(2), 217-235.
George, D. (1988). Distinguishing classical tyrannicide from modern terrorism. The
Review of Politics, 50, (3), 390-419.
Georges-Abeyie, D. E. (1981). Terrorism and the liberal state: A reasonable response.
Police Studies, 4(3), 34-53.
Gibbs, J. P. (1989). Conceptualization of terrorism. American Sociological Review, 54(3),
329-340.
Gibson, K. (1989). Children in political violence. Social Science and Medicine, 28(7),
659-668.
Gibson, K. (1991, July). The indirect effects of political violence on children: Does
violence beget violence? Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Girard, R. (1972). La violence et le sacré [Violence and the sacred]. Paris: Grasset.
Glasser, S. B. (2005, May 15). ‘Martyrs’ in Iraq mostly Saudis. The Washington Post.
Retrieved September 23, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com
222

Godson, R. (1994). Crisis of governance: Devising strategy to counter international
organized crime. Terrorism and Political Violence, 6(2), 163-177.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday Anchor Press.
Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. The
Qualitative Report, 8(4), 597-607.
Goldberg, D. T. (1989). Ethical theory and social issues: Historical texts and
contemporary readings. Orlando, FL: Holt Rinehart Winst.
Goldman, E. (1974). The psychology of political violence. New York: Gordon Press.
Goldstein, A. P., & Segall, M. H. (Eds.) (1983). Aggression in global perspective. New
York: Pergamon Press.
Goldstone, J. A. (1982). The comparative and historical study of revolutions. Annual
Review of Sociology, 8, 187-207.
Goldstone, J. A. (1986). The comparative and historical study of revolutions. In J. A.
Goldstone (Ed.), Revolutions: Theoretical, comparative, and historical studies
(pp. 1-17). San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Goldstone, J. A. (1991a). Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Goldstone, J. A. (1991b). An analytic framework. In J. A. Goldstone, T. R. Gurr, & F.
Moshiri, Revolutions of the late twentieth century (pp. 37-51). Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Gould, R. V. (1999). Collective violence and group solidarity: Evidence from a feuding
society. American Sociological Review, 64(3), 356-380.
Gouldner, A. W. (1982). Marx’s last battle: Bakunin and the First International. Theory
and Society, 11(6), 853-884.
Graaff, J. (2001). South African explanations of political violence: 1980-1995. South
African Journal of Philosophy, 20(1), 102-123.
Graham, H. D., & Gurr, T. R. (Eds.) (1979). Violence in America: Historical and
comparative perspectives. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Green, D. P., & Seher, R. L. (2003). What role does prejudice play in ethnic conflict?
Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 509-531.
223

Green, R. T., & Korth, C. M. (1974). Political instability and the foreign investor.
California Management review, 17(1), 23-31.
Grofman, B. N., & Muller, E. N. (1973). The strange case of relative gratification and
potential for political violence: The V-curve hypothesis. The American Political
Science Review, 67(2), 514-539.
Guelke, A. (1995). The age of terrorism and the international political system. London:
Tauris.
Guelke, A. (2000). Violence and electoral polarization in divided societies: Three cases
in comparative perspective. Terrorism and Political Violence, 12(3/4), 78-105.
Gupta, D. K., Singh, H., and Sprague, T. (1993). Government coercion of dissidents:
Deterrence or provocation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37(2), 301-339.
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gurr, T. R. (1973). The revolution – Social-change nexus: Some old theories and new
hypotheses. Comparative Politics, 5(3), 359-392.
Gurr, T. R. (1978). Burke and the modern theory of revolution: A reply to Freeman.
Political Theory, 6(3), 299-311.
Gurr, T. R. (1993). Why minorities rebel. International Political Science Review, 14(2),
161-201.
Gurr, T. R. (Ed.) (1980). Handbook of political conflict. New York: Free Press.
Gurr, T. R., & Bishop, V. F. (1976). Violent nations, and others. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 20(1), 79-110.
Gurr, T. R., & Ruttenberg, C. (1967). The conditions of civil violence: First tests of a
causal model. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Gwala, N. (1989). Political violence and the struggle for control in Pietermaritzburg.
Journal of Southern African Studies, 15(3), 506-524.
Hagtvet, B. (1994). Right-wing extremism in Europe. Journal of Peace Research, 31(3),
241-246.
Haïm, L. (2003). Les bombes humaines: Enquête au coeur du conflit Israélo-Palestinien
[Human bombs : Investigation at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict].
Paris: Editions de la Martinière.
224

Hall, J. R. (1990). Social interaction, culture, and historical studies. In H. S. Becker & M.
M. McCall (Eds.), Symbolic interaction and cultural studies (pp. 16-45). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Hall, P. M. (1987). Interactionsim and the study of social organization. Sociological
Quarterly, 28, 1-22.
Hall, P. M. (1991). A symbolic interactionist analysis of politics. In K. Plummer (Ed.),
Symbolic interactionism – Volume II (pp. 168-208). Brookfield, VT: Edward
Elgar Publishing.
Hamilton, L. C., & Hamilton, J. D. (1983). Dynamics of terrorism. International Studies
Quarterly, 27(1), 39-54.
Han, H. H. (Ed.) (1984). Terrorism, political violence and world order. Washington, DC:
University Press of America.
Han, H. H. (Ed.) (1993). Terrorism and political violence: Limits and possibilities of
legal control. New York: Oceana Publications.
Hardin, R. (1995). One for all: The logic of group conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Harper, J., & Yantek, T. (Eds.) (2001). Media, profit, and politics: Competing priorities
in an open society. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
Hartman, J., & Hsiao, W. (1988). Inequality and violence: Issues of theory and
measurement in Muller. American Sociological Review, 53(5), 794-799.
Harrison, M. (2004). An economist looks at suicide terrorism. Retrieved July 10, 2004,
from http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/papers/
Hassan, R. (2004, April 23). Terrorists and their tools – Part I – Suicide bombings driven
more by politics than religious zeal. Yale Global Online. Retrieved December 8,
2004, from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu
Hecht, R. D. (2003). Deadly history, deadly actions, and deadly bodies: A response to
Ivan Strenski’s “Sacrifice, gift and the social logic of Muslim ‘human bombers’”.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 35-47.
Hechter, M. (1995). Explaining nationalist violence. Nations National, 1(1), 53-68.
Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review
of Sociology, 23, 191-214.
225

Hedstrom, P., & Swedberg, R. (1996). Rational choice, empirical research, and the
sociological tradition. European Sociological Review, 12(2), 127-146.
Held, V. (1997). The media and political violence. Journal of Ethics, 1(2), 187-202.
Hicks Maynard, N. (2001). Mega media: How markets are changing news. In J. Harper &
T. Yantek (Eds.), Media, profit, and politics: Competing priorities in an open
society (pp. 122-129). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
Hildebrand, D. K., Laing, J. D., & Rosenthal, H. (1976). Prediction analysis in political
research. The American Political Science Review, 70(2), 509-535.
Hill, T. E. (1997). A Kantian perspective on political violence. Journal of Ethics, 1(2),
105-140.
Hobbes, T. (1968). Leviathan [1651]. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.
Hoefnagels, M. (1977). Repression and repressive violence. Amsterdam: Swets &
Zeitlinger.
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Holmes, J. S. (2001). Political violence and regime change in Argentina: 1965-1976.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(1), 134-154.
Holody, R. (2004). Social justice in times of mass violence. In S. L. Ashenberg
Straussner & N. Kolko Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social
work perspective (pp. 187-199). Boston: Pearson.
Honderich, T. (1973). Democratic violence. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2(2), 190214.
Honderich, T. (1976). Political violence. New York: Cornell University Press.
Honderich, T. (1989). Violence and equality: Inquiries in political philosophy. New
York: Routledge.
Hook, S. (1973). Myth and fact in the Marxist theory of revolution and violence. Journal
of the History of Ideas, 34(2), 271-280.
Hoole, F. W., & Huang, C. (1992). The political economy of global conflict. Journal of
Politics, 54(3), 834-856.

226

Hopmeier, M., Ganor, B., Goodwin, T., & Greinke, D. S. (2003). ‘There are no
dangerous weapons…’: Suicide attacks and potential responses. Retrieved April
11, 2004, from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Hopmeier.html
Horovitz, D. (2004). Still life with bombers: Israel in the age of terrorism. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Howard, R. D., & Sawyer, R. L. (Eds.) (2004). Terrorism and counter-terrorism:
Understanding the new security environment. Guilford,CT: McGrawHill/Dushkin.
Howe, J. R., Jr. (1967). Republican thought and the political violence of the 1790s.
American Quarterly, 19(2), 147-165.
Howes, D. E. (2003, August). The challenge of violence for political theory. Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Philadelphia, PA.
Human Rights Watch (1990). The “drug war” in Colombia: The neglected tragedy of
political violence (Americas Watch report). New York: Human Rights Watch.
Hume, D. (1778). The history of England: From the invasion of Julius Caesar to the
Revolution in 1688 [1983 ed.]. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics.
Hunt, A. (1997). ‘Moral panic’ and moral language in the media. The British Journal of
Sociology, 48(4), 629-648.
Introvigne, M. (2000). Moral panics and anti-cult terrorism in Western Europe. Terrorism
and Political Violence, 12(1), 47-59.
Isaac, S., & Michael, W. B. (1995). Handbook in research and evaluation: A collection
of principles, methods, and strategies useful in the planning, design, and
evaluation of studies in education and the behavioral sciences (3rd edition). San
Diego, CA: Edits Publishers.
Israeli, R. (1998). The Arabs in Israel: Identity, criminality and the peace process.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 10(1), 39-59.
Israeli, R. (2000). Western democracies and Islamic fundamentalist violence. Terrorism
and Political Violence, 12(3/4), 160-173.
Jabara, A., & Stork, J. (1986). Political violence against Arab-Americans. MERIP Middle
East Report, 143, 36-38.

227

Jackman, R. W., & Boyd, W. A. (1979). Multiple sources in the collection of data on
political conflict. American Journal of Political Science, 23(2), 434-458.
Jacoby, J. E. (Ed.) (1994). Classics of Criminology (2nd edition). Prospect Heights, IL:
Waveland Press.
Jansen, J. J. G. (1997). The dual nature of Islamic fundamentalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Jenkins, B. M. (1980). Terrorism in the 1980s. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Jenkins, B. M. (1986). Defense against terrorism. Political Science Quarterly, 101(5),
773-786.
Jenkins, B. M., Wildhorn, S., & Lavin, M. M. (1982). Intelligence constraints of the
1970's and domestic terrorism: Executive summary. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation.
Jenkins, J. C., & Bond, D. (2001). Conflict-carrying capacity, political crisis, and
reconstruction: A framework for the early warning of political system
vulnerability. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(1), 3-31.
Jenkins, J. C., & Schock, K. (1992). Global structures and political processes in the study
of domestic political conflict. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 161-185.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167214.
Johnson, C. (1964). Revolution and the social system. Stanford, CT: Hoover Institution.
Johnson, G. D., & Shifflet, P. A. (1981). George Herbert Who? A critique of the
objectivist reading of Mead. Symbolic Interaction, 4(2), 143-155.
Jones, L., Rrustemi, A., Shahini, M., & Uka, A. (2003). Mental health services for waraffected children: Report of a survey in Kosovo. British Journal of Psychiatry,
183, 540-546.
Jongman, A. J. (2001). Database section: Dimensions of contemporary conflict and
human rights violations. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(2), 143-177.
Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. Review of Economic
Studies, 59, 63-80.

228

Kapferer, B. (1988). Legends of people, myths of state: Violence, intolerance, and
political culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Institute Press.
Kaplan, J. (Ed.) (2002). Millennial violence: Past, present and future. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 14(1), 1-29.
Kaplan, K. J., & Schwartz, M. B. (Eds.) (1998). Jewish approaches to suicide,
martyrdom, and euthanasia. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Kappeler, V., Blumberg, M., & Potter, G. W. (2000). The Mythology of crime and
criminal justice. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Kara, K. (1968). On the Marxist theory of war and peace. Journal of Peace Research,
5(1), 1-27.
Kassimeris, G. (2001). Europe's last red terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17
November, 1975-2000. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(2), 67-84.
Kay, B. H. (1999). Violent opportunities: The rise and fall of “King Coca” and Shining
Path. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(3), 97-127.
Kelly, R. J., & Schatzberg, R. (1992). Galvanizing indiscriminate political violence:
Mind-sets and some ideological constructs in terrorism. International Journal of
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 16(1), 15-41.
Keohane, R. O. (2002, September). The globalization of informal violence, theories of
world politics, and “the liberalism of fear.” Paper presented at the annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
Kerbo, H. R. (1978). Foreign involvement in the preconditions for political violence: The
World System and the case of Chile. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22(3),
363-391.
Keyserlingk, R. H. (1977). Media manipulation: A study of the press and Bismarck in
imperial Germany. Montreal, Canada: Renouf Publishing.
Kholi, A. (1997). Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of
self-determination movements in India. Journal of Asian Studies, 56(2), 325-344.
Khosrokhavar, F. (2002). Les nouveaux martyrs d’Allah [Allah’s new martyrs]. Paris :
Flammarion.
Kieve, R. A. (1986). From necessary illusion to rational choice? A critique of neoMarxist rational-choice theory. Theory and Society, 15(4), 557-582.
229

King, J. (2002). White House condemns 'homicide bombing.' Retrieved June 30, 2005,
from http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/04/12/Bush.mideast.reax/
Kirk, J., & Miller, M. L. (1986). Reliability and validity in qualitative research.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Kiser, E., & Hechter, M. (1998). The debate on historical sociology: Rational choice
theory and its critics. The American Journal of Sociology, 104(3), 785-816.
Knox, C. (2001). The “deserving” victims of political violence: “Punishment” attacks in
Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice, 1(2), 181-199.
Kohli, A. (1997). Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of
self-determination movements in India. The Journal of Asian Studies, 56(2), 325344.
Kolko Phillips, N. (2004). Mass violence and social welfare policy. In S. L. Ashenberg
Straussner & N. Kolko Phillips (Eds.), Understanding mass violence: A social
work perspective (pp. 171-186). Boston: Pearson.
Korbonski, A. (2000). Violence and democracy in Eastern Europe. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 12(3/4), 237-260.
Korn, A. (2003). From refugees to infiltrators: Constructing political crime in Israel in the
1950s. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31(1), 1-22.
Korpi, W. (1974). Conflict, power and relative deprivation. The American Political
Science Review, 68(4), 1569-1578.
Kowalewski, D. (1992). Counterinsurgent paramilitarism: A Philippine case study.
Journal of Peace Research, 29(1), 71-84.
Krain, M. (1997). State-sponsored mass murder: The onset and severity of genocides and
politicides. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3), 331-360.
Kressel, N. J. (2002). Mass hate: The global rise of genocide and terror. Cambridge,
MA: Westview Press.
Kritzer, H. M. (1977). Political protest and political violence: A nonrecursive causal
model. Social Forces, 55(3), 630-640.
Kuhn, R., & Neveu, E. (Eds.) (2002). Political journalism: New challenges, new
practices. New York: Routledge.

230

Kuran, T. (1998a). Ethnic dissimilation and its international diffusion. In D. A. Lake &
D. Rotchild, Ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion and escalation (pp. 35-60). Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kuran, T. (1998b). Ethnic norms and their transformation through reputational cascades.
Journal of Legal Studies, 27(2), 623-659.
Kushner, S., & Norris, N. (1981). Interpretation, negotiation and validity in naturalistic
research. Interchange, 11, 26-36.
Labuschagne, A. (2003). Qualitative research – Airy fairy or fundamental? The
Qualitative Report, 8(1). Retrieved February 6, 2005, from
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/labuschagne.html
Laitin, D. D. (1995). National revivals and violence. Archives of European Sociology,
36(1), 3-43.
Landa, J. T. (1994). Trust, ethnicity, and identity. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
Lane, R., & Turner, J. J. (Eds.). Riot, rout, and tumult: Readings in American social and
political violence. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Laqueur, W. (1977). Interpretations of terrorism: Fact, fiction and political science.
Journal of Contemporary History, 12(1), 1-42.
Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Laufer, W. S., & Adler, F. (Eds.) (1989). Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Laufer, W. S., & Adler, F. (Eds.) (1989). Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Lawal, O. A. (2002). Social-psychological considerations in the emergence and growth of
terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 4. Programs and
practices in response and prevention (pp. 23-32). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Le Vine, V. T. (2000). Violence and the paradox of democratic renewal: A preliminary
assessment. Terrorism and Political Violence, 12(3/4), 261-292.
Lee, T. W. (1999). Using qualitative methods in organizational research. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

231

Leighley, J. E. (1995). Attitudes, opportunities and incentives: A field essay on political
participation. Political Research Quarterly, 48(1), 181-209.
Lentz, H. M. (1988). Assassinations and executions: An encyclopedia of political
violence, 1865-1986. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
Lentz, H. M. (2002). Assassinations and executions: An encyclopedia of political
violence, 1900 through 2000. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
Levene, M. (2002). The changing face of mass murder: Massacre, genocide, and postgenocide. Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.
Levitt, M. A. (2003). The political economy of Middle East terrorism. Middle East
Review of International Affairs, 6(4). Retrieved March 31, 2003, from
http://www.ict.org.il/articles
Levy, J. T. (1996). The multiculturalism of fear. Critical Review, 10(2), 271-283.
Levy, S. G. (1969). A 150-year study of political violence in the United States. In H. D.
Graham & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), Violence in America: Historical and comparative
perspectives (pp. 84-100). New York: Bantam Books.
Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of
repression and dissent. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), 266-297.
Lichbach, M. I. (1989). An evaluation of ‘Does economic inequality breed political
conflict?’ studies. World Politics, 41(4), 431-470.
Lichbach, M. I. (1990). Will rational people rebel against inequality? Samson’s choice.
American Journal of Political Science, 34(4), 1049-1076.
Lichbach, M. I., & Gurr, T. R. (1981). The conflict process: A formal model. The Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 25(1), 3-29.
Lichtman, R. (1970). Symbolic interactionism and social reality: Some Marxist queries.
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 15, 75-94.
Lichtman, R. (1991). Symbolic interactionism and social reality: Some Marxist queries.
In K. Plummer (Ed.), Symbolic interactionism – Volume II (pp. 64-83).
Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Lincourt, J. M., & Hare, P. H. (1973). Neglected American philosophers in the history of
symbolic interactionism. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 9,
333-338.

232

Lindenberg, S. (1996). Choice-centered versus subject-centred theories in the social
sciences: The influence of simplification on explananda. European Sociological
Review, 12(2), 147-157.
London, B., & Robinson, T. D. (1989). The effect of international dependence on income
inequality and political violence. American Sociological Review, 54(2), 305-308.
Lustick, I. S. (1990). Changing rationales for political violence in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies, 20(1), 54-79.
Lustig, S. L., Kia-Keating, M., Grant Knight, W., Geltman, P., Ellis, H., Kinzie, D.,
Keane, T., & Saxe, G. N. (2004). Review of child and adolescent refugee mental
health. Journal of the American Academy of child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
43(1), 24-36.
MacDonald, M. (1986). Children of wrath: Political violence in Northern Ireland.
Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.
Mack, A. (1981). The utility of terrorism. Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology, 14(4), 197-224.
Madison, C. A. (1945). Anarchism in the United States. Journal of the History of Ideas,
6(1), 46-66.
Madsen, J. (2004). Suicide terrorism: Rationalizing the irrational. Strategic Insights, 3(8).
Retrieved October 14, 2004, from http://www.au.af.mil
Magura, S. (1975). Is there a subculture of violence? American Sociological Review,
40(6), 831-835.
Maines, D. R. (1977). Social organization and social structure in symbolic intractionist
thought. Annual Review of Sociology, 3, 235-259.
Malecki, E. S. (1973). Theories of revolution and industrialized societies. The Journal of
Politics, 35(4), 948-985.
Malthaner, S., & Waldmann, P. (2003). Terrorism in Germany: Old and new problems. In
M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat
perceptions and policies (pp.111-128). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International.
Malvesti, M. L. (2001). Explaining the United States' decision to strike back at terrorism.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(2), 85-106.
Mamdani, M. (2002). Good Muslim, bad Muslim: A political perspective on culture and
terrorism. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 766-775.
233

Maniruzzaman, T. (1992). Arms transfers, military coups, and military rule in developing
states. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(4), 733-755.
Margalit, A., & Elon, A. (2003). Pourquoi des kamikazes? Les raisons d’un désastre
[Why kamikazes? The reasons of a disaster]. Paris: Seuil.
Markowitz, F. E., & Felson, R. B. (1998). Social-demographic attitudes and violence.
Criminology, 36(1), 117-138.
Mars, P. (1995a). Foreign influence, political conflicts and conflict resolution in the
Caribbean. Journal of Peace Research, 32(4), 437-451.
Mars, P. (1995b). State intervention and ethnic conflict resolution: Guyana and the
Caribbean experience. Comparative Politics, 27(2), 167-186.
Marx, G. T., & Wood, J. L. (1975). Strands of theory and research in collective behavior.
Annual Review of Sociology, 1, 363-428.
Marx, K. (1934). The civil war in France. Chicago: C.H. Kerr.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1919). The Manifesto of the Communist Party. New York: Rand
School of Social Science.
Mason, T. D. (1984). Individual participation in collective racial violence: A rational
choice synthesis. American Political Science Review, 78(4), 1040-1056.
Mason, T. D. (1989). Nonelite response to state-sanctioned terrorism. The Western
Political Quarterly, 42(4), 467-492.
Mason, T. D., & Campany, C. (1995). Guerrillas, drugs and peasants: the rational peasant
and the war on drugs in Peru. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(4), 140-170.
Mason, T. D., & Krane, D. A. (1989). The political economy of death squads: Toward a
theory of the impact of state-sanctioned terror. International Studies Quarterly,
33(2), 175-198.
Maxfield, M. G., & Babbie, E. R. (2004). Research methods for criminal justice and
criminology (4th edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.
Maxwell, J. (1992). Understanding and validity in qualitative research. Harvard
Educational Review, 62(3), 279-300.
May, R. A. (1999). “Surviving all changes in your destiny”: Violence and popular
movements in Guatemala. Latin American Perspectives, 26(2), 68-91.
234

Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis. Forum: Qualitative Research, 1(2).
Retrieved February 6, 2005, from http://www.qualitative-research.net
McAllister, I., & Rose, R. (1983). Can political conflict be resolved by social change?
Northern Ireland as a test case. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(3), 533557.
McCarthy, S. (2002). Preventing future terrorist activities among adolescents through
global psychology: A cooperative learning community. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The
psychology of terrorism: Vol. 4. Programs and practices in response and
prevention (pp. 131-156). Westport, CT: Praeger.
McCauley, C. (2002). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response
to terrorism. In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 3. Theoretical
understanding and perspectives (pp. 3-30). Westport, CT: Praeger.
McCormick, G. H. (2003). Terrorist decision making. Annual Review of Political
Science, 6, 437-507.
McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1999). Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a new start.
Belfast, Ireland: Blackstaff Press.
McKendrick, B., & Hoffmann, W. (1990). People and violence in South Africa. Cape
Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press.
McPhail, C., & Rexroat, C. (1979). Mead vs. Blumer: The divergent methodological
perspectives of social behaviorism and symbolic interactionism. American
Sociological Review, 44, 449-467.
McVey, P. M. (1997). Terrorism and local law enforcement: A multidimensional
challenge for the twenty-first century. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Mead, G. H. (1930). Cooley’s contribution to American social thought. American Journal
of Sociology, 35(5), 693-706.
Merkl, P. H. (1986a). Approaches to the study of political violence. In P. H. Merkl (Ed.),
Political violence and terror: Motifs and motivations (pp. 19-59). Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Merkl, P. H. (Ed.) (1986b). Political violence and terror: Motifs and motivations.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Merton, R. K., & Rossi, A. K. (1950). Contributions to the theory of reference group
behavior. In R. K. Merton & P. F. Lazarsfeld (Eds.), Continuities in Social
Research. New York: Free Press.
235

Meyer, P. (2001). The proper role of the news media in a democratic society: Is it enough
simply to cover the news? In J. Harper & T. Yantek (Eds.), Media, profit, and
politics: Competing priorities in an open society (pp. 11-17). Kent, OH: Kent
State University Press.
Mian, A., Mahmodd, S. F., Chotani, H., & Luby, S. (2002). Vulnerability to homicide in
Karachi: Political activity as a risk factor. International Journal of Epidemiology,
31, 581-585.
Michelet, J. (1979). Histoire de la Révolution française [History of the French
Revolution]. Paris: Robert Laffont.
Mickolus, E. F. (1987). Comment – Terrorists, governments, and numbers: Counting
things versus things that count. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(1), 54-62.
Midlarsky, M. I. (1988). Rulers and the ruled: Patterned inequality and the onset of mass
political violence. The American Political Science Review, 82(2), 491-509.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded
sourcebook (2nd edition). London: Sage Publications.
Miller, A. H., & Damask, N. A. (1996). The dual myths of “narco-terrorism”: How myths
drive policy. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8(1), 114-131.
Miller, A. H., & Schaen, E. (2000). Democracy and the black urban riots: Rethinking the
meaning of political violence in democracy. Terrorism and Political Violence,
12(3/4), 345-361.
Miller, B. (1992). Collective action and rational choice: Place, Community, and the
individual self-interest. Economic Geography, 68(1), 22-42.
Milte, K. (1975). Terrorism and international order. Australian and New Zealand Journal
of Criminology, 8(2), 101-111.
Milte, K. L. (1978). Extradition and the terrorist. Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology, 11(2), 89-94.
Milte, K. L., Shuvayev, D., & Bartholomew, A. A. (1980). Political violence and its
assessment: Some issues. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology,
13(2), 107-116.
Moaddel, M. (1994). Political conflict in the world economy: A cross-national analysis of
modernization and world-system theories. American Sociological Review, 59(2),
276-303.
236

Moore, M. (1993). Thoroughly modern revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka. Modern
Asian Studies, 27(3), 593-642.
Moore, W. H. (1995). Rational rebels: Overcoming the free-rider problem. Political
Research Quarterly, 48(2), 417-454.
Moore, W. H. (2000). The repression of dissent: A substitution model of government
coercion. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(1), 107-127.
Moser, C. O. N., & Clark, F. C. (Eds.) (2001). Victims, perpetrators or actors? Gender,
armed conflict and political violence. London: Zed Books.
Muller, E. N. (1972). A test of a partial theory of potential for political violence. The
American Political Science Review, 66(3), 928-959.
Muller, E. N. (1985). Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence.
American Sociological Review, 50(1), 47-61.
Muller, E. N. (1986). Income inequality and political violence: The effect of influential
cases. American Sociological Review, 51(3), 441-445.
Muller, E. N. (1988). Inequality, repression, and violence: Issues of theory and research
design. American Sociological Review, 53(5), 799-806.
Muller, E. N., & Jukam, T. O. (1983). Discontent and aggressive political participation.
British Journal of Political Science, 13(2), 159-179.
Muller, E. N., & Opp, K. D. (1986). Rational choice and rebellious collective action.
American Political Science Review, 80(2), 471-487.
Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1987). Inequality and insurgency. American Political
Science Review, 81(2), 425-452.
Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence: A
rational action approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34(4), 624-651.
Muller, E. N., Dietz, H. A., & Finkel, S. E. (1991). Discontent and the expected utility of
rebellion: The case of Peru. American Political Science Review, 85(4), 12611282.
Muller, E. N., Seligson, M. A., Fu. H., & Midlarsky, M. I. (1989). Land inequality and
political violence. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 577-596.
Muncie, J. (1999). Exorcising demons: Media, politics and criminal justice. In B. Fanklin
(Ed.), Social policy, the media and misrepresentation (pp. 174-190). New York:
Routledge.
237

Munck, R., & De Silva, P. L. (2000). Postmodern insurgencies: Political violence,
identity formation and peacemaking in comparative perspective. London:
Macmillan.
Nafziger, E. W., & Richter, W. L. (1976). Biafra and Bangladesh: The political economy
of secessionist conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 2(13), 91-109.
Nagengast, C. (1994). Violence, terror, and the crisis of the state. Annual Review of
Anthropology, 23, 109-136.
Nasr, K. B. (1997). Arab and Israeli terrorism: The causes and effects of political
violence, 1936-1993. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
National Center for Policy Analysis (2001). Suicide terrorists. Retrieved December 13,
2004, from http://www.ncpa.org
Neal, P. (1988). Hobbes and rational choice theory. Western Political Quarterly, 41(4),
635-652.
Newman, G. (1979). Understanding violence. New York: Lippincott.
Nice, D. C. (1988). Abortion clinic bombings as political violence. American Journal of
Political Science, 32(1), 178-195.
Nielsen, K. (1977). On justifying revolution. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 37(4), 516-532.
Nielsen, K. (1981). On justifying violence. Inquiry, 24, 21-58.
Nielsen, K. (1982). Political violence and ideological mystification. Journal of Social
Philosophy, 13, 25-33.
Nkemdirim, B. A. (1977). Reflections on political conflict, rebellion, and revolution in
Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 15(1), 75-90.
Norris N. (1997). Error, bias and validity in qualitative research. Educational Action
Research, 5(1), 172-176.
O’Neil, R. (1999). Suicide squads. London: Salamander Books.
O’Day, A., & Yonah, A. (Eds.) (1989). Ireland's terrorist trauma: Interdisciplinary
perspectives. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.

238

Oka, T., & Shaw, I. (2003). Qualitative research in social work. In N. Hisada (Ed.),
Introduction to social work research (pp. 115-147). Tokyo: Chûô Hôki.
Olzak, S. (1989). Analysis of events in the study of collective action. Annual Review of
Sociology, 15, 119-141.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective
action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. The
American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1-22.
Palmer, D. S. (1992). Peru, the drug business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and
Charybdis? Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34(3), 65-88.
Pandey, G. (1992). In defense of the fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim riots in
India today. Representations, 37, 27-55.
Parfitt, B. A. (1996). Using Spradley: An ethnosemantic approach to research. Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 24(2), 341-349.
Pastor, L. H. (2004). Countering the psychological consequences of suicide terrorism.
Psychiatric Annals, 34(9), 701-707.
Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. Health
Services Research, 34(5), 1189-1208.
Payne, S. G. (1990). Political violence during the Spanish Second Republic. Journal of
Contemporary History, 25(2/3), 269-288.
Paz, R. (2002). The Islamic legitimacy of suicide terrorism. In International Policy
Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 89-98).
New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). The mind of the political terrorist. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Research Books.
Pedahzur, A., & Ranstorp, M. (2001). A tertiary model for countering terrorism in liberal
democracies: The case of Israel. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(2), 1-26.
Petras, J. W. (1968). John Dewey and the rise of interactionism in American social
theory. Jounral of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 4, 18-27.
Pilisuk, M., & Wong, A. (2002). State terrorism: When the perpetrator is a government.
In C. E. Stout (Ed.), The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 2. Clinical aspects and
responses (pp. 105-132). Westport, CT: Praeger.
239

Pipes, D. (1986, Summer). The scourge of suicide terrorism. National Interest. Retrieved
August 13, 2003, from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/175
Pisano, V. S. (1987). The dynamics of subversion and violence in contemporary Italy.
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Pitcher, B. L., Hamblin, R. L., & Miller, J. L. L. (1978). The diffusion of collective
violence. American Sociological Review, 43(1), 23-35.
Plato (1974). Plato's Republic [Translated by G. M. A. Grube]. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publications.
Plomin, R., & McClearn, G. E. (Eds.) (1993). Nature, nurture and psychology.
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Pomper, P. (1974). Nechaev and tsaricide: The conspiracy within the conspiracy. Russian
Review, 33(2), 123-138.
Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. Survival, 35(1), 27-47.
Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of
psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies,
ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 25-40). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Post, J. M. (2005). The new face of terrorism: Socio-cultural foundations of
contemporary terrorism. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23, 451-465.
Potter, G. W., & Kappeler, V. E. (Eds.) (1998). Constructing crime: Perspectives on
making news and social problems. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Premo, D. L. (1981). Political assassination in Guatemala: A case of institutionalized
terror. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 23(4), 429-456.
Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (1980). Effects of deindividuating situational cues
and aggressive models on subjective deindividuation and aggression. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 104-113.
Prus, R. (1987). Generic social processes: Maximizing conceptual development in
ethongraphic research. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 16(3), 250-293.
Punamaki, R. L. (1990). Relationships between political violence and psychological
responses among Palestinian women. Journal of Peace Research, 27(1), 75-85.

240

Quillen, C. (2001). Terrorism with weapons of mass destruction: The congressional
response. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(1), 47-65.
Quinet, E. (1987). La révolution [Revolution]. Paris: Belin.
Rangnekar, D. K. (1960). The nationalist revolution in Ceylon. Pacific Affairs, 33(4),
361-374.
Reich, W. (1990a). Understanding terrorist behavior: The limits and opportunities of
psychological inquiry. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies,
ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp.261-279). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Reich, W. (Ed.) (1990b). Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies,
states of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reinares, F. (2003). Democratization and state responses to protracted terrorism in Spain.
In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat
perceptions and policies (pp.57-70). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International.
Rezneck, S. (1927). The political and social theory of Michael Bakunin. The American
Political Science Review, 21(2), 270-296.
Richani, N. (1997). The political economy of violence: The war-system in Colombia.
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 39(2), 37-81.
Richards, P. (1999). New political violence in Africa: Secular sectarianism in Sierra
Leone. GeoJournal, 47, 433-442.
Richardson, J. T. (2001). Minority religions and the context of violence: A
conflict/internationalist perspective. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(1), 103133.
Richardson, L. (1998). Global rebels: Terrorist organizations as trans-national actors.
Harvard International Review, 20(4), 52-56.
Riches, D. (Ed.) (1986). The anthropology of violence. Oxford, England: Blackwell
Publishers.
Rochberg-Halton, E. (1987). Situation, structure and the context of meaning. Sociological
Quarterly, 23, 455-476.

241

Rock, P. (1991). Symbolic interactionism and labelling theory. In K. Plummer (Ed.),
Symbolic interactionism – Volume I (pp. 227-243). Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Rosand, E. (2003). Security council resolution 1373, the counter-terrorism committee,
and the fight against terrorism. The American Journal of International Law, 97(2),
333-341.
Rosenbaum, H. J., & Sederberg, P. C. (1974). Vigilantism: An analysis of establishment
violence. Comparative Politics, 6(4), 541-570.
Rosenberger, J. (2003). Discerning the behavior of the suicide bomber: The role of
vengeance. Journal of Religion and Health, 42(1), 13-20.
Ross, J. I. (1993). Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal
model. Journal of Peace Research, 30(3), 317-329.
Ross, J. I. (2003). The dynamics of political crime. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Ross, J. I., & Gurr, T. R. (1989). Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada
and the United States. Comparative Politics, 21(4), 405-426.
Rothgeb, J. M., Jr. (1991). The effects of foreign investment upon political protest and
violence in underdeveloped societies. Western Political Quarterly, 44(1), 9-38.
Rubin, B. (Ed.) (1989). The politics of terrorism: Terror as a state and revolutionary
strategy. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute.
Rubington, E., & Weinberg, M. S. (Eds.) (1995). The study of social problems: Seven
perspectives (5th edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. (1992). Surviving your dissertation: A comprehensive
guide to content and process. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Ruggie, J. (1998). Constructing the world polity: Essays on international
institutionalization. New York: Routledge.
Ruggiero, V. (2003). Terrorism: Cloning the enemy. International Journal of the
Sociology of Law, 31(1), 23-34.
Rule, J. B. (1989). Rationality and non-rationality in militant collective action.
Sociological Theory, 7(2), 145-160.

242

Rummel, R. J. (1985). Libertarian propositions on violence within and between nations:
A test against published research results. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(3),
419-455.
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice. London: Routledge.
Ryan, J. J. (1994). The impact of democratization on revolutionary movements.
Comparative Politics, 27(1), 27-44.
Samarasinghe, D. S. (2001). Overplaying the terrorist card. Foreign Policy, 122, 14
Sambanis, N. (2001). Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A
theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3),
259-282.
Samii, B. (2005). Terrorism: Islamic scholars debate suicide bombing and hostage
taking. Retreived December 22, 2005, from http://www.azadradio.org
Sandelowski, M. (1993). Rigor or rigor mortis: The problems of rigor in qualitative
research revisited. Advances in Nursing Science, 16(2), 1-8.
Sarraj, E. (2003). Why we have become suicide bombers: Understanding Palestinian
terror. Mission Islam. Retrieved December 11, 2004, from
http://www.missionislam.com
Satz, D., & Ferejohn, J. (1994). Rational choice and social theory. The Journal of
Philosophy, 91(2), 71-87.
Schmaus, W. (2004). Rethinking Durkheim and his tradition. Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Schock, K. (1996). A conjunctural model of political conflict: The impact of political
opportunities on the relationship between economic inequality and violent
political conflict. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(1), 98-133.
Schorkopf, F. (2003). Behavioural and social science perspectives on political violence.
In C. Walter, S. Vöneky, V. Röben, & F. Schorkopf (Eds.), Terrorism as a
challenge for national and international law: Security versus liberty? Berlin:
Springer.
Schroeder, M. J. (1996). Horse thieves to rebels to dogs: Political gang violence and the
state in the western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the time of Sandino, 1926-1934.
Journal of Latin American Studies, 28(2), 383-434.

243

Schuster, H. (2005). Suicide bombings as military strategy. Retrieved November 12,
2005, from http://www.cnn.com
Schwandt, T. (1997). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Schwartz, D. C. (1968). On the ecology of political violence: “The long hot summer” as a
hypothesis. American Behavioral Scientist, 11(6), 24-28.
Schwartz, S. (2002). The two faces of Islam: The house of Sa’ud from tradition to terror.
New York: Doubleday.
Schweitzer, Y. (2003). The export and import of suicide bombers. Retrieved November 1,
2004, from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org
Schweitzer, Y. (2004). Suicide terrorism: Historical background and risks for the future.
Retrieved November 1, 2004, from http://www.pbs.org
Sederberg, P. C. (1994). Fires within: Political violence and revolutionary change. New
York: Harper Collins.
Sederberg, P. C. (1995). Conciliation as counter-terrorist strategy. Journal of Peace
Research, 32(3), 295-312.
Sémelin, J. (2002). Extreme violence: Can we understand it? Malden, MA:
UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.
Sénéchal de la Roche, R. (1996). Collective violence as social control. Sociological
Forum, 11(1), 97-128.
Senechal de la Roche, R. (2001). Why is collective violence collective? Sociological
Theory, 19(2), 126-144.
Shabad, G., & Gunther, R. (1982). Language, nationalism, and political conflict in Spain.
Comparative Politics, 14(4), 443-477.
Shadish, W. R. (1995a). The logic of generalization: Five principles common to
experiments and ethnographies. American Journal of Community Psychology,
23(3), 419-428.
Shadish, W. R. (1995c). The quantitative-qualitative debates: DeKuhnifying the
conceptual contexts. Evaluation and Program Planning, 18(1), 47-49.
Shaheen, J. G. (2001). Reel bad Arabs: How Hollywood vilifies a people. Brooklyn, NY:
Olive Branch Press.
244

Shamai, M. (2003). Using social constructionist thinking in training social workers living
and working under threat of political violence. Social Work, 48(4), 545-554.
Shamir, M. Y. (2004). Suicide bombing: Professional eyewitness report. Anesthesiology,
100(4), 1042-1043.
Shay, S. (2002). Suicide terrorism in Lebanon. In International Policy Insitute for
Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp. 134-139). New York:
Anti-Defamation League.
Shields, L. B. E., Hunsaker, D. M., Hunsaker, J. C., & Humbert, K. A. (2003).
Nonterrorist suicidal deaths involving explosives. American Journal of Forensic
Medicine and Pathology, 24(2), 107-113.
Shiqaqi, K. (2002). The views of Palestinian society on suicide terrorism. In International
Policy Insitute for Counter-Terrorism (Ed.), Countering suicide terrorism (pp.
155-164). New York: Anti-Defamation League.
Shoemaker, D. J., & Williams, J. S. (1987). The subculture of violence and ethnicity.
Journal of Criminal Justice, 15(6), 461-472.
Shubik, M. (1982). Game theory in the social sciences: Concepts and solutions.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shultz, R. (1978). The limits of terrorism in insurgency warfare. The case of the Viet
Cong. Polity, 11(1), 67-91.
Sigelman, L., & Simpson, M. (1977). A cross-national test of the linkage between
economic inequality and political violence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution,
21(1), 105-128.
Silke, A. (1998). The Lords of discipline: The methods and motives of paramilitary
vigilantism in Northern Ireland. Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 7,
121-156.
Silke, A. (1999). Ragged justice: Loyalist vigilantism in Northern Ireland. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 11(1), 1-31.
Silke, A. (2003). Deindividuation, anonymity, and violence: Findings from Northern
Ireland. The Journal of Social Psychology, 143(4), 493-499.
Simon, J. D. (1987, Summer). Misunderstanding terrorism. Foreign Policy, 67, 104-120.

245

Simpson, G., & Rauch, J. (1993). Political Violence: 1991. In N. Boister & K. FergusonBrown (Eds.), Human Rights Yearbook 1992 (pp. 212-239). Cape Town, South
Africa: Oxford University Press.
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France,
Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, T. (1994). Social revolution in the modern world. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Skocpol, T., & Trimberger, E. R. (1978). Revolutions and the world – Historical
development of capitalism. Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 22, 101-113.
Sloan, S. (1993). US anti-terrorism policies: Lessons to be learned to meet an enduring
and changing threat. Terrorism and Political Violence, 5(1), 105-131.
Slone, M. (2000). Responses to media coverage of terrorism. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 44(4), 508-522.
Slone, M., Lobel, T., & Gilat, I. (1999). Dimensions of the political environment
affecting children’s mental health: An Israeli study. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 43(1), 78-91.
Snyder, D. (1978). Collective violence: A research agenda and some strategic
considerations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22(3), 499-534.
Sommier, I. (2002). ‘Terrorism’ as total violence? Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell
Publishers.
Sontag, F. (1991). Liberation theology and the interpretation of political violence.
Thomist, April, 271-292.
Sorel, G. (1990). Reflexions on violence. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Spencer, J. (1990). Collective violence and everyday practice in Sri Lanka. Modern Asian
Studies, 24(3), 603-623.
Sprinzak, E. (2000c). Rational fanatics. Foreign Policy, 120, 66-73.
Sprinzak, E. (2001). The lone gunmen. Foreign Policy, 127, 72-73.
Starr, H. (1994). Revolution and war: Rethinking the linkage between internal and
external conflict. Political Research Quarterly, 47(2), 481-507.

246

Staub, E. (2003). Notes on cultures of violence, cultures of caring and peace, and the
fulfillment of basic needs. Political Psychology, 24(1), 1-21.
Stavrou, V. (1993). Psychological effects of criminal and political violence on children.
The Child Care Worker, 11(7), 3-9.
Steele, R. W. ( 1985). Propaganda in an open society: The Roosevelt administration and
the media, 1933-1941. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Steger, M. B., & Lind, N. S. (Eds.) (1999). Violence and its alternatives: An
interdisciplinary reader. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.
Stephens, G. (1995). Remodeling collective violence: James Tong’s rational choice
model and the Great Strikes of 1877. Political Research Quarterly, 48(2), 345369.
Stevens, M. J. (2005). What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it?
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 23, 507-526.
Stohl, M. (1975). War and domestic political violence: The case of the United States,
1890-1970. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19(3), 379-416.
Stohl, M. (Ed.) (1979). The politics of terrorism. New York: Marcel Dekker.
Stohl, M. (Ed.) (1988). The politics of terrorism (3rd edition). New York: Marcel Dekker.
Storr, A. (1968). Human aggression. London: Allen Lane.
Stout, C. E. (Ed.) (2002). The psychology of terrorism: Vol. 1-4. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Stout, C. E., & Felthous, A. R. (2005). Introduction to this issue: Terrorism. Behavioral
Science and the Law, 23, 449-450.
Stryker, S. (1987). The vitalization of symbolic interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly,
50(1), 83-94.
Suarez-Orozco, M. M. (1990). Speaking of the unspeakable: Toward a psychological
understanding of responses to terror. Ethos, 18(3), 353-383.
Suicide terrorism: Martyrdom and murder (2004, January 8). The Economist. Retrieved
August 15, 2004, from http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/economist0801.htm
Surette, R. (1998). Media, crime, and criminal justice: Images and realities (2nd edition).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

247

Takeyh, R. (2003). Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony. Middle
East Policy, 10(2), 62-77.
Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. (1994). The new criminology. In J. E. Jacoby (Ed.),
Classics of Criminology (2nd edition) (pp. 96-105). Prospect Heights, IL:
Waveland Press.
Taylor, M. (1988). Rationality and revolutionary collective action. In M. Taylor (Ed.),
Rationality and revolution (pp. 63-97). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor, M. (1993). Rational choice, behavior analysis, and political violence. In R. V.
Clarke and M. Felson, Advances in Criminological Theory (pp. 159-178). New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Taylor, M. C. (1982). Improved conditions, rising expectations, and dissatisfaction: A
test of the past/present relative deprivation hypothesis. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 45(1), 24-33.
Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (1999). The future of terrorism. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 11(4), 1-224.
Testas, A. (2001). The economic causes of Algeria’s political violence. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 13(3), 127-144.
Thackrah, J. R. (1987). Encyclopedia of terrorism and political violence. New York:
Routledge.
Theen, R. H. W. (1972). The idea of the revolutionary state: Tkachev, Trotsky, and
Lenin. Russian Review, 31(4), 383-397.
Thompson, J. L. P. (1989). Deprivation and political violence in Northern Ireland, 19221985: A time-series analysis. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(4), 676-699.
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Timmerman, K. R. (2003). Preachers of hate: Islam and the war on America. New York:
Crown Forum.
Trundle, R. C., Jr. (1996). Has global ethnic conflict superseded cold war ideology?
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19, 93-107.
Tucker, D. (2001). What is new about the new terrorism and how dangerous is it?
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3), 1-14.
248

Tucker, H. H. (Ed.) (1988). Combating the terrorists: Democratic responses to political
violence. New York: Facts on File.
Turk, A. T. (1989). Notes on criminology and terrorism. In W. S. Laufer & F. Adler
(Eds.), Advances in criminological theory: Vol. 1. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers.
Turk, A. T. (2002b). Political violence: Patterns and trends. In R. A. Silverman, T. P.
Thornberry, & B. Krisberg (Eds.), Crime and justice at the Millenium: Essays by
and in honor of Marvin E. Wolfgang (pp. 31-44). Norwell, MA: Kluwer
Academics.
Ultee, W. C. (1996). Do rational choice approaches have problems? European
Sociological Review, 12(2), 167-179.
Valls, A. (2000). Can terrorism be justified? In A. Valls (Ed.), Ethics in international
affairs: Theories and cases (pp. 65-79). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
van Belle, D. A. (2000). Press freedom and global politics. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Van de Voorde, C., & Özeren, S. (2004). Turkish Hizballah: A case study of radical
terrorism. Retrieved January 13, 2005, from http://www.turkishweekly.net
van Ginkel, B. T. (2003). The United Nations: Towards a comprehensive convention on
combating terrorism. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European
experiences, threat perceptions and policies (pp.207-226). The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
van Henten, J. W., & Avemarie, F. (2002). Martyrdom and noble death: Selected texts
from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and Christian Antiquity. London: Routledge.
van Leeuwen, M. (2003a). Confronting terrorism. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting
terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies (pp.1-10). The
Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
van Leeuwen, M. (2003b). Democracy versus terrorism: Balancing security and
fundamental rights. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European
experiences, threat perceptions and policies (pp.227-235). The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
van Manen, M. (1990). Researching lived experience: Human science for an actionsensitive pedagogy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

249

von Tagen, M. (1998). Prisons, peace and terrorism: Penal policy in the reduction of
political violence in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Spanish Basque Country,
1968-97. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Walker, C. (2003). Policy options and priorities: British perspectives. In M. van Leeuwen
(Ed.), Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and
policies (pp.11-36). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Walsh, D. (2003). Irish experiences and perspectives. In M. van Leeuwen (Ed.),
Confronting terrorism: European experiences, threat perceptions and policies
(pp.37-56). The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
Walter, E. V. (1969). Terror and resistance: A study of political violence. London:
Oxford University Press.
Wang, T. Y., Dixon, W. J., Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1993). Inequality and
political violence revisited. The American Political Science Review, 87(4), 979994.
Ward, R. H., & Ezeldin, A. G. (Eds.) (1990). International responses to terrorism: New
initiatives. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Warshay, L. H., & Warshay, D. W. (1986). The individualizaing and subjectivizing of
George Herbert Mead: A sociology of knowledge interpretation. Sociological
Focus, 19(2), 177-188.
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic Content Analysis (2nd edition). Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications.
Weede, E. (1981). Income inequality, average income, and domestic violence. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(4), 639-654.
Weede, E. (1986). Income inequality and political violence reconsidered. American
Sociological Review, 51(3), 438-441.
Weede, E. (1987). Some new evidence on correlates of political violence: Income
inequality, regime repressiveness, and economic development. European
Sociological Review, 3(2), 97-108.
Weede, E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rebellion, violence and revolution: A rational choice
perspective. Journal of Peace Research, 35(1), 43-59.
Weede, E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rebellion, violence and revolution: A rational choice
perspective. Journal of Peace Research, 35(1), 43-59.
250

Weinberg, L. (1991). Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn
to terrorist activities. Comparative Politics, 23(4), 423-438.
Weiner, N. A., Zahn, M. A., & Sagi, R. J. (Eds.) (1990). Violence: Patterns, causes,
public policy. Stamford, CT: International Thomson Publishing.
Weisbrod, B. (2002). Fundamentalist violence: Political violence and political religion in
modern conflict. Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.
Wheelock, A., Haney, W., & Bebell, D. (2000). What can student drawings tell us about
high-stakes testing in Massachusetts? Retrieved October 3, 2003, from
http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentID=10634
White, R. W. (1993). On measuring political violence: Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1980.
American Sociological Review, 58(4), 575-585.
White, R. W. (2000). Issues in the study of political violence: Understanding the motives
of participants in small group political violence. Terrorism and Political Violence,
12(1), 95-108.
White, R. W., & Falkenberg White, T. (1995). Repression and the liberal state: The case
of Northern Ireland, 1969-1972. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(2), 330352.
Wieviorka, M. (1993). The making of terrorism. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Wiktorowicz, Q., & Kaltner, J. (2003). Killing in the name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s
justification for September 11. Middle East Policy, 10(2), 76-94.
Wilkinson, D. Y. (1970). Political assassins and status incongruence: A sociological
interpretation. The British Journal of Sociology, 21(4), 400-412.
Wilkinson, P. (1995). Violence and terror and the extreme right. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 7(4), 82-93.
Williams, G. (1989). J.S. Mill and political violence. Utilitas, 1, 102-111.
Williams, K. R., & Timberlake, M. (1984). Structured inequality, conflict, and control: A
cross-national test of the threat hypothesis. Social Forces, 63(2), 414-432.
Williams, R. M., Jr. (1994). The sociology of ethnic conflicts: Comparative international
perspectives. Annual Review of Sociology, 20, 49-79.
Williamson, R. C. (1965). Toward a theory of political violence: The case of rural
Colombia. The Western Political Quarterly, 18(1), 35-44.
251

Withers, B. (2003). Terrorism and war: Unconscious dynamics of political violence.
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 48(4), 513-514.
Wolcott, H. F. (1990). Writing up qualitative research. London: Sage Publications.
Wolfgang, M. E., & Ferracuti, F. (1982). The subculture of violence: Towards an
integrated theory of criminology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Wood, M., & Wardell, M. L. (1983). G. H. Mead’s social behaviorism vs. the astructural
bias of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic Interaction, 6(1), 85-96.
Wright, L. (2004, August 2). The terror web. The New Yorker. Retrieved December 28,
2004, from http://www.newyorker.com
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd edition). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Zapata, B. C., Rebodello, A., Atalah, E., Newman, B., & King, M. C. (1992). The
influence of social and political violence on the risk of pregnancy complications.
American Journal of Public Health, 82(5), 685-690.
Zawadzki, P. (2002). Working with abhorrent objects: Some moral and epistemological
considerations. Malden, MA: UNESCO/Blackwell Publishers.
Zey, M. (1998). Rational choice theory and organizational theory: A critique. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Zimbardo, P. G. (1970). The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus
deindividuation, impulse, and chaos. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (Eds.), 1969
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 237-307). Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press.
Zulaika, J. (1988). Basque violence: Metaphor and sacrement. Reno, NV: University of
Nevada Press.

252

Appendices

253

Appendix A: Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2005)
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Ansar al-Islam
5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
6. Asbat al-Ansar
7. Aum Shinrikyo
8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
10. Continuity Irish Republican Army
11. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
13. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
14. Hizballah (Party of God)
15. Islamic Jihad Group
16. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
17. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
18. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
19. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
20. Kahane Chai (Kach)
21. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
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23. Lashkar i Jhangvi
24. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
25. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
26. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
27. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
28. National Liberation Army (ELN)
29. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
31. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)
32. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
33. al-Qa’ida
34. Real IRA
35. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
36. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
37. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
38. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
39. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
40. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
41. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly
Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
42. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are
designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight
against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities
and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Identification
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department
(S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to
identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks
not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the
group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or
retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation
Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record,"
which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open
sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been
satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the
Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the
designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period
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and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the
designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes
effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the
designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not
later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.
Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every two years
or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain
review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for
revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most
recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent
petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO
must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are
sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted
during a five year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is
required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate.
In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding
that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a
manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States
warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by
the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act
of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.
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Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212
(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the
economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation
1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a
designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2)
provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching
258

Appendix A: (Continued)
designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or
assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge.’’
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are
inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States
(see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or
control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must
retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to
do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named
organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.
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* Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA defines "terrorist activity" to mean: "any activity
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or
any State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft,
vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined
in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of
such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one
or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing."
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Other pertinent portions of section 212(a)(3)(B) are set forth below:
(iv) Engage in Terrorist Activity Defined
As used in this chapter [chapter 8 of the INA], the term ‘engage in terrorist activity’
means in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization–
1.

to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;

2.

to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;

3.

to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;

4.

to solicit funds or other things of value for–

(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can
demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
solicitation would further the organization’s terrorist activity;
I.

to solicit any individual–

(aa) to engage in conduce otherwise described in this clause;
(bb) for membership in terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless
the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the solicitation would further the organization’s terrorist
activity; or
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II.

to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training–

(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor can
demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act
would further the organization’s terrorist activity.
This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien afforded to an
organization or individual that has committed terrorist activity, if the Secretary of State,
after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation
with the Secretary of State, concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion, that that this
clause should not apply."

(v) Representative Defined
As used in this paragraph, the term ‘representative’ includes an officer, official, or
spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or
induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity.
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(i) Terrorist Organization Defined
As used in clause (i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term ‘terrorist organization’ means an
organization-I. designated under section 219 [8 U.S.C. § 1189];
II. otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of
State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General, as a terrorist
organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities described
in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv), or that the organization provides
material support to further terrorist activity; or
III. that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages
in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv).

** Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989 defines "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

Source: United States Department of State, 2005 (http://www.state.gov)
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Appendix B: Suicide Terrorism Grant Questions
1. To what extent does your work expose you to or require you to deal with the
phenomenon of suicide terrorism?
2. Suicide terrorism is not a sui generis phenomenon, but an integral feature of the
historical development of oppositional terrorism worldwide. It is usually the result
of an assortment of typical tactics, goals, and motives characteristic of more
conventional terrorism. Should the same tactics and policies that have been
implemented to fight terrorism in general be applied to suicide terrorism? Why /
Why not?
3. If you answered “yes” to Question 2, how do you suggest the same policies be
applied to both dimensions? If you answered “no,” how would you develop
policies to specifically and effectively target suicide terrorism?
4. Suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon either. It is rooted in the historical,
social, and psychological dimensions of international terrorism, as a result of
centuries of opposition between various terrorist groups and their actual or
perceived enemies. How can governments, non-governmental organizations
(NGO’s), and other entities efficiently and effectively take all these different
dimensions of suicide terrorism into account?
5. Suicide terror operations are politically motivated violent attacks perpetrated by
self-aware individuals who actively and purposely cause their own death by
blowing themselves up along with their chosen target(s). How can the inherently
political nature of the problem be addressed?
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6. Suicide terrorism has become one of the most spectacular and dreadful weapons
available to terrorists (along with blowing up airplanes in mid air and using
weapons of mass destruction). How high of a priority is suicide terrorism in your
agency/country today?
7. If applicable, how has your country addressed the problem of suicide terrorism
thus far?
8. If applicable, has your agency/organization compiled a database of past suicide
terror attacks? If so, how has it been used?
9. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, how
prepared would you (i.e., as an agency or a country) be to respond to the critical
incident and manage its outcomes?
10. If a suicide terror attack occurred in your jurisdiction or country next week, what
protocols would be set into motion in order to respond to and recover from the
incident?
11. Has there been any attempt in your country at training first responders and law
enforcement personnel in general to respond specifically to suicide terror attacks
(at the local, regional or national level)?
12. About fifteen religious or secular terrorist groups have used or are capable of
using suicide terrorism against their own governments and foreign governments.
How important is it to adapt antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies to the
secular or religious nature of the terrorist group resorting to suicide terrorism?
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13. How should antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies be tailored to fit the
nature of the threat?
14. One of the distinctive characteristics of suicide terrorism is the motive of
individual self-sacrifice and martyrdom. How can these two elements be
specifically addressed in developing and enforcing policies to counter and prevent
suicide terrorism?
15. How can strategies and policies be formulated and enforced in order to address
the issue of suicide terrorism at the micro- (individual), meso- (group), and
macro- (societal) levels?
16. Should these levels be clearly identified and autonomously targeted by these
antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies or policies? Why / Why not?
17. Suicide terrorism represents a substantial intensification of a group’s terrorist
activity. Suicide terrorism is difficult to combat; it results in high casualty tolls
and often inspires considerable religious and/or ideological zeal. When suicide
terrorism is associated with religious extremism, what kind of strategies and
public policies do you suggest be created/implemented?
18. Secular groups may also resort to suicide bombings in their terrorist campaigns.
Two examples are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and
KONGRA-GEL (former PKK) in Turkey. The latter has stopped using suicide
terrorism as a tactic, whereas the LTTE is still the world leader in suicide
terrorism. Given the context of the Kurdish issue, why do you think a group like
PKK/KONGRA-GEL gave up?
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19. What policies could be enforced in order to incite a secular group (e.g., the LTTE)
to stop using suicide terrorism and ultimately cease resorting to terrorism in
general?
20. Suicide terror attacks are either battlefield operations (e.g., Japanese Kamikazes
during WWII, “enemy combatants” in Iraq in the past few months) or off-thebattlefield operations involving single suicide bombers and sometimes even
multiple suicide bombers (e.g., Hamas, LTTE). Should strategies and policies be
different depending on the type of operations concerned?
21. Or should they be applicable to both but flexible enough to adapt to the kind of
operations a region/country may face?
22. The targets of suicide terror operations are generally varied. They can be either
stationary or mobile, human beings or infrastructures; their nature can be civilian,
military, political, economic, or cultural. How can comprehensive strategies be
developed to include all potential targets?
23. What are the practical risks involved in creating and implementing such wideranging strategies (cost, paranoia, etc.)?
24. The high number of casualties in suicide attacks warrants worldwide media
coverage, which guarantees suicide terrorist groups exposure on the international
scene. How may media coverage affect the effectiveness and potential of
antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies?
25. In light of current or recent events, should the role of the mass media be
downplayed or enhanced?
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26. The participation of women in suicide terrorism, though not a new feature, is an
increasing phenomenon that has compelled authorities to react accordingly (e.g.,
by adapting their profiling techniques). How can preventive and operational
strategies address this particular issue?
27. Can criminal/psychological profiling be an effective tool in the fight against
suicide terrorism? Why / Why not?
28. The primary purpose of contemporary suicide terrorism is to cause maximum
physical damage and subsequently paralyze entire populations with overwhelming
fear and angst. This guarantees the devastating, negative psychological effect of
the impromptu operations (traumatic stressors) not only on the direct victims of
the attacks, but also on entire populations. What policies exist in your country to
address the psychological consequences or overall mental health outcomes of
suicide terrorism?
•

Primary victims (individuals directly exposed to the elements of the
suicide terror attack, who experienced the life-threatening situation
personally)

•

Secondary victims (close family members and personal friends of the
primary victims)

•

Tertiary victims (individuals whose occupation demand they respond to
the attack)

•

Quaternary victims (displaced workers, as well as sensitive and caring
members of communities in and beyond the directly impacted areas)
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29. Suicide terrorism is not a domestic problem affecting certain countries, but an
international phenomenon that endangers the safety of entire populations. How
important is it for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to communicate,
share intelligence and expertise, and expand their existing cooperation?
30. Several terrorist groups have been building worldwide networks to mainly ensure
their logistical growth and financial stability. Should uniform international
policies be formulated and enforced in order to: (a) freeze the financial assets of
terrorist groups; (b) prohibit fundraising in the name of religious or social goals to
actually finance terrorist operations or propaganda activities?
31. Should uniform international policies be formulated and enforced in order to
prohibit governments from sponsoring or actively participating in terrorism and
suicide terrorism?
32. What kind of new technologies and tactics could be developed to counter suicide
terrorism at the international level?
33. How should existing special counterterrorist units (task forces) be strengthened?
34. Should international funds be allotted to conduct more research on countering
suicide terrorism?
35. Additional comments.
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The Terrorist Threat Integration Center
In his January 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced a new
initiative to better protect America by continuing to close the “seam” between analysis of
foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.
The President announced that he had instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, the
Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland
Security and Defense to develop the Nation’s first unified Terrorist Threat Integration
Center. This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected
domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has been working together and
sharing information like never before. The creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center is the next phase in the dramatic enhancement of the government’s
counterterrorism effort. The President has now directed his senior advisors to take the
next step in ensuring that intelligence information from all sources is shared, integrated,
and analyzed seamlessly -- and then acted upon quickly.
The Administration will ensure that this program is carried out consistently with the
rights of Americans.
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The New Terrorist Threat Integration Center
Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division, the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense will form a
Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to
terrorism.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will continue to close the “seam” between
analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.
Specifically, it will:
•

Optimize use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and capabilities to
conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.

•

Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines.

•

Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order
to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.

•

Be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for our
national leadership.

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will be headed by a senior U.S. Government
official, who will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. This individual will be
appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
FBI and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will play a lead role in overseeing a national
counterterrorism tasking and requirements system and for maintaining shared databases.
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The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will also maintain an up-to-date database of
known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to federal and non-federal officials
and entities, as appropriate.
In order to carry out its responsibilities effectively, the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center will have access to all intelligence information -- from raw reports to finished
analytic assessments -- available to the U.S. Government.
A senior multiagency team will finalize the details, design, and implementation
strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

Transforming the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immediately after September 11, the President directed the FBI and the Attorney
General to make preventing future terrorist attacks against the homeland their top priority
-- and they have responded.
The FBI has:
•

Disrupted terrorist plots on U.S. soil.

•

Established 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces across America, with full
participation from, and enhanced communications with, multiple federal, state,
and local agencies.

•

Created a National Joint Terrorism Task Force at FBI Headquarters.

•

Established a 24-7 Counterterrorism Watch center.

•

Created new counterterrorism “Flying Squads” to deploy into the field at a
moment’s notice.
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•

Created Intelligence Reports Offices to facilitate the vital flow of information.

•

Trained new analysts for the Counterterrorism Division, using a curriculum
developed with assistance from the CIA.

The FBI is establishing an intelligence program to ensure that the collection and
dissemination of intelligence is given the same institutional priority as the collection of
evidence for prosecution. A new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence will have
direct authority and responsibility for the FBI’s national intelligence program. The FBI is
establishing intelligence units in all of its Field Offices.
The FBI is implementing a revolutionary new data management system to ensure that
it shares all the FBI’s terrorism-related information internally and with the CIA, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies.
Last year, by enacting the USA PATRIOT Act, the President and Congress took an
important step to enhance the ability of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to
investigate and prosecute terrorism, and to share information with other government
agencies.

Enhancing CIA’s Counterterrorism Capabilities
Counterterrorism is a long-standing priority of the CIA and the CIA has been pivotal to
the major successes in America’s War on Terror. The CIA has:
•

Disrupted dozens of planned terrorist attacks around the world.

•

Continued to expand our insight into terrorist organizations and plans.

•

Greatly enhanced its working relationships with foreign partners.
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Since September 11, 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence has dramatically
redeployed analysts and operatives against the terrorist target. He has:
Doubled the size of the Counterterrorist Center.
Quadrupled the number of personnel engaged in counterterrorism analysis.
Detailed 25 experienced analysts to work side by side with their counterparts at FBI.
The DCI created the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for
Homeland Security to ensure timely, effective and secure flow of intelligence to agencies
engaged in Homeland Security.

A Key Role for the Department of Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security will add critical new capabilities in the area of
information analysis and infrastructure protection.
The Department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate will:
•

Perform comprehensive vulnerability assessments of the Nation’s critical
infrastructure and key assets.

•

Receive and analyze terrorism-related information from the Terrorism Threat
Integration Center, as well as open sources, the public, private industry, state and
local law enforcement, and the entire federal family.

•

Map the threats against our vulnerabilities, in order to develop a comprehensive
picture of the terrorist threat and our ability to withstand it.
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•

Take and facilitate action to protect against identified threats, remedy
vulnerabilities, and preempt and disrupt terrorist threats, as consistent with the
operational authorities of the Department’s constituent agencies.

•

Set national priorities for infrastructure protection, strategically designed to
maximize the return on the investment.

•

Take a lead role in issuing warnings, threat advisories, and recommended
response measures to America’s public safety agencies, elected officials, industry,
and the public.

The Department will be a full partner in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will help the Department perform its critical
missions. It will provide the Department with a full and comprehensive picture of the
terrorist threat that will inform the actions of the Department.
Some of the Department’s functions are expected to be performed at the new facility
housing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The integration of elements of the
Department into the Terrorist Threat Integration Center will ensure an unimpeded twoway flow of terrorist threat information.
The Department of Homeland Security, working hand in hand with the FBI, will be
responsible for ensuring that threat information, including information produced by the
Center, is disseminated quickly to the public, private industry, and state and local
governments as appropriate.
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Contributions of the Department of Defense
The Department of Defense has been a key player in the global war on terrorism,
including prosecuting the war on terrorism overseas. Intelligence elements of the
Department, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, continue to make crucial contributions to our
terrorism intelligence collection overseas.
Appropriate DOD intelligence elements will participate fully in the TTIC, providing
information, receiving information, and contributing to analytic efforts, under their own
current authorities.
DOD will have no new operational authority or responsibility under the President's
announced program. The TTIC does not involve new activities by DOD; rather, it seeks
to maximize and "fuse" the efforts of all of our counterterrorism intelligence efforts, as
has been called for by many experts on both sides of the aisle.

Source: U.S. Department of State, 2003 (http://www.state.gov)
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Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies
The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We remain a nation at risk to terrorist
attacks and will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all Threat Conditions, we
must remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following Threat
Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat
Condition are some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal
departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate
agency-specific Protective Measures:

1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist
attacks.
Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in
addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:
•

Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;

•

Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory
System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and

•

Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are
regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable
measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
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2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is declared when there is a general risk of
terrorist attacks.
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to
the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
•

Checking communications with designated emergency response or command
locations;

•

Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and

•

Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act
appropriately.

3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a
significant risk of terrorist attacks.
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to
the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
•

Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;

•

Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further
refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and

•

Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.
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4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of
terrorist attacks.
In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal
departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to
the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
•

Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces
organizations;

•

Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering
alternative venues or even cancellation;

•

Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site
or dispersing their workforce; and

•

Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.

5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks.
Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not
intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective
Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also
should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific
Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
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•

Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;

•

Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing
specially trained teams or resources;

•

Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and

•

Closing public and government facilities.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (http://www.dhs.gov)
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